Angelo D'Alessandro v. State

18 Citing cases

  1. Holliday v. State

    104 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)   Cited 16 times

    Wheeler v. State, Fla., 72 So.2d 364, 366. However, we have carefully reviewed the evidence and find it insufficient to support the premise that appellant was interested in a live lottery — one yet to be played — as is necessary to conviction of the felony under the authority of our supreme court in D'Allessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95. Indeed, the state does not so contend or argue on the appeal. The jury acquitted appellant of the first count of the information charging him with having set up, promoted and conducted a live lottery — the felony defined by paragraph (a) of the statute.

  2. Greater Loretta Imp. Ass'n v. State ex Rel. Boone

    234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970)   Cited 44 times
    In Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1970), we stated: "[W]here a constitutional provision may well have either of several meanings, it is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that, if the Legislature has by statute adopted one, its action in this respect is well-nigh, if not completely, controlling."

    This, of course, is the classic definition of a lottery. This definition was again approved in D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95 (1934), the year before Lee. While not strictly essential for the disposition of this case, this Court ought to lay at rest at this time any question as to the proper interpretation of what constitutes a lottery within the contemplation of Article IV, Section 23, of the Constitution of 1885.

  3. Bazarte v. State

    117 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)   Cited 2 times

    The allegations of the indictment are insufficient to show that at the time of the alleged false deposition the preliminary trial alleged to have been in progress involved the alleged violation of any law of the state of Florida. See D'Alessandro v. State, decided February 27, 1934, reported [ 114 Fla. 70] 153 So. 95. "* * *. But the statute does not authorize a preliminary hearing unless a charge is first made against the accused of an act which constitutes a criminal offense.

  4. Harris v. State

    189 So. 787 (Ala. Crim. App. 1939)   Cited 9 times

    The sale or possession of a ticket in a lottery which has already been played or completed is not a violation of Code, § 4247. D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95. Charge C states a correct proposition of law, and its refusal was error. Veasey v. State, 20 Ala. App. 478, 103 So. 67; Townsend v. State, 18 Ala. App. 242, 90 So. 58; Davisdon v. State, 167 Ala. 68, 52 So. 751, 140 Am.St.Rep. 17; Hunt v. State, 135 Ala. 1, 33 So. 329; Turner v. State, 124 Ala. 59, 27 So. 272; Patterson v. State, 146 Ala. 39, 41 So. 157; Gilbert v. State, 20 Ala. App. 565, 104 So. 45. A witness cannot substitute his judgment for that of the jury and give his conclusion as to the effect of a transaction.

  5. Smith v. United States

    105 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1939)   Cited 28 times
    In Smith v. United States, (1939) 70 App. D.C. 255, 105 F.2d 778, the court there held an officer may testify before a jury that, acting upon information, he did certain things, but he may not go further and testify precisely what he was told about the particular place or the particular person.

    While the language of the statute is broad and speaks of any ticket "used * * * for the purpose of * * * conducting any lottery," we are not disposed to hold that a dead or expired lottery ticket would satisfy the statute. Cf. France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676, 17 S.Ct. 219, 41 L.Ed. 595; Francis v. United States, 188 U.S. 375, 23 S.Ct. 334, 47 L.Ed. 508. And see D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95; Stewart v. State, 114 Fla. 544, 154 So. 322. But in this instance the coupling of the old with the new could not have influenced the verdict, since the evidence establishes that the tickets in appellant's possession at the time of his arrest were tickets for use in the future for the purpose of playing and conducting a lottery. We have, therefore, a case in which the evidence unmistakably shows the violation by appellant of a statute passed by Congress with a view to the suppression of the lottery business in the District of Columbia and the lawful arrest of appellant for the commission of the crime in the view and presence of the officers.

  6. Knight v. State ex Rel. Moore

    574 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1990)   Cited 9 times

    Id. at 12 15. See Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. Florida, 234 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1970) (also holding that its constitutional prohibition of lotteries does not encompass bingo); see Sanders' Brief at 4 (contending that the definition of "lottery" does not contemplate "bingo") (citing D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95, 96 (1934)). The operators add that this Court has distinguished between "common forms of gambling [which] are . . . innocuous when in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries."

  7. Harris v. State

    55 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1951)

    Since it failed to establish this essential allegation of Count 1 of the information, it became the duty of this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction entered below. See D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95. Reversed.

  8. YARB v. STATE

    55 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1951)   Cited 1 times

    He entered a plea of not guilty. Counsel waived trial by a jury, and the trial court, after hearing all the evidence, found the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of $750 and costs or in default thereof to serve a period of six months in the State Prison. Yarb appealed. It is contended here that the State of Florida failed to carry the burden of proof required by law by establishing that the tickets in Yarb's possession at the time of his arrest represented an interest in a lottery yet to be played within the meaning of our holding in D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95. We are forced to the conclusion, after a careful consideration of all the evidence adduced by the State of Florida to sustain the material allegations of the information, that this assignment has merit and must be sustained.

  9. Mixon v. State

    54 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1951)   Cited 42 times

    The punishment prescribed by the statute was the same for a conviction upon one count only as it would have been for a conviction upon all, because the counts did not charge separate and distinct offenses, but the same offense * * *." See also Jarrell v. State, 135 Fla. 736, 185 So. 873, and D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95. Under the ruling in the cited case but one sentence was justified and we consider the principle applicable here.

  10. Pinder v. State

    53 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1951)   Cited 7 times

    The officers were unable to testify that the tickets then on the table with the cash in the rear of the fish market were live tickets, as prescribed by statute and the rulings of this Court. See D'Alessandro v. State, 114 Fla. 70, 153 So. 95, 96, and similar cases. On cross examination officer O'Donnell was asked the following question (Tr. 13): By Mr. Roberts: "You would not swear under oath that that was for a future drawing rather than a past drawing, would you Mr. O'Donnell? A. No, I wouldn't say under oath it was a live one. I didn't actually know it was a live one, other than it was with the cash."