Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities

85 Citing cases

  1. Angelsea Productions v. Commission on Human Rights

    727 A.2d 1268 (Conn. 1999)   Cited 15 times
    In Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 248 Conn. 392, 399, 727 A.2d 1268 (1999) (Angelsea II), this court confirmed, without criticism, that Angelsea I had concluded that the legislature intended for those time limits on the statutory discriminatory practice complaint procedure carried out by the commission to be jurisdictional.

    " We transferred the reservation from the Appellate Court to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 4023, now § 65-1. In Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996) ( Angelsea I), we answered all four of the reserved questions in the affirmative. Specifically, we concluded that the time deadlines set forth in §§ 46a-83 (b) and 46a-84 (b) were mandatory, not discretionary, and that upon failure to comply with those time limits, the commission was required to dismiss the underlying complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

  2. Williams v. Comm. on Human Rights Opportunities

    257 Conn. 258 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 156 times
    Acknowledging that, although "mandatory language may be an indication that the legislature intended a … requirement to be jurisdictional, such language alone does not overcome the strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does such language alone prove strong legislative intent to create a jurisdictional bar"

    Without reaching the plaintiff's claims, however, the Appellate Court determined that the time limitation of § 46a-82 (e) was subject matter jurisdictional and, therefore, not waivable or subject to equitable tolling. Id. The court, relying on Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996), determined that § 46a-82 (e) was a mandatory time limitation that deprived the commission of jurisdiction. Williams v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, supra, 54 Conn. App. 255-56.

  3. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa.

    314 Conn. 749 (Conn. 2014)   Cited 17 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Observing that our appellate courts have concluded that "statutory deadlines are directory where there is no express legislative guidance to the contrary and no indication that the legislature intended the deadline to be jurisdictional" by distinguishing cases in which statute provided consequence for failure to act within certain time and cases in which statute did not

    We next consider whether holding a requirement to be mandatory would result in an unjust windfall for the party seeking to enforce the duty or, in the alternative, whether holding it to be directory would deprive that party of any legal recourse. Compare Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 289 Conn. at 794, 961 A.2d 349 (treating rule requiring use of authorized forms for payroll deductions as mandatory would result in unwarranted windfall for employees), with Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 692–93, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996) (time limits held mandatory where neither party could take further legal action until commission had made finding of reasonable cause or no reasonable cause); see also J. Evans, supra, 1 Legal Stud. 245 (purpose of mandatory/directory distinction is to avoid injustice and honor purposes of statute while not imposing unreasonably harsh consequences for trivial breaches). In the present case, we agree with the defendant and the amicus supporting the defendant's position that this balancing weighs heavily in favor of treating the ninety day response period as directory.

  4. Golnik v. Amato

    No. 3:02-CV-777(EBB) (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 2003)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that, where plaintiff neither referred to nor named defendants in the CHRO/EEOC Complaint, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over discrimination claims including one brought under the ADEA

    Section 46a-101 requires that any 46a-100 action "shall be brought within ninety days of the release [by the CHRO]. . . .". In 1996, the Connecticut Supreme Court held, in Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. CHRO, 236 Conn. 681, 694 (1996), that "the use of the word `shall' in conjunction with the word `may' confirms that the legislature `acted with complete awareness of the different meanings'; Hartford Principals Supervisors' Assn. v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 506 (1987)'; and that it intended the terms to have different meanings." The test we have adopted for determining whether such a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to matter material or immaterial — to matters of convenience or substance. . . . If it is a matter of convenience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. . . . Stated another way, language is deemed to be mandatory if the mode of action is of the essence of the purpose to be accomplished by the statute. . . . but will be considered directory if the failure to comply with the requirement does no

  5. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Ass'n

    273 Conn. 373 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 34 times
    Discussing line of cases under which statutory time limitation is deemed not to implicate subject matter jurisdiction

    Section 46a-82e (a) provides: "Notwithstanding the failure of the [commission] to comply with the time requirements of [General Statutes §§] 46a-83 and 46a-84 with respect to a complaint before the commission, the jurisdiction of the commission over any such complaint shall be retained." The legislature enacted § 46a-82e in response to this court's decision in Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 700, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996), wherein we held that the commission's failure to comply with statutory timelines under § 46a-83 or § 46a-84 for investigating a complaint deprived the commission of jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints pending before it. See Williams v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, supra, 257 Conn. 281 (noting that legislature's enactment of Public Acts 1996, No. 96-241, and Public Acts 1998, No. 98-245, "signaled its disapproval of Angelsea Productions, Inc."). In the absence of flexible language in either § 46a-83 or § 46a-84, such as that set forth in the statute at issue here, the saving provision in § 46a-82e was necessary to save the complaints over which the commission could lose jurisdiction.

  6. Craig v. Driscoll

    64 Conn. App. 699 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 70 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that mother and brother stated causes of action for negligent and reckless infliction of bystander emotional distress, finding that plaintiffs "may claim alternative relief"

    In Bohan, our Supreme Court permitted the defendant purveyors of alcohol to seek apportionment of the tortfeasor liability to innocent third party victims of intoxicated minors. Bohan v. Last, supra, 236 Conn. 681. In that case, the defendant tavern impleaded adult patrons who supplied liquor to a minor in the bar in the case brought by the plaintiff against the tavern.

  7. Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities

    54 Conn. App. 251 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 9 times
    In Williams v. CHRO, 54 Conn. App. 251 (1999), the court determined that the timeliness of filing a complaint is jurisdictional in nature.

    The Supreme Court instead upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs action on the basis that the death of the complainant employee ousted the court of jurisdiction. Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996), unlike the cases previously mentioned, discusses other sections of the same legislation that is the subject of the present case in terms of jurisdiction. We conclude that Angelsea Productions, Inc., is determinative of the issue we must decide.

  8. Costa v. Coker

    2001 Ct. Sup. 10572 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)

    State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 78, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). See alsoAngelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 698, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). Therefore, the court deems it unnecessary to discuss the issue further other than to note that both parties had adequate notice that Adolfo Costa's death was at issue by virtue of the FHO's correspondence dated June 2, 1999 and that each party was given ample opportunity to respond and address the FHO and neither choose to present additional evidence, argument or request an administrative hearing.

  9. Wilson v. Planning and Zoning Commission

    1997 Ct. Sup. 8398 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    The statutory use of "shall" for the prior publication is significant, though not dispositive. "We have noted, however, that the use of this word `shall' though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory date." Angelsea Productions, In. v. CHRO, 236 Conn. 681, 690 (1996). In Angelsea, supra, the Court held:

  10. Lariviere v. Thomas

    1997 Ct. Sup. 9066 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    The use of shall is significant but not dispositive. "We have noted, however, that the use of this word `shall' though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty." Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. CHRO, 236 Conn. 681, 690 (1996). Counterbalanced against the use of "shall" we have the omission from the statute of an explicit consequence, and a policy favoring jurisdiction.