Opinion
2:22-CV-01772-SPB
04-11-2023
BRYAN ANGLE II, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY LITTLE, SUPERINTENDENT ARMEL, DEPUTY WALKER, DEPUTY TREMPUS, CCPM HAWKINBERRY, MAJOR HAWKINBERRY, U.M. RIDDLE, CAPT WALKER, C.O. SHAW, C.O. FARRELL, SGT DOBISH, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ECF NO. 19
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Bryan Angle II's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiffs Motion and Factual Averments
Plaintiff Brian Angle II (“Angle”), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”), initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County on November 16, 2022. As Defendants, the complaint names Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, George Little; SCI-Fayette Superintendent Armel; and eight other employees at SCI-Fayette. ECF Nos. 1-1,3. Defendants removed the action to this Court on December 9, 2022. ECF No. 1. The complaint alleges that Defendants retaliated against Angle after they learned that he had filed injunction motions in his two other open cases with this Court. It describes events alleged to have occurred on April 20, April 21, April 23, May 31, and June 7, 2022. Angle claims that Defendants' actions constitute violations of “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution,” and for relief, he seeks declaratory relief, “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation and to release plaintiff from the R.H.U./gang unit,” and monetary damages. Id.
Angle v. Montag, l:21-cv-252 and Angle v. Smith et al., l:22-cv-33.
In the instant motion for emergency injunctive relief, Angle avers that “Defendant Dobish and an officer acting on behalf of Defendant Dobish are continuing their campaign of harassment in retaliation to [him] filing this complaint.” ECF No. 19, ¶ 1. Angle specifically alleges that “CO. 1 Bamsworth acting on behalf of Defendant Dobish entered [his] cell while [he] was in the yard,” “claimed that he found a fishing line made out of a sheet” in Angle's cell, and then issued Angle a misconduct because of this allegedly falsified fishing wire. Id., ¶ 2. Angle adds that “Defendant Rudzieki knowingly aided in this retaliation by finding [Angle] guilty and ordering that [his] account be charged.” Id. Next, Angle asserts that “Defendant Dobish himself retaliated against [him] when he came to [his] cell and tried to use his body to block the audio/video camera that is stationed outside of [his] cell and lied saying stop ripping the jumpsuit.” Id., ¶ 3. Angle adds that Dobish did not succeed in blocking the camera, however, and thus, that the camera footage shows that Angle did not rip up his jumpsuit but instead was given an already ripped jumpsuit by Dobish. Appended to this motion is a copy of the misconduct he was issued asserting that he ripped up his jumpsuit and asking to charge Angle twenty dollars for the jumpsuit. ECF No. 19-1. For relief, Angle seeks an “order that all harassment cease and bar the D.O.C. or it's [sic] employees from charging him”; “a video conference”; “that all evidence be called i.e. ripped sheet fishing line, jumpsuit, and camera footage from 3-19-23; and “that C.O. Bamsworth and Defendant Dobish be called to testify under oath to prove that they lied.” Id., ¶ 5.
B. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Angle bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” .. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527(1979).
C. Discussion
1. Angle's allegations do not support that he will sustain irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
Angle's allegations do not support a “probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). His motion alleges past isolated incidents of alleged retaliation that involve no imminent threat of harm. See Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). See Boyd v. Larson, 2017 WL 1904278, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (“A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.”) (quoting Fischer v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). What's more, Angle's allegations do not support any injury or damage that cannot be compensated through money damages. The injury he claims is therefore inappropriate for injunctive relief. See Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). See also ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (preliminary relief may only issue where the injury is of a “peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it”); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must allege an injury that cannot ultimately be “redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial”).
2. Angle's allegations do not support a likelihood of success on the merits.
Angle's allegations are also insufficient to meet his heavy burden of demonstrating that he will likely succeed on the merits. While Angle “need not prove his case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
In the Report and Recommendation on Angle's January 3, 2023 motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 4), the undersigned summarized Angle's complaint as follows:
Angle's complaint recites various incidents of alleged retaliation and harassment occurring between April and June of 2022. The complaint asserts that these acts are in retaliation for Angle's two other open cases, which were filed before this action. Angle also avers that Defendants' actions were in retaliation for filing this action though his complaint was not filed until November. The complaint asserts no specific constitutional or state claims, but only generally that Defendants have violated his “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appended to the complaint is a motion for a preliminary emergency injunction and TRO alleging that his May 15, 2021, placement in the RHU was supposed to end but Defendants are refusing to let him out as retaliation for the injunctions he filed in the other two civil actions, and requesting injunctive relief by way of being released from the RHU “and that all retaliation and harassment cease.” ECF No. 1-1, pp. 6-7. The complaint and attached motion are not verified and no supporting affidavit has been filed.ECF No. 6.
Here, Angle's motion's allegations of other alleged acts of retaliation, including ones allegedly committed by a non-Defendant, are tethered to the complaint only by conclusory allegations of common motive. No facts are alleged to support that the allegedly false misconduct against him was motivated by prior protected activity on his part. See Young v. Medden, 241 Fed.Appx. 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a temporary restraining order where prisoner provided no evidence, outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing). Furthermore, “a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897) (“The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit.”)). Accordingly, Angle's motion does not support a likelihood of success on the merits.
Angle's failure to allege facts that support a likelihood of success on the merits or an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to his motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Angle's motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (ECF No. 19) be denied.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).