Opinion
Case No. 3:19-CV-1645-JGC
03-01-2023
ANGEL'S DREAM, LLC et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOLEDO JET CENTER, LLC et al., Defendants.
William A. Posey, Matthew M. Allen, Keating Muething & Klekamp, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff Angel's Dream, LLC, SRT Holdings LLC, Samuel Santa Rita. Jennifer J. Dawson, Marshall & Melhorn, Toledo, OH, Marshall A. Bennett, Jr., Law Office of Marshall Bennett, Dublin, OH, for Defendant Toledo Jet Center, LLC. Christopher E. Cotter, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, Phillip M. Sarnowski, Roetzel & Andress, Columbus, OH, for Defendants IAL Corp., Dodson International Parts, Inc., Robert L. Dodson, Jr.
William A. Posey, Matthew M. Allen, Keating Muething & Klekamp, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff Angel's Dream, LLC, SRT Holdings LLC, Samuel Santa Rita. Jennifer J. Dawson, Marshall & Melhorn, Toledo, OH, Marshall A. Bennett, Jr., Law Office of Marshall Bennett, Dublin, OH, for Defendant Toledo Jet Center, LLC. Christopher E. Cotter, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, Phillip M. Sarnowski, Roetzel & Andress, Columbus, OH, for Defendants IAL Corp., Dodson International Parts, Inc., Robert L. Dodson, Jr. ORDER James G. Carr, Senior United States District Judge
This is a breach of contract and negligence case. Plaintiffs, the purchasers of a Cessna Citation Bravo aircraft, have sued the seller—IAL Corp.; Dodson International Parts, Inc.; New Century Air Services, Inc.; and Robert L. Dodson, Jr. (collectively, the "Dodson defendants")—and two aircraft inspection and maintenance companies, Toledo Jet Center, LLC and Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (Doc. 24). Toledo Jet has in turn crossclaimed against The Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive. (Doc. 54).
While the parties' briefing at times references second amended crossclaims (Doc. 55), Toledo Jet moved, and I granted its motion to strike that iteration of their pleading. (Doc. 56; Sept. 8, 2022 Order). Toledo Jet also moved to file a third amended crossclaim. I stayed that motion pending the resolution of the personal jurisdiction motions to dismiss. (Sept. 8, 2022 Order).
Before me are plaintiffs and Toledo Jet's motions to compel jurisdictional discovery responses from the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive. (Docs. 60, 62, 63).
Precipitating this are the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motions, arguing that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over each of them. (Docs. 51, 53). Toledo Jet, as its name implies, did not contest personal jurisdiction.
After defendants moved to dismiss, plaintiffs propounded personal jurisdiction interrogatories and requests for production on the contesting defendants. (Docs. 62-2, 63-2). The parties attempted to come to terms on the scope of those requests but could not. (See Doc. 59, 5:13-19; Doc. 62, pgID 758; Doc. 63, pgID 792).
The parties presented the issues to me in a hearing. I requested that they file written submissions to explain the legal and factual issues underpinning the contested discovery.
Plaintiffs and Toledo Jet thus filed their respective motions to compel. For the reasons below, I grant in part and deny in part the motions to compel discovery responses from the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive.
Toledo Jet has not propounded any jurisdictional discovery requests on the other defendants. But the proposed requests that it attaches to its motion to compel are identical to those served by the plaintiffs. (See Docs. 60-2, 60-3, 62-2, 63-2). Dodson and Dallas Airmotive argue that a motion to compel cannot be filed until Toledo Jet serves their discovery requests. However, with an aim to resolve these issues together, I have already granted leave to Toledo Jet to file its own motion to compel. (Sept. 8, 2022 Order). I will construe Toledo Jet as joining plaintiffs' identical personal jurisdiction interrogatories and requests for production to the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive.
Background
Relevant to the motions, IAL is a corporation organized in Delaware and headquartered in Kansas; Dodson International Parts is organized and headquartered in Kansas; New Century is organized in Delaware and headquartered in Kansas; Mr. Robert Dodson is an individual domiciled in Texas; and Dallas Airmotive is organized and headquartered in Texas. Conspicuously absent from these defendant domiciliaries is the State of Ohio.
Because the discovery issues are intertwined with the jurisdictional issues, a full discussion of this dispute's history will provide necessary context.
A. The Aircraft Purchase Agreement
According to the pleadings and declarations, Plaintiff Samuel Santa Rita and Defendant IAL Corp. (one of the Dodson defendants) entered into an Aircraft Purchase Agreement for the sale of a Cessna Citation Bravo personal jet. (Doc. 24-1).
Before entering into the agreement, plaintiff hired Ames Aviation—a company based in Henry County, Ohio—to conduct a "pre-buy" inspection of the aircraft. (Doc. 60-1, ¶ 16; Doc. 61-13). Ames contacted defendant Dallas Airmotive's Missouri office about a previous borescope performed in Texas on the aircraft's engines. (Doc. 61-13). The Missouri office apparently did not have any information or photographs of the inspection their Texas office performed, and they told Ames as much. (Doc. 60-1, ¶ 16; Doc. 61-13).
The Aircraft Purchase Agreement was then signed on December 5, 2018. There are no claims stemming from Ames's "pre-buy" inspection in this lawsuit.
Mr. Santa Rita subsequently assigned his rights in the agreement to the other plaintiff entities, which he and his family control. (Doc. 24, ¶ 25).
As part of the agreement, the plaintiffs contracted a right to conduct another pre-purchase inspection of the aircraft (Doc. 24-1, § 3.3). The contract parties agreed that Toledo Jet, "acting as agent for Buyer," would conduct the inspection at its facility in Swanton, Ohio. (Id.).
B. Toledo Jet's Prepurchase Inspection
The plaintiffs exercised this right, and the Dodson defendants delivered the aircraft from their Kansas facility to Toledo Jet's facility in Ohio (as it had agreed). (Doc. 24-1, § 3.3(a)). Satisfactorily passing the pre-inspection was a condition of the final sale. Plaintiffs had the option to either accept the aircraft—subject to any repairs that were identified during inspection—or reject it and return it to IAL. (Id. § 3.4(a)(i)-(ii)).
Key to this inspection was "airworthiness." Under FAA regulations, "[no] person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition." 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a). The purpose of Toledo Jet's inspection was to ensure that the jet was airworthy and make any repairs needed to make it so. (Doc. 24-1, §§ 3.3, 3.3(d))
Once the Dodson defendants delivered the aircraft to Ohio, Toledo Jet performed its inspection, which included, among other things, a borescope camera inspection of the two jet engines. (Doc. 24, ¶ 40).
Toledo Jet wrote in its inspection report that the engines were previously borescoped by defendant Dallas Airmotive on June 1, 2017. Dallas Airmotive noted "minor nicks" in the engine at that time. (Doc. 24-3, pgID 254). Toledo Jet performed its own borescope and "found no new damage." (Id.). Toledo Jet also conducted an "engine performance run" of both engines and noticed no defects during that test. (Id.)
Toledo Jet informed the plaintiffs that, while the jet was airworthy, several repairs were needed—i.e., the "airworthiness discrepancies" described in the contract (Doc. 24, ¶ 42; Doc. 24-1, § 3.3(d)). The Dodson defendants agreed in the contract that they would be responsible for working with Toledo Jet in Ohio to remedy the discrepancies while Toledo Jet made the necessary repairs in Ohio. (Doc. 24-1, § 3.4(a)(2)).
Dodson corresponded with Toledo Jet's Ohio location by email regarding the scope of their repairs. For example, on December 17, 2018, a Dodson representative—presumably defendant Robert Dodson—emailed a Toledo Jet employee regarding the aircraft sale. (Doc. 61-14). Mr. Dodson wrote that he needed to speak with Toledo Jet's general manager before Toledo Jet replied to the plaintiff. (Id.). After a presumed phone call, Mr. Dodson specified which repairs he was willing to approve for Toledo Jet to make in Ohio. (Id.). The Dodson defendants then delivered parts into Ohio to be used for the repairs in Ohio. (Doc. 60-1, ¶ 21).
Eventually, Toledo Jet completed its repairs, and it assured plaintiff that the jet was airworthy. (Doc. 24, ¶ 44). Relying on that assurance, plaintiffs finalized their purchase and took possession of the aircraft. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45).
C. Aircraft Damage Uncovered Post-Sale
At some point after the purchase, another maintenance shop noticed "engine nicks" in one of the engines during routine maintenance. (Id. ¶ 45). After this discovery, plaintiff hired Dallas Airmotive to perform an engine inspection. (Id. ¶ 46).
Dallas Airmotive performed another borescope inspection on May 22, 2019. (Id.) They found multiple engine blades with "foreign object damage," including a blade tear on one of them. (Id.) Dallas Airmotive determined that the engine was "unairworthy" and needed to be removed and repaired. (Id. ¶ 47).
The aircraft was thus grounded, unairworthy, and unable to be flown by plaintiffs. (Doc. 24, ¶ 48). On June 14, 2019, about three weeks after the aircraft was grounded and incapable of legal flight, Toledo Jet's chief inspector contacted Brad Huelsman—Dallas Airmotive's regional engine manager in Dayton, Ohio. (Doc. 61-6).
Toledo Jet asked Mr. Huelsman for any records or pictures of Dallas Airmotive's borescope inspection from two years prior. (Id.). Based on the record before me, this was Toledo Jet's first contact with Dallas Airmotive regarding the subject aircraft.
About one month later, on July 19, 2019, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Toledo Jet, claiming that Toledo Jet failed to identify the airworthiness defects that grounded the aircraft in May. (Doc. 1).
Toledo Jet was served with the complaint on July 24, 2019. (Doc. 6.). Counsel for Toledo Jet appeared on August 14, 2019, and counsel moved for and received an extension of time to respond to the complaint because they were just retained. (Doc. 9).
Toledo Jet filed their motion for an extension of time 21 days after service of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) ("A defendant must serve an answer . . . within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint . . . .).
One week later, and while presumably preparing its response to plaintiffs' complaint, Toledo Jet's inspector followed up with Mr. Huelsman regarding its request for borescope photographs. (Doc. 61-6). Mr. Huelsman forwarded the request to a customer account manager, who said that they did not keep any pictures or a formal inspection report. (Id.). Mr. Huelsman then forwarded the account manager's email to Toledo Jet on August 21, 2019. (Id.).
About three weeks later, on September 13, 2019, Toledo Jet answered plaintiffs' complaint. (Doc. 10).
D. Discovery of the 2015 Runway Excursion
As this litigation proceeded, the parties issued third-party subpoenas to Dodson, the aircraft seller, and Dallas Airmotive, among others. (Doc. 24, ¶ 53). Dodson and Dallas Airmotive produced responsive documents in September 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55).
The document productions showed an incident involving the aircraft engines that was previously unknown to plaintiffs and Toledo Jet. (Id. ¶ 56). In September 2015, when the engines were on another aircraft, that aircraft was involved in a "runway excursion"—i.e., an incident where the aircraft veers off the runway—in Australia. (Id.).
After experiencing problems during takeoff, the aircraft captain aborted the takeoff and applied brakes and reverse thrust to stop the aircraft. (Id. ¶ 57). It did not stop in time and overran the runway. (Id.). While the pilots (the only passengers) were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged as its landing gear broke off and it skidded to a stop in the grass. (Id.).
Some parts were salvaged from the crashed aircraft, and the Dodson defendants purchased the two jet engines. (Id. ¶ 59). Dodson hired Dallas Airmotive to perform their previously discussed 2017 inspection on the engines. (Id. ¶ 62).
Dallas Airmotive noted debris in the engine and "[m]inor [a]irfoil [n]icks." (Id. ¶ 63; Doc. 24-9; Doc. 24-10). They also took borescope photographs of the damage. (Doc. 24, ¶ 64). After performing an engine test run without incident, and without recertifying the engines, Dallas Airmotive returned them to Dodson. (Id. ¶ 67).
Dodson then installed the engines on a different aircraft and sold that aircraft to plaintiffs, without telling them about the runway incident. (Id. ¶ 61).
E. Claims against Dodson and Dallas Airmotive
On August 2, 2021, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding claims against the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive. (Doc. 24).
Against the Dodson defendants, plaintiffs claim that (1) they failed to keep accurate logbooks as required by FAA regulations (the negligence per se claim); (2) they fraudulently conveyed the aircraft to plaintiff by concealing information about the engines' history and damage; and (3) Dodson conspired with himself to fraudulently convey the aircraft. (Id., pgID 212-16).
Against Dallas Airmotive, plaintiffs' operative complaint claims that they failed to keep accurate logbooks as required by FAA regulations (negligence per se). (Id., pgID 216-18). Plaintiffs' proposed second amended complaint adds a claim against Dallas Airmotive for fraudulently concealing the borescope photographs when Toledo Jet requested them, after the aircraft sale was finalized. (Doc. 57-1, pgID 597-99).
Toledo Jet crossclaimed against the Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive soon after, on September 29, 2021. (Doc. 39). Its first and second crossclaims in the operative cross-complaint appear to be for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations, respectively, against Dallas Airmotive. (Doc. 54). Its third crossclaim is for contribution against both Dallas Airmotive and the Dodson defendants.
The first two crossclaims also appear derivative of plaintiffs' claims for damages resulting from the unairworthy aircraft purchase—i.e., Toledo Jet alleges that Dallas Airmotive was the primary cause for the faulty sale and plaintiffs' injury—not Toledo Jet. Toledo Jet has no apparent independent injury outside of this lawsuit and its attendant legal fees.
The Dodson defendants and Dallas Airmotive have moved under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss all claims against them. They argue that Ohio lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Docs. 51, 52, 53).
These defendants also move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Docs. 51-53). However, because "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a defendant is a threshold issue that must be present to support any subsequent order of the district court," I will resolve it first. See Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App'x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiffs and Toledo Jet now move to compel responses to the jurisdictional discovery requests propounded on Dodson and Dallas Airmotive. (Docs. 60, 62, 63).
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
When a defendant contests a state's authority over it, a plaintiff may request "jurisdictional discovery" limited to investigating and establishing a defendant's contacts with the forum state.
At the outset, I note that the typical procedure born from the case law is for a party first to request leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. E.g., Nottingham-Spirk Design Assocs., Inc. v. Halo Innovations, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 3d 561, 571 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (Calabrese, J.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). This is because I retain control over the method and manner in which I resolve a personal jurisdiction motion. I may "decide the motion upon the affidavits alone; . . . permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion; or . . . conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions." Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). Whether discovery is needed to resolve the jurisdiction issue is a matter for my discretion.
There is no right to such discovery. "[P]laintiffs must do more than merely assert the need for discovery; they must explain what evidence relevant to . . . jurisdiction they [would be] denied from obtaining." C.H. By & Through Shields v. United States, 818 F. App'x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether to grant, deny, or limit jurisdictional discovery is discretionary. Olivia v. Airbus Americas, Inc., 2020 WL 1451972, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2020) (Gaughan, C.J.) (citing Burnshire Dev., LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron Corp., 198 F. App'x 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2006)).
I disagree with the parties that, in exercising my discretion, I am required to find that the movants have made a "prima facie" case for personal jurisdiction before ordering any jurisdictional discovery. This would subsume the 12(b)(2) standard itself. See AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 836 F.3d 543, 548-49 (6th Cir. 2016) ("When the district court resolves a Rule 12(b)(2) motion solely on written submissions . . . the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal.") (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, if I find that the movants have made their prima facie case, then there is no need for discovery; the movants would have defeated the motion to dismiss.
The "prima facie" language here appears to come from the Seventh Circuit. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) ("At a minimum, the plaintiff must establish a colorable or prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction before discovery should be permitted."). Other courts have declined to follow this as a discovery standard. See, e.g., Focht v. Sol Melia S.A., 2010 WL 3155826, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has adopted a prima facie standard only for purposes of evaluating whether a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted or denied on the merits—not for purposes of evaluating whether jurisdictional discovery is appropriate."). I likewise decline to adopt the prima facie standard for jurisdictional discovery.
I am not without guidance, however. To obtain jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, offer a factual basis for its jurisdictional allegations; give the court "a reasonable basis to expect that . . . discovery would reveal evidence that supports the claimed jurisdiction"; and explain what evidence relevant to jurisdiction they would be denied from obtaining. See C.H., supra, 818 F. App'x at 484. While C.H. discussed subject matter jurisdiction discovery, the parties correctly point out that its rationale applies equally here. See, e.g., Nottingham-Spirk Design Assocs., Inc. v. Halo Innovations, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 3d 561, 571 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (Calabrese, J.).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The requested discovery concerns Ohio's personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause restricts the authority of a state's courts (including federal) to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). A defendant lacking sufficient contacts to a state cannot be hailed in court to that state where it is a stranger. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemp't Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
If, however, a nonresident has sufficient contacts with the forum state, it may be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts without offending "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
Two theories of personal jurisdiction have emerged in our case law. First, a state may have general personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts with the forum are "so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). Under "all-purpose" general jurisdiction, a state may hear any and all claims against a defendant regardless of the nature or origin of the claim. Id.
Second, a defendant may be subject to specific personal jurisdiction where it has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum and the suit arises out of or is related to those contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (citing Int'l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). This is both more restrictive than general jurisdiction, in that it requires the contacts be related to the lawsuit, and less restrictive, in that it can subject a defendant to state authority that has its jurisdictional "home" elsewhere.
The movants have divided their discovery requests into two categories: (1) specific personal jurisdiction discovery directed to the Dodson defendants and (2) general personal jurisdiction discovery to Dallas Airmotive.
1. Specific Jurisdiction over the Dodson Defendants
The movants seek to compel the Dodson defendants to respond to their interrogatories and requests for production. (Docs. 60, 63). Plaintiffs argue that they need discovery to further rebut Dodson's assertion that there is no relationship between Dodson's conduct and Ohio that would establish specific jurisdiction. (Doc. 63, PgID 802). Dodson responds that plaintiffs are speculating and that there is no reasonable basis to expect that discovery would reveal evidence supporting jurisdiction. (Doc. 67, pgID 919).
Toledo Jet, for its part, does not explain what information it is seeking through discovery and how that information relates to its claimed jurisdiction. See C.H., supra, 818 F. App'x at 484.
For specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show both that the defendant is amenable to suit under Ohio's long-arm statute and that exercising jurisdiction would comport with the constitutional due process standard of "minimum contacts." Air Prod. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2007). On the due process inquiry, courts in this Circuit follow the Mohasco test:
The Ohio General Assembly amended the long-arm statute in 2020, effective April 7, 2021, to allow for jurisdiction "on any basis consistent with the . . . Unites States Constitution." See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 (eff. Apr. 7, 2021). This provision does not apply to this case, which was filed before the amendment became law. See Ricker v. Mercedes-Benz of Georgetown, 191 N.E.3d 1179, 1187 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App.) (declining to consider the April 2021 amendment in a case that pre-dated its enactment); see also, e.g., Chulsky v. Golden Corral Corp., 583 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1071 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (same). Going forward, the parties should analyze the applicability of the enumerated provisions of the Ohio long-arm statute.
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.Id. (quoting S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968)).
Far from being speculative, the pleadings and declarations already demonstrate the Dodson defendants' case-related connections with Ohio. They agreed in the contract that Toledo Jet specifically would perform the predicate inspection of the aircraft prior to the deal's closing. They agreed that they would deliver the aircraft to Toledo Jet's Swanton, Ohio facility, and they in fact did so. They agreed to pilot a one-hour test flight in Ohio, where the aircraft would remain in the "care[,] custody, command and control" of the Dodson defendants during its operation. (Doc. 24-1, ¶ 3.3(b)). They specified the scope of work to be performed in Ohio. They agreed to pay for certain maintenance issues uncovered during the Ohio inspection. They supplied parts to Ohio to facilitate those repairs. Finally, they corresponded with and directed Toledo Jet on its inspection and repairs.
The movants have also shown a reasonable basis to expect that some discovery may yield additional relevant information that supports specific jurisdiction over the Dodson defendants. Many of the interrogatories and productions requests concern Dodson's case-specific contacts with Ohio. For example, the requests ask about transporting the jet from Kansas to Ohio as well as communications with Toledo Jet in Ohio.
Therefore, I grant in part movants' motions to compel directed to the Dodson defendants. The Dodson defendants shall respond to interrogatory numbers 1, 4, 5, and 6. They shall also respond to production requests numbers 1, 4, and 5.
The motion is denied in part with respect to interrogatory numbers 2, 3, 7, and 8; and production request numbers 2 and 3. The Dodson defendants are not ordered to answer them.
Interrogatory number 2 and production request number 2 ask for ownership interest information on the Dodson defendants.
Interrogatory number 3 and production request number 3 are backward-looking, asking for information regarding the engines before Dodson possessed them.
While this information may be relevant for other purposes, such as to identify other potential at-fault parties, the movants have not given a reasonable basis on how this relates to the jurisdictional question of Dodson's contacts with Ohio.
Interrogatory numbers 7 and 8 ask for contacts that are not case-related. These go beyond movants' offered factual basis of specific personal jurisdiction. Movants have not demonstrated how these requests relate to their claimed jurisdiction. There is no reasonable basis to expect that they will "reveal contacts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction." Reyes v. Freedom Smokes, Inc., 2020 WL 1677480, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2020) (Lioi, J.) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981)).
2. General Jurisdiction over Dallas Airmotive
The movants also seek to compel Dallas Airmotive to respond to their interrogatories and requests for production. (Docs. 60, 62). Plaintiffs argue that they need discovery to demonstrate Ohio's general jurisdiction over Dallas Airmotive. (Doc. 62, PgID 769). Dallas responds that general jurisdiction discovery would be fruitless since it is legally deficient. (Doc. 67, pgID 919).
For general jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's contacts with the forum state "are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." Flake v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 538 F. App'x 604, 617 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846).
The "paradigm" forum where a corporation is "at home" is its principal place of business or its place of incorporation. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). But our case law leaves open the possibility of an "exceptional" circumstance where a corporation's contacts in a forum are so substantial that its jurisdictional home may be different from either its headquarters or its place of incorporation. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413, 137 S.Ct. 1549, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017).
Movants argue they have already shown Dallas Airmotive's continuous and systematic contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction, and discovery may reveal more contacts. (Doc. 62, pgID 769-72). We cannot stop, however, at "continuous and systematic" and must read the rest of the sentence in Goodyear—that the nature of these contacts must render the defendant "essentially at home in the forum State." Supra, 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (emphasis added).
As the Supreme Court has explained, general jurisdiction "does not focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant's in-state contacts." Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20, 134 S.Ct. 746 (internal quotation marks omitted). It must also be at home in the forum, "comparable to a domestic enterprise in that state." See id. at 133 n.11, 134 S.Ct. 746.
A corporation may operate in many places but, just as an individual, it "can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them." See id. at 139 n.20, 134 S.Ct. 746. Dallas Airmotive operates U.S. facilities in Texas, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Missouri and international facilities in the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Brazil. (Doc. 62, pgID 771). Movants have not shown why I should consider Ohio home for Dallas Airmotive instead of Texas or any other one of its international holdings.
The one-time presence of a Dallas Airmotive employee, Brad Huelsman, in Dayton, Ohio is not enough. (See Doc. 62, pgID 770-71). The question is not whether Dallas uses employees' residences as a base of operations but rather whether such residence is the base of operations. Nothing in the record indicates that Dallas Airmotive may have been directing its entire international enterprise from Mr. Huelsman's kitchen table. See BNSF, supra, 581 U.S. at 413, 137 S.Ct. 1549 (rejecting general jurisdiction where a company had almost 2,100 employees in the forum state).
Therefore, I find that movants have not provided a sufficient factual basis that would warrant general jurisdiction discovery.
3. Specific Jurisdiction over Dallas Airmotive
The plaintiffs' opening motion focused solely on how "these discovery requests address relevant aspects of the general-jurisdiction due-process inquiry." (Doc. 62, pgID 771). They shift to a new argument in their reply—that there is a reasonable basis for specific-jurisdiction discovery. (Doc. 69, pgID 974).
Plaintiffs and cross-plaintiffs argue that Dallas Airmotive's statements—that they did not have any borescope photographs—was a purposeful fraud that caused them injury. (Doc. 69, pgID 975-76; Doc. 70, pgID 996).
At this stage, this factual basis is insufficient for two reasons. First, movants have not shown how Dallas Airmotive could have "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of acting within Ohio when it did not initiate those email and phone contacts. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021) ("The contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not 'random, isolated, or fortuitous.' ") (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984)). Second, once the jet purchase closed, the injury was complete (if not yet detected). Movants have not shown how any post-purchase contacts could have affected plaintiffs' purchase of an unairworthy jet. The die had already been cast.
Movants have not made any other argument that connects their factual basis for jurisdiction to the requested discovery. However, I will still consider the requests to resolve the issue now instead of later.
The current discovery requests to Dallas Airmotive are overbroad in time and substance. The claims against Dallas Airmotive do not concern all aircraft parts and repairs between 2012 and 2020. They are about a pre-purchase aircraft inspection that Dallas Airmotive completed on or around June 1, 2017. See Straight v. LG Chem, Ltd., 640 F.Supp.3d 795, 804 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2022) ("In order to satisfy due process, there must also be 'a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.' ") (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017)).
On the basis of the 2017 pre-purchase inspection, movants have shown that some requests may reveal relevant contacts. See Lum v. Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC, 433 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (Carr, C.J.) (discussing contacts such as designing a product for or marketing a product specifically to a forum state's market).
Therefore, I grant in part movant's discovery requests to Dallas Airmotive. Dallas Airmotive shall respond to interrogatory numbers 1, 5, and 10; and production requests 3 and 4. Additionally, I limit the scope of the requests to the time period of January 1, 2016 to June 1, 2017.
I otherwise deny the motion. Dallas Airmotive need not respond to any of the other interrogatories or requests.
Conclusion
It is, therefore,
ORDERED THAT:
1. Toledo Jets' Motion to Compel Jurisdictional Discovery (Doc. 60) be, and the same hereby is, granted in part and denied in part, consistent with this opinion; 2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Jurisdictional Discovery from Dallas Airmotive (Doc. 62) be, and the same hereby is, granted in part and denied in part, consistent with this opinion; 3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Jurisdictional Discovery from IAL Corp., Dodson International Parts, Inc., New Century Air Services, Inc., and Robert Dodson, Jr. (Doc. 63) be, and the same hereby is, granted in part and denied in part, consistent with this opinion; 4. Defendants shall serve discovery responses to the requests, as limited by this order, by April 3, 2023; 5. The clerk shall forthwith set a status/scheduling conference thereafter, at a date and time convenient for the parties, for setting a timetable on the pending motions to dismiss (Docs. 51, 52, 53). 6. All other proceedings remain stayed, pending the resolution of the jurisdictional issues. So ordered.