The final order of a trial court declaring a forfeiture of a bail bond cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent action against the principal and sureties on the bond. (Andrews v. State ex rel. Saye, 80 Okla. 20, 193 P. 873.) 2.

A bond forfeiture declaration cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent action against either the principal or sureties on a bond. State ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Mines, supra note 15 at ¶ 13, at 310; Scholtes v. State, 1966 OK 166, ¶ 7, 420 P.2d 496, 498; Addington v. State ex rel. Pruet Co. Atty., 1935 OK 477, ¶ 10, 44 P.2d 131, 133; State ex rel. Wilson Co. Atty., v. Reger, 1924 OK 833, ¶ 3, 229 P. 470, 471; State ex rel Sullivan v. Littrell, 1924 OK 585, 226 P. 872, syl 1; Andrews v. State ex rel. Saye, 1920 OK 333, 193 P. 873, syl 1. A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, defeat, evade or deny the force and effect of a final order or judgment in an incidental proceeding other than by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or motion for new trial.

This shows the clear distinction between the questions presented in the McIntosh Case and those presented in the instant case. The response to the petition for rehearing has been carefully examined, and it calls to the attention of the court no authority in conflict with the holdings of this court heretofore in Edwards et al. v. State, 39 Okla. 605, 136 P. 577; Andrews et al. v. State, 80 Okla. 20, 193 P. 873; State ex rel. Hankin v. Holt et al., 42 Okla. 472, 141 P. 969. In the Edwards Case, supra, the law applicable to the facts in the instant case is thus stated:

Section 6110, Rev. Laws 1910, provides for the forfeiture of bail and the procedure whereby and the time within which a forfeiture may be set aside, and this court has repeatedly held that after a court has decreed a forfeiture and the term of that court at which the forfeiture has been taken has expired, the final order of the trial court declaring such forfeiture cannot be collaterally attacked in subsequent proceedings against the sureties on the bond. Ables v. State, 79 Okla. 282, 193 P. 969; Andrews v. State ex rel. Saye, 80 Okla. 20, 193 P. 873; State v. Hines, 37 Okla. 198, 131 P. 688; Hines v. State, 39 Okla. 638, 136 P. 592; Edwards v. State, 39 Okla. 605, 136, Pac. 577; State v. Pierce, 65 Okla. 212, 166 P. 132; State v. Holt, 42 Okla. 472, 141 P. 969. The plaintiffs in error seek to escape the force of the rule announced and insist that the situation disclosed by the record was such as to bring this case within the class of cases wherein a court of equity is warranted in relieving against a judgment of forfeiture on one of the well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, viz., unavoidable surprise or misfortune superinduced by the acts of the county attorney which, while not intended as a fraud, yet did actually operate as a "legal" fraud upon the principal and his bondsmen, and while counsel do not in any way impugn the personal motives or character of the county attorney, they contend that by his acts he was guilty of actual fraud in a legal sense, even though his motives and intentions were of the best, and predi