Opinion
22-CV-6019 (JSR) (BCM) 21-CR-88 (JSR)
02-18-2024
LORD ANING, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF
BARBARA MOSES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Petitioner Lord Aning, proceeding pro se, moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 24-month prison sentence, imposed after he pled guilty in this Court to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. See Mot. to Vacate a Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Mot.) (Dkt. 1); Judgment (US v. Aning, Dkt. 74) at 2.Petitioner seeks credit for "time served" while on pretrial release prior to entering his guilty plea. Mot. at ECF p. 5. For the reasons that follow, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be denied. I. BACKGROUND
Citations to "Dkt." are to filings in No. 22-CV-6019. Citations to "US v. Aning, Dkt." are to filings in the underlying criminal case, No. 21-CR-88.
A. Factual Background
On February 10, 2021, petitioner, along with three others, was indicted on charges of (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, (2) wire fraud, (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering, (4) conspiracy to receive stolen money, and (5) receipt of stolen money. US v. Aning, Dkt. 2.
After his arrest, petitioner made his initial appearance in this District before the Hon. Debra C. Freeman, United States Magistrate Judge, on March 29, 2021. US v. Aning, Dkt. 26. Petitioner was granted bail on the following conditions: he and three "financially responsible persons" were required to sign a $500,000 personal recognizance bond; his travel was restricted to this District, the Eastern District of New York, the District of New Jersey, and the Eastern District of Virginia; he was required to surrender his passport; he was subject to pretrial supervision as directed by Pretrial Services (PTS); he was required to continue or seek employment; he was prohibited from contact with his co-defendants and any victims or witnesses identified by the Government (except in the presence of counsel); he was barred from applying for or opening any new bank accounts or lines of credit without prior approval of PTS; he was required to disclose all current bank accounts and lines of credit to PTS; he was not permitted to possess any personally identifying information of others; he could not access the internet or possess computers or other devices that do so, except as required for employment and approved and monitored by PTS; and he was required to disclose these restrictions to his family and roommates. Id. On April 1, 2021, petitioner and his codefendants were arraigned, id., Dkt. 30, and petitioner's bond was entered. Id., Dkt. 32.
The next day, the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge, issued an order modifying the conditions of petitioner's release, adding a curfew from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and location monitoring as directed by PTS, due to the "limited net worth" of the three individuals who co-signed petitioner's bond. US v. Aning, Dkt. 31. Judge Rakoff modified the conditions of petitioner's release again on April 21, 2021, allowing him computer and internet access, monitored by PTS. Id., Dkt. 33. Petitioner's conditions of release were modified yet again on September 20, 2021, when Judge Rakoff permitted him to travel to Maryland for a wedding on September 26, 2021. Id., Dkt. 47.
On October 15, 2021, petitioner pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment (conspiracy to commit wire fraud). US v. Aning, Dkt. 52. The plea was entered pursuant to a Plea Agreement (Plea Ag.) dated August 4 and signed September 20, 2021. See Def. Opp. (Dkt. 9) Ex. A (ECF pp. 6-11). In that document, petitioner agreed, among other things, that he would not seek any departure from the "Stipulated Guidelines Range" for the offense to which he pled guilty, which was 51 to 63 months' imprisonment. Plea Ag. at 3. He further agreed that he would not "file a direct appeal; nor bring a collateral challenge, including but not limited to an application under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 and/or Section 2241; nor seek a sentence modification pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3528(c), of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 51 to 63 months' imprisonment[.]" Id. at 4. This condition was "binding on the parties even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis different from that stipulated herein." Id.
On February 28, 2022, petitioner was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment on Count One, followed by three years of supervised release. Judgment, at 2. In accordance with the Plea Agreement, the remaining counts against him were dismissed. Id. at 1.
B. Procedural Background
Petitioner, who is serving his sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, filed his Motion on July 12, 2022, arguing that from April 2021 until April 12, 2022, he was under "home detention," and should get credit against his sentence for his time served on home detention. Mot. at ECF p. 5. Petitioner argues that, during this time, "he was not allow[ed] to work, [p]rogram, or any other movement"; that he was "confined to a small [a]partment on a constant [b]asis, with around the clock 'surveillance'"; and that his movements were restricted, as "any trips to the outside world were only made with the express [a]pproval of the official Court." Id. This is the only argument he raises, and the only relief he seeks is "credit for time on monitor/home detention." Id. at ECF p. 13.
Judge Rakoff referred this matter to me for report and recommendation on September 9, 2022. (Dkt. 2.) I issued an Order to Answer on September 16, 2022, giving the Government 60 days to file an answer or other pleading in response to the Motion. (Dkt. 4.)
On October 13, 2022, without waiting for the Government's filing, petitioner filed a one-page "motion" (Dkt. 6) making the same arguments as in his original Motion, accompanied by a declaration (Aning Decl.) (Dkt. 7) in support of the motion. Petitioner attests that he was "only allowed to go to church and to the hospital only with permission from the court or a pre-trial officer." Aning Decl. at 2. The Government filed an opposition letter-brief on November 16, 2022, arguing (1) that petitioner waived his right to any collateral attack on his sentence in his Plea Agreement, and (2) that in any event, petitioner's pretrial release conditions did not constitute detention. Def. Opp. at 2-3. Petitioner did not file a reply.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 2255
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, "a federal prisoner may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence, or that sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Coffield v. United States, 2016 WL 8737575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)) (internal punctuation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1383814 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2017) (Rakoff, J.). Relief under § 2255 is available "only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 2255(b) requires that a hearing on a motion take place, "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief[.]" Smith v. United States, 2020 WL 13065428, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Smith v. USA, 2022 WL 443631 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022). As in other contexts, a petitioner's pro se status requires that the Court liberally construe his Motion and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. Id.
B. Petitioner Waived His Right to Collaterally Attack His Sentence
It is "well-settled" that a criminal defendant's "knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal a sentence within an agreed upon guideline range is enforceable." Benton v. United States, 2022 WL 16722399, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2022) (quoting United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Coffield, 2016 WL 8737575, at *3 ("Waivers of the right to appeal a sentence are presumptively enforceable.") (quoting United States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010)). A criminal defendant "who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence" cannot "then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement," as such a rule would "render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless." United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). The record must clearly demonstrate that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, which "can be established by demonstrating that during the plea hearing the defendant's attention was drawn to the waiver provision in the plea agreement." Coffield, 2016 WL 8737575, at *3.
In his Plea Agreement, petitioner expressly waived his right to mount a collateral attack on his sentence. The agreement states that "the defendant will not file a direct appeal; nor bring a collateral challenge, including but not limited to an application under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 . . . of any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 51 to 63 months' imprisonment[.]" Plea Ag. at 4. This language unambiguously waives petitioner's right to challenge his 24-month sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Smith, 2020 WL 13065428, at *6 (finding that the waiver in petitioner's plea agreement, which stated that the petitioner "will not file a direct appeal; nor bring a collateral challenge, including but not limited to an application under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 . . . of any sentence at or below the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence of 70 to 76 months' imprisonment," was an "independent basis for denial of his motion" when petitioner received a sentence of 70 months imprisonment).
Here, petitioner was sentenced to 24 months. Even if he had already "served" 13 months, as he claims, the total time served would come to 37 months, which is well below the Stipulated Guidelines Range (51-63 months) set forth in his Plea Agreement.
Petitioner does not argue that his waiver was anything other than knowing and voluntary. Nor would the record support such an argument. During petitioner's plea allocution on November 9, 2021, Judge Rakoff asked him whether he read the plea agreement before signing it, discussed it with his lawyer, understood its terms, and signed it "in order to indicate [his] agreement to its terms[.]" US v. Aning, Dkt. 55 (10/15/21 Tr.), at 9-10. Petitioner responded "yes" to each question. Id. After walking through the various terms and conditions of the agreement, Judge Rakoff asked petitioner, "do you understand that if I do sentence you to 63 months or less, then under your agreement with the government, you have agreed not to appeal or otherwise collaterally attack your sentence? Do you understand that?" Id. at 11. Petitioner responded, "Yes, Your Honor." Id. Thus, petitioner affirmed under oath that he was aware of the waiver, discussed it with his lawyer, and understood its meaning. See Coffield, 2016 WL 8737575, at *4 (finding that petitioner's waiver of collateral attacks on his sentence was knowing and voluntary where petitioner "stated under oath that he had read the agreement, reviewed it with counsel, understood its contents, and was willing to be bound by its terms").
Petitioner sought the benefits of entering into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to only one charge, rather than face trial on all five charges against him. He cannot now seek relief from the bargained-for sentence that he received in exchange for that plea. See Northover v. United States, 2019 WL 6173704, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2019) ("Having gained the benefit of the bargain from the Plea Agreement, Petitioner now cannot collaterally attack the conditions on which that benefit was given.... The Petition is thus dismissed as waived."). As a result, petitioner's Motion should be denied.
C. Petitioner's Pre-Trial Conditions of Release Did Not Constitute Time Served
Even if petitioner had not waived his right to collaterally attack a sentence within the range set forth in his Plea Agreement, his Motion would be meritless. Petitioner seeks credit for "time served" on "home detention" during approximately the approximately one-year period when his conditions of pretrial release included a curfew (from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.), travel restrictions (limiting him to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, the District of New Jersey, and the Eastern District of Virginia), and electronic location monitoring. Mot. at ECF pp. 5, 13.He reiterates in his declaration that he "seeks credit for time served against my sentence as a result of a pre-trial conditional release in which I was under home confinement." Aning Decl. at 2.
Petitioner's pretrial conditions did not actually include "home detention," which would have been more restrictive than the conditions about which petitioner now complains.
The Bail Reform Act requires that a defendant "be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences." Lewis v. United States, 2012 WL 2394810, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)). It is well-settled that pre-trial release, even if it includes "home confinement," does not constitute "official detention," and does not qualify as time in prison for which a criminal defendant may receive credit for time served. See United States v. Pjetri, 2014 WL 6851280, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014) ("The time spent by defendant on home confinement with electronic monitoring as part of his bail conditions does not qualify as 'official detention,' and he is not entitled to credit toward his federal sentence for that time."); Kaiser v. United States, 20 F.Supp.3d 301, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[T]ime spent in home confinement is generally not considered to be time in prison for which the defendant is afforded credit.") (collecting cases). Petitioner's claim for relief in the form of credit applied to his current sentence thus lacks merit, and his Motion should be denied without an evidentiary hearing. See King v. United States, 2017 WL 1483337, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017) (denying motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in part because "[t]he Court was not required to afford the petitioner any credit for the time that she had spent in home confinement").
III. CONCLUSION
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to mount a collateral attack on his sentence, including one brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Even if had not waived that right, his Motion would fail on the merits, as his pre-trial release conditions, including a curfew, travel restrictions, and electronic monitoring, did not constitute "official detention" for which a criminal defendant may receive credit for time served. Consequently, I recommend, respectfully, that the Motion be denied.