Where the execution of the release is not in dispute, the party attacking the release bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. Anselmo v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Jenkins v. Simmons, 472 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Mo. 1971) (stating that "where the execution of release purporting to rest on a consideration is admitted the burden is on the plaintiff to prove some invalidity in the release").

The district court then determined that Gleason should be deemed to have accepted Avon's offer as a matter of law because he signed and returned Markovits' August 25, 1983 letter and accepted the benefits it outlined. The district court determined that under Missouri law, even a forced resignation is not inconsistent with a binding settlement of an employment controversy, see Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 595 F. Supp. 541, 549-51 (W.D.Mo. 1984), and that the necessary intention to settle may be inferred as a matter of law when a party accepts a benefit intended to resolve a dispute, even under words of protest. Milgram Food Stores v. Gelco Corp., 550 F. Supp. 992, 996-97 (W.D.Mo. 1982) (quoting Henderson, 483 S.W.2d at 768).

(4) An absence of any justification or insufficient justification for the defendant's act.Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo.Ct.App. 1988); Lohse v. St. Louis Children's Hospital, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Mo.Ct.App. 1983); see also Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 548 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs have not plead "the element of absence of justification or insufficient justification."

HGP responds, and the district court agreed, that the paper only establishes Baum's projected salary and benefits over a three-year period, which is not a "contractual undertaking" to employ Baum for three years. See Anselmo v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. 595 F.Supp. 541, 547 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). HGP invokes the Missouri cases holding that, if an employment document does not specify a duration, the relationship is at-will.

(3) Courts may also use the word "waiver" as a way of insisting that an individual forego protection which he says that he does not wish to give up but which he has agreed to give up in the past. See, e.g., Schmid v. National Bank of Greece, 622 F. Supp. 704, 714-15 (D.Mass. 1985) (enforcing contractual release of right to sue other party), aff'd, 802 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1986); Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 549-51 (W.D.Mo. 1984) (enforcing contractual release of right to sue, and encouraging settlements incorporating such releases), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Wilhelm v. Baxter, 436 F. Supp. 1322, 1326-27 (S.D.Ill. 1977) (finding purchase of liability insurance to waive local government's immunity from suit). (4) Finally, courts sometimes insist that an individual forego protection that he does not wish to give up, in order to avoid unfairness to others, such as adversaries in litigation who might suffer harm were a factfinder to be misled, say, by a partial disclosure of relevant information.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge. Jerome Anselmo appeals from the district court's order granting Manufacturers Life Insurance Company's (Manu-Life) motion for summary judgment in his action against Manu-Life for breach of an employment contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Anselmo contends that the district court, 595 F. Supp. 541, erred in ruling that a release of claims executed by Anselmo, in favor of Manu-Life, barred all claims in this action. Anselmo claims that the release was invalid because it was executed under duress.

It went on to hold that the plaintiff could not pursue a § 1981 claim against a party that was not a party to an employment contract between the plaintiff and another defendant. Under established Missouri law, unless there is a contract which provides for either a term of employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged, the employee is considered an "at-will" employee and may be discharged from employment without cause or reason.Paul v. Farmland Industries, 37 F.3d 1274, 1277 (8th Cir. 1994); Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 546-47 (W.D.Mo. 1984) aff'd 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Luethans v. Washington University, 894 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. 1995); Porter v. Reardon Machine Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 936-37 (Mo.App. 1998); Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing Services, 954 S.W.2d 383, 389 (Mo.App. 1997); Adcock v. Newtec, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Mo.App. 1996); Clark v. Washington University, 906 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Mo.App. 1995); Fields v. R.S.C.D.B., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Mo.App. 1993); Kaskowitz v. Commerce Magazine, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Mo.App. 1990). The Missouri Supreme Court has made it clear that a statement of duration is "an essential element to an employment contract".

A release is a valid defense to subsequent lawsuits involving the same issues and the same parties or those in privity. Thurman v. City of Lake St. Louis, 24 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1994); Anselmo v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 550 (W.D.Mo.), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). A release must be "freely executed without deception or coercion" and made with complete understanding of one's rights.

Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1070, 1086 (E.D.Mo. 1990), aff'd without opinion, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1963, 118 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992). Voluntary settlement of a dispute accompanied by a release avoids the expense of litigation, promotes certainty for the parties, and relieves a strained judicial system; therefore, settlement agreements should be encouraged. Anselmo v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 551 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985). Settlement agreements are contracts and as such, they are subject to general rules of contract construction.

The letter from Hale to Nargi does not fulfill the writing requirement for the statute of frauds (and neither party claims that it does) because the letter omits the duration of Nargi's employment, an essential term to the contract in view of the dispute between the parties. For three cases in which employer's letters set forth the terms of employment but omitted the duration of employment, and thus failed to satisfy the statute of frauds, see Rubin v. Rudolf Wolff Commodity Brokers, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 258, 260 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (applying the Illinois statute of frauds); Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 541, 546-47 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying the Missouri statute of frauds); Lewis v. Finetex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 12, 13-14 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying the South Carolina statute of frauds). CaMac asserts that any oral promises alleged by Nargi are barred by the statute of frauds.