Opinion
2:22-CV-01772-RAL
01-10-2023
BRYAN ANGLE II, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY LITTLE, SUPERINTENDENT ARMEL, DEPUTY WALKER, DEPUTY TREMPUS, CCPM HAWKINBERRY, MABR HAWKINBERRY, U.M. RIDDLE, CAPT WALKER, C.O. SHAW, C.O. FARRELL, SGT DOBISH, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN RE: ECF NO. 4
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Motion for Emergency Injunction (ECF No. 4) be denied.
II. REPORT
a. Plaintiffs motion and factual allegations
Plaintiff Brian Angle II (“Angle”), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”), initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County on November 16, 2022; it was removed to this Court on December 9, 2022. ECF No. 1. Defendants, whose answer or other response to the Complaint is due by January 31, 2023, are Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections George Little, SCI-Fayette Superintendent Armel, and SCI-Fayette personnel and corrections officers. ECF Nos. 1-1,3. The Complaint asserts that Defendants began retaliating against Angle after they learned that he had filed injunctive motions in his two other open cases with this Court, and describes events alleged to have occurred on April 20, April 21, April 23, May 31, and June 7, 2022. Angle claims that Defendants' actions constitute violations of “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution,” and for relief, he seeks declaratory relief, “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation and to release plaintiff from the R.H.U./gang unit,” and monetary damages. Id. .
Angle v. Montag, l:21-cv-252 and Angle v. Smith et al., l:22-cv-33.
On January 3, 2022, Angle filed this motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) alleging that Defendants are retaliating against him for filing the above-captioned action and subjecting him “to a continuing campaign of harassment.” ECF No. 4, ¶ 1. Additionally, he avers that on May 31, 2022, Dobish “fabricated false misconduct reports on [Angle]”; Dobbish and Shaw threatened him by telling him: “we can say your [sic] hanging yourself and come in there (referring to [his] cell) anytime we want,” and Shaw took Angle out of his cell, off of the camera, and said, “see I can take you off camera anytime that shit aint gonna save you”; on August 15, 2022, “Dobish went in [Angle's] cell and seen [sic] that he had a commissary food and ordered the C.O.'s to take all of his property and had the C.O.'s fabricate another misconduct”; on November 17, 2022, the SGT filed a misconduct against Angle as retaliation for the filing of the above-captioned action; and on November 18, 2022, “C.O.'s fabricated several more misconducts” and “Shaw along with several other C.O.'s . .. physically and sexually assault plaintiff. . . in retaliation to this case and placed [him] in a cell with no heat,” a temperature of 38 degrees, and a steal door leading outside.” Id., ¶¶ 2-10. Angle seeks injunctive relief by way of a transfer to “a safer environment until” his sentence is finished on April 11, 2023, and an “order that all retaliation be rectified.” Id.
b. Standards
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Angle bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” .. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,527(1979).
c. Discussion
i. Angle's allegations do no support a likelihood of success on the merits.
Angle's allegations are insufficient to meet his heavy burden of demonstrating that he will likely succeed on the merits. While Angle “need not prove his case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
Angle's complaint recites various incidents of alleged retaliation and harassment occurring between April and June of 2022. The complaint asserts that these acts are in retaliation for Angle's two other open cases, which were filed before this action. Angle also avers that Defendants' actions were in retaliation for filing this action though his complaint was not filed until November. The complaint asserts no specific constitutional or state claims, but only generally that Defendants have violated his “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution.” Appended to the complaint is a motion for a preliminary emergency injunction and TRO alleging that his May 15, 2021, placement in the RHU was supposed to end but Defendants are refusing to let him out as retaliation for the injunctions he filed in the other two civil actions, and requesting injunctive relief by way of being released from the RHU “and that all retaliation and harassment cease.” ECF No. 1-1, pp. 6-7. The complaint and attached motion are not verified and no supporting affidavit has been filed.
Angle's instant unverified motion reiterates the general allegations of retaliation and harassment and adds a few allegations of isolated threats or acts retaliation. Aside from the repeated May 31, 2022, alleged falsified misconduct report, and Dobish and Shaw's alleged threats, the events alleged in the pending motion occurred between August 15 and November 18, 2022. The events alleged in the motion are later in time and largely untethered to the unverified allegations of the complaint. Angle has proffered no documents or other evidence to support his unverified allegations. See Young v. Medden, 241 Fed.Appx. 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a temporary restraining order where prisoner provided no evidence, outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing). Accordingly, the motion does not support a likelihood of success on the merits.
ii. Angle's allegations do not support a probability of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
Angle's allegations also fail to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, the burden on a party seeking injunctive relief is “particularly heavy” where the party is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). Thus, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief, such as Harrison's demand for an emergency transfer, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
Angle has failed to meet his burden because his motion does not support a the risk of imminent irreparable harm. Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). Rather, the incidents of retaliation cited by Angle have each occurred in the past. Boyd v. Larson, 2017 WL 1904278, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (“A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.”) (quoting Fischer v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). What's more, Angle has failed to demonstrate why his claims, if proven, may not be compensated through money damages or equitable relief and, thus, are inappropriate for injunctive relief. See Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). See also ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (preliminary relief may only issue where the injury is of a “peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it”); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must allege an injury that cannot ultimately be “redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial”). To the contrary, the “relief requested” portion of Angle's complaint specifically requests “no less then [sic] $300,000” in monetary damages. ECF No. 1-1. Angle's request for monetary compensation for his injuries suggests that such damages “may be adequate redress, yet another factor which weighs against extraordinary injunctive relief.” Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (noting that, where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate”). Angle's failure to allege facts that support a likelihood of success on the merits and an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to his motion.
III. CONLCUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Angle's motion for a temporary restraining order or emergency injunction (ECF No. 4) be denied.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
BY THE COURT: