Opinion
2:22-CV-01772-SPB-RAL
08-15-2023
BRYAN ANGLE II, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY LITTLE, SUPERINTENDENT ARMEL, DEPUTY WALKER, DEPUTY TREMPUS, CCPM HAWKINBERRY, MAJOR HAWKINBERRY, U.M. RIDDLE, CAPT WALKER, C.O. SHAW, C.O. FARRELL, SGT DOBISH, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
ECF NO. 8
RICHARD A. LANZILLO Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' partial motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 8) be GRANTED. It is further respectfully recommended that the claims of the Complaint not challenged in Defendants' motion also be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
IL Report
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Brian Angle II (“Angle”), an inmate previously in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) at its State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette), commenced this pro se civil rights action by filing a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County against former DOC Secretary George Little and the following current or former employees at SCI-Fayette: Superintendent Armel, Deputy Walker, Deputy Trempus, CCPM Hawkinberry, Major Hawkinberry, U.M. Riddle, Captain Walker, C.O Shaw, C.O. Farrell, and Sgt. Dobish. ECF Nos. 1-1. Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges generally that Defendants violated Angle's “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution” by retaliating against him for his having filed injunctive motions in two other open cases with this Court. As relief, the Complaint demands monetary damages, declaratory relief, and “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation” and mandating Angle's release “from the R.H.U./gang unit.” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 16.
Angle was released from DOC custody on April 11, 2023. See ECF No. 25. See also Inmate/Parolee Locator, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gOv/#/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2023).
Certain of the individuals named as Defendants may be duplicative.
Angle v. Montag, l:21-cv-252 and Angle v. Smith et al., l:22-cv-33.
Defendants moved to dismiss certain of Angle's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Despite multiple extensions of time to do so, Angle has not filed a brief in opposition to the motion. ECF Nos. 11, 22. Accordingly, the Court will address the pending motion without the benefit of Angle's response. In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court will also review the sufficiency of the claims asserted in the Complaint that have not been expressly challenged by Defendants' motion.
As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, Angle has not notified the Court of any change of address despite reminders from the Court of his “continuing obligation to keep the Court informed of [his] address.” ECF Nos. 22, 33. See also 1:22-cv-00033, ECF No. 50.
B. Factual Allegations of the Complaint
Angle was transferred to SCI-Fayette on March 17, 2022. Thereafter, Defendants allegedly learned that Angle had filed motions for injunctive relief in two other cases. On April 20, 2022, “[D]efendants 2-8 retaliated by destroying official documents verifying that [he] completed the special management unit,” “refused to allow [Angle] out of the [Restricted Housing Unit],” “and then placed [Angle] on the security threat group management unit.” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 6. The Complaint alleges that the next day, “Shaw and Farrell sexually harassed and physically assaulted [Angle],” although it does not describe the nature or specific conduct of the sexual harassment or the physical assault. The Complaint next alleges that the following day “Farrell lied to other prisoners (gang members) saying that [Angle] was a ‘rat, fagot, and a pedophile' in a deliberate attempt to put him at risk of violence.” Id., ¶¶ 8, 9. When Angle attempted to “grieve[] these issues perpetrated by COS [sic] Shaw and Farrell they put a hit out on [him].” Id., ¶ 10.
The Complaint further alleges that on May 31, 2022, “Dobish filed a false misconduct against [Angle] so [he] would be restricted from his legal work and to retaliate against [him] for his lawsuits.” Id., ¶ 11. And on June 7, Walker refused to return Angle's “clothing, bedding, and legal work” and denied him his showers, even though “his restrictions were done.” Id., ¶ 12.
C. Standard of Review
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
Finally, because Angle is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's complaint to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).
2. Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Because Angle seeks redress from governmental employees and was a prisoner proceeding pro se at the time he filed his Complaint, this Action is also subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Sanchez, 2014 WL 7392400, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) (citing Stackhouse v. Crocker, 266 Fed.Appx. 189, 190 (3d Cir. 2008). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to assess a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review. . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”). That statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, or (3) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D 'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) instructs the court to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1)is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief”.
D. Analysis
Defendants' motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of the claims against eight of the eleven Defendants solely based on the Complaint's failure to allege facts to support their personal involvement in actionable conduct. Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned will also address whether Angle has stated a cognizable claim against any Defendant.
1. The Complaint fails to demonstrate Defendant Little's personal involvement.
In order to prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Markv. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is axiomatic that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's “personal involvement” in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Gould v. Wetzel, 2013 WL 5697866, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2013). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of allegations of fact demonstrating that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Defendants argue that Angle has failed to demonstrate the personal involvement of Secretary Little, Superintendent Armel, Deputy Walker, Deputy Trempus, CCPM Hawkinberry, Major Hawkinberry, UM Riddle, and Captain Walker because he “has not made any factual allegations in the Complaint against” them. ECF No. 9, p. 3. Defendants correctly observe that “[t]he only individuals specifically named in the Complaint as committing any sort of action against Plaintiff' are Shaw, Farrell, and Dobish. ECF No. 9, p. 1. However, Defendants overlook Angle's designation of “Defendants 2-8,” who Angle lists and identifies in the Caption of the Complaint as: Superintendent Armel, Deputy Walker, Trempus, CCPM Hawkinberry, Major Hawkinberry, U.M. Riddle, and Capt. Walker. See ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 6. The Complaint's numeric identification of Defendants Armel, Deputy Walker, Trempus, CCPM Hawkinberry, Major Hawkinberry, Riddle, and Captain Walker sufficiently relates each to conduct alleged in the Complaint and upon which he bases his claim. The Complaint does not allege any acts or omissions on the part of Secretary Little and, therefore, does not support his personal involvement.
2. The claims against the remaining Defendants should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
a. The allegations do not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against any Defendant.
Although the Complaint alleges that various Defendants engaged in conduct affecting Angle, these allegations fall far short of supporting the essential elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim against any Defendant. The First Amendment prohibits prison officials from retaliating against prisoners for their engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). To support a retaliation claim, a prisoner must produce evidence that (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) prison officials took an adverse action against the plaintiff that was “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights”; and (3) “a causal link” exists “between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original). See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
For purposes of a retaliation claim, an “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). This requirement is not demanding: “unless the claimed retaliatory action is truly ‘inconsequential,' the plaintiffs claim should go to the jury.” Id. (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)).
To show that retaliatory motive caused the adverse action, the plaintiff may rely on direct evidence or an inference of retaliatory motive arising from either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). “These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)).
“If a prisoner establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to prison officials to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ‘they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.'” See Cooper v. Garman, 2021 WL 4033113, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2021) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001)). If the defendants make such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to (1) produce “other evidence” of the defendant's retaliatory motive, and (2) demonstrate that the violation of prison policy was “not so ‘clear and overt'” that the court can conclude that the defendant would have taken the same action despite this evidence. Watson, 834 F.3d at 426; Carter v. McGrady', 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).
Nevertheless, “[b]ecause retaliation claims can be easily fabricated, district courts must view prisoners' retaliation claims with sufficient skepticism to avoid becoming entangled in every disciplinary action taken against a prisoner.” Miskovitch v. Hostoffer, 721 F.Supp.2d 389, 396 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995)). “Finally, allegations of de minimis acts of retaliation do not state a claim under § 1983.” Id. (citing Thaddeus-Xv. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a de minimis retaliatory act is outside the ambit of constitutional protection)). Using these precepts, the Court will review each of Angle's retaliation claims.
Angle generally alleges that “once defendants found out that [Angle] filed these injunctions they started retaliating against [him].” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 5. He then specifies that on April 20, 2022, Armel, Deputy Walker, Trempus, CCPM Hawkinberry, Major Hawkinberry, U.M. Riddle, and Capt. Walker prolonged his placement in the RHU by “destroying official documents verifying that [he] completed the special management unit in retaliation to [Angle] filing lawsuits/injunctions,” and, on May 31, 2022, “Dobish filed a false misconduct against [him] ... to retaliate against [Angle] for his lawsuits.” ECF No. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 10. He also avers that “when [he] grieved” Shaw and Farrell's alleged misconduct, “they put a hit out on Angle.” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 10. Although far from clear, it also appears that Angle may be alleging that Shaw and Farrell harassed and assault him, Farrell spread false rumors about him, and Walker failed to remove restrictions upon Angle, all in retaliation for his legal filings.
Even under the most charitable reading, the Complaint fails to state a retaliation claim against any Defendant. A prisoner's filing of a lawsuit, motion, or grievance against prison officials is protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim. Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that the filing of a lawsuit is protected activity); Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“Plaintiff has met the first prong of her retaliation claims against these Defendants, as “pressing charges” and/or filing civil lawsuits, as well as voicing complaints and/or filing grievances, are all constitutionally protected activities.”). But Angle's conclusory allegations that the array of actions and omissions by the Defendants were taken in retaliation for his having filed motions in other pending lawsuits are insufficient to support a claim. Angle speculates that his legal filings and grievances motivated Defendants' allegedly improper conduct, but his Complaint includes no allegations connecting Angle's filings in other lawsuits with any Defendant's alleged adverse actions. As the protective conduct upon which Angle bases his claim, he refers to having filed motions in two other cases formerly pending in this Court: Angle v. Montag, 1:21-cv-252 and Angle v. Smith et al., 1:22-cv-33. Although Angle provides no meaningful information regarding either case, the Court properly takes judicial notice of the docket in each of these cases. See Williams v. PA. Dep't of Corr., 2023 WL 2655406, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Williams v. PA Dep't of Corr., 2023 WL 2652298 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2023). The Montag case involved Angle's single claim against a dentist who provided dental services to Angle at the prison. Angle alleged that Montag's dental services were deficient. See Angle v. Montag, 1:21-cv-252, ECF No. 1-1. The Smith case involved a hodgepodge of claims against various prison personnel. See Angle v. Smith et al., l:22-cv-33, ECF No. 1-1. Significantly, the Complaint in this case does not allege any involvement or association between any defendant named in the Montag or Smith actions and any of the eleven Defendants named in this case. Smith alleges no temporal proximity between his protected conduct and alleged adverse actions or other circumstantial evidence to support a plausible inference of retaliatory motive and causation. He also does not attribute any statements to any Defendant that would support such an inference. The First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants therefore should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
b. Angle's remaining allegations are merely legal conclusions and his request for injunctive relief is moot.
Angle does not expressly assert any other cause of action. Instead, he alleges generally that Defendants have “violated [his] rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania constitution,” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 16, which is plainly insufficient to support any claim under the Constitution or state law. Similarly, Angle's singular conclusory statement that “Shaw and Farrell sexually harassed and physically assaulted” him cannot, without more, state a viable claim under either federal or state law. His allegations that Walker refused to return his personal items and let him shower, and Farrell engaged in labeling him, do not amount to a violation of Angle's constitutional or state law rights. What's more, his request for “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation and to release [him] from the R.H.U./gang unit” has been rendered moot by his release from prison. See Cobb v. Yost, 342 Fed.Appx. 858, 859 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In general, an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief becomes moot on his release from prison.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, all claims against Defendants should be dismissed.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, Angle cannot cure the deficiency in his request for injunctive or declaratory relief, and so this claim should be dismissed with prejudice. Angle may, however, be able to cure the Complaint's deficiencies with respect to his failure to demonstrate Little's personal involvement and otherwise to state a viable claim for relief against one or more of the Defendants. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Angle's claims without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint within twenty days. If Angle fails to file an amended complaint within this time, the Court should enter an order dismissing all claims and this action with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be GRANTED with respect to the claim against Defendant Little and that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), all other claims asserted in the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).