A defendant asserting diminished responsibility maintains he or she lacked the required specific intent of the crime charged. See Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008); State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000). We likewise find that Lamasters preserved error on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to sufficiently support the request for bifurcation.
"We may affirm the district court's rejection of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking." Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008).
The defense “allows a defendant to negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to some mental defect [he] did not have the capacity to form that specific intent.” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008) (emphasis added). That a defendant has a mental diagnosis by itself is not enough to warrant assertion of an insanity or diminished-capacity defense; it must be proven the defendant lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent based upon the mental diagnosis.
Iowa Code § 701.4. Gear presented no evidence supporting the viability of such a defense at the hearing on his postconviction application. See State v. Griffin, 691 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 2005) ("[C]ounsel has no duty to raise an issue that has no merit."); see also Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008) (determining attorney did not breach a duty in failing to investigate or present an insanity defense based on postpartum depression because defendant did not present any evidence at the postconviction hearing supporting that defense). Gear likewise presented no evidence aside from his self-serving testimony regarding his mental health history and intoxication that would support a diminished responsibility defense.
The defense “allows a defendant to negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to some mental defect she did not have the capacity to form that specific intent.” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008). “Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result.”
The claim fails if either element is lacking. Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008). Carr states the issues raised were preserved "by Carr's notice of appeal.
The defense “allows a defendant to negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to some mental defect she did not have the capacity to form that specific intent.” Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008). “Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result.”
The claim fails if either element is lacking. Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008). Generally, we do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012). If we determine the claim cannot be addressed on appeal, we must preserve it for a postconviction relief proceeding, regardless of our view of the potential viability of the claim.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harkey must show (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)). Harkey must prove both elements, or the claim will fail.
In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Kehoe must demonstrate her trial counsel (1) failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984)). If either element is not met, the claim will fail.