'There is no fixed length of time that is considered to be per se unreasonable. Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). Generally, the passage of time, standing alone, is not enough to justify a holding that the guarantee of a speedy trial has been violated.
The question called for a purely speculative answer and was therefore improper. Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070, 1074 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), writ denied, Ex parte Andrews, 370 So.2d 323 (Ala. 1979); Flanagan v. State, 369 So.2d 46 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979). The testimony elicited by the appellant's counsel concerning F.D.'s alleged flirtatious nature with other men was improper and was properly rejected by the trial court.
It is undisputed that a witness cannot testify to facts that are not within the witness's knowledge. Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). It is also well settled that a witness can testify to his beliefs, thoughts, or impressions where he had the opportunity to observe. Williams v. State, 375 So.2d 1257 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 1271 (Ala. 1979).
We do not see this as a break in the chain of custody for the first investigating officer to arrive at the crime scene in order to secure potential evidence. See, Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). Trooper Jones does not appear to have been involved in the custody of the vehicle at all, and appellant failed to develop any evidence otherwise at trial.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner v. State, 378 So.2d 1173 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 1182 (Ala. 1979). Clearly, a person becomes an "accused" for speedy trial purposes when an indictment is returned against him. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463; Corn v. State, 387 So.2d 275 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala. 1980); Davis v. State, 387 So.2d 268 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 274 (Ala. 1980); Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). 1. Length of Delay.
However, this delay is not sufficient in and of itself to justify a finding that the guarantee of a speedy trial has been violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1979); Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). Assertion of Right: Despite and contrary to the defendant's contentions, both federal and state courts found that the defendant failed to establish that he had requested a speedy trial in either 1976 or 1977.
"There is no fixed length of time that is considered to be per se unreasonable." Andrews v. State, 370 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1979). Generally, the passage of time, standing alone, is not enough to justify a holding that the guarantee of a speedy trial has been violated.