Opinion
2:22-CV-01772-SPB-RAL
05-02-2023
BRYAN ANGLE II, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY LITTLE, SUPERINTENDENT ARMEL, DEPUTY WALKER, DEPUTY TREMPUS, CCPM HAWKINBERRY, MAJOR HAWKINBERRY, U.M. RIDDLE, CAPT WALKER, C.O. SHAW, C.O. FARRELL, SGT DOBISH, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ECF NO. 21
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Bryan Angle H's motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 21) be DENIED.
II. Report
a. Procedural Background and Plaintiff's Pending Motion
Plaintiff Brian Angle II (“Angle”) was formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”) and, following completion of his sentence of incarceration, is now detained at the Fayette County Prison (“FCP”). While incarcerated at SCI-Fayette, he initiated this pro se civil rights action in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County against Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, George Little, SCI-Fayette Superintendent Armel, and eight other employees at that correctional institution. See ECF Nos. 1-1,3. The Defendants removed the action to this Court. ECF No. 1. Angle's complaint alleges that the Defendants retaliated against him after they learned that he had filed injunction motions in his two other cases pending in this Court. Angle claims that Defendants' actions violated his “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution,” and he seeks “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation and to release plaintiff from the R.H.U./gang unit,” declaratory relief, and monetary damages. Id.
Angle v. Montag, l:21-cv-252, which the Court closed on February 27,2023, and Angle v. Smith, et al., l:22-cv-33.
Although Angle's request for injunctive relief in his complaint is distinct from the injunctive relief he requests in his present motion and is not presently at issue, the Court notes that his completion of his sentence and release from SCI-Fayette would appear to render that request moot.
Angle's instant motion for an “injunction/T.R.O./motion to intervine [sic]” avers that “he completed his sentence” on April 11, 2023, but that he will nevertheless be detained in the future at the FCP. ECF No. 21, ¶¶ 1, 3. Angle does not state how long he may be detained at the FCP or the reason for his detention following completion of his sentence. According to his motion, on April 2, 2023, Defendant Shaw and Corrections Officer Knizner removed him from his cell at SCI-Fayette to inventory his property in anticipation of his release or transfer. Id., ¶ 2. Angle's inventoried property included “his legal work which includes irreplacable [sic] affidavits and documents because [he] is going to the county jail.” ECF No. 21, ¶ 2. He asserts that “[he] was able to stop the immediate destruction of his property but was told that he had 30 days to come back to S.C.I. Fayette and retrieve his property/legal work knowing that [he] will be detained in Fayette County Prison and therefor [sic] unable to travel to S.C.I. Fayette to retrieve it.” Id., ¶ 3. He alleges that the loss of his legal papers will adversely affect his ability to prosecute various lawsuits he has pending in federal and state court. He seeks a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from destroying his papers or requiring that they forward his papers to him. Id., ¶ 5.
b. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Angle bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” ...'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572,2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
c. Discussion
Angle's current motion seeks injunctive relief distinct from the relief requested in his complaint and fails to support a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
Because Angle's pending motion is based on factual allegations and a request for injunctive relief that are distinct from those raised in his complaint, it does not support a likelihood of success on the merits of the claims asserted in this action. His complaint alleges that the Defendants previously retaliated against him because he filed lawsuits and other injunction motions. His current motion is based, in part, on corrections officers' routine practice of inventorying a prison's property prior to his release or transfer. The crux of his motion is his allegation that the Defendants will allow him only thirty days following his release to retrieve his legal papers from SCI-Fayette and his belief that Defendants will destroy his papers if he fails to do so. He argues that injunctive relief is necessary because his detention in the FCP will make it impossible for him to retrieve his papers and, thus, result in the destruction of his papers and a denial of his access to the courts. Because Angle's current motion for injunctive relief is not tethered to facts alleged or claims asserted in his Complaint, it should be denied. See Harrison v. Little, 2022 WL 18359018, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Harrision v. Little, 2023 WL 275985 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2023); Angle v. Montag, 2022 WL 1156606, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting injunctive relief where it “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))).
To the extent Angle may allege that the inventorying of his property and the willingness of prison officials to store his papers for only thirty days are further acts of retaliation, the allegations are conclusory and relate to matters of routine prison administration concerning which the Court is loath to interject itself. His allegations also fail to support any “proof of an actual, concrete injury, in the form of direct prejudice to the plaintiff in the pursuit of some legal claim-” a necessary requirement of an access to courts claim. Hennis v. Varner, 2014 WL 1317556, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.1997)). Furthermore, any prejudicial effect the alleged conduct may have on his other cases does not constitute harm in this case, and “a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897) (“The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit.”)).
Angle does not have any case against Fiscus in this Court; Angle v. Montag, 1:2l-cv-252, is closed; and Angle does not allege an inability to access his legal materials in Angle v. Smith, et al., 1:22-cv-33, which is currently in discovery.
The Court also notes that with respect to the above-captioned action, Angle failed to file a response in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) by March 6, 2023, as directed by this Court's scheduling order (ECF No. 11). Because this deadline passed well before Shaw and Knizner inventoried Angle's property, Angle cannot assert that their actions impaired his ability to respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss in this case. Furthermore, even if Angle had identified specific legal materials he is missing and how their absence would impair his prosecution of this or any other action pending before this Court, the Court “has the ability to mitigate any potential prejudice through appropriate pretrial orders.” Shegog v. Grinell, 2022 WL 7932873, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2022). Accordingly, Angle's motion does not support his likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or that he will sustain irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Angle's motion for emergency injunctive relief (ECF No. 21) be denied. At the same time, the undersigned encourages prison officials at SCI-Fayette to preserve Angle's legal papers for a reasonable period to allow Plaintiff to make arrangements to retrieve them given his present detention at the FCP. Although Angle's motion fails to support an injunction commanding prison officials to preserve Angle's papers, the undersigned notes that doing so may materially decrease the likelihood of future claims and litigation.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).