A statute that `" is free from ambiguity, explicit in terms and plain of meaning'" must be enforced as written, without resort to judicial construction. Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 726, 264 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting School Commissioners v. Alderman, 158 N.C. 191, 196, 73 S.E. 905, 907 (1912)). `"[S]ignificance and effect should, if possible, . . . be accorded every part of the act, including every section, paragraph, sentence or clause, phrase, and word.'"
With respect to interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act, this Court has warned against any inclination toward judicial legislation, and in the words of Justice Ervin, speaking for this Court, "`[j]udges must interpret and apply statutes as they are written.'" Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 726, 264 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980) (quoting Montague Bros. v. W.C. Shepherd Co., 231 N.C. 551, 556, 58 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1950)). This Court has long distinguished between liberal construction of statutes and impermissible judicial legislation or the act of a court in "`ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it] believes ought to have been embraced.'"
Second, such liberality should not, however, extend beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts may not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or engage in any method of "judicial legislation." Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 726, 264 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980) ("[J]udges must interpret and apply statutes as they are written"); Davis v. Granite Corporation, 259 N.C. 672, 675, 131 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1963) (a statute must be interpreted according to its "definite and sensible" meaning); Gilmore v. Board of Education, 222 N.C. 358, 366, 23 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1942) ("[i]t is ours to construe the laws and not to make them"). Third, it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would leave an important matter regarding the administration of the Act open to inference or speculation; consequently, the judiciary should avoid "ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it] believes ought to have been embraced."
G.S. 160A-50 (h). Since the legislature amended G.S. 160A-38 (h) to provide that those appeals are to go to the Court of Appeals, we cannot say that its failure to amend G.S. 160A-50 (h) is a "clear legislative oversight" as was the case in Adams-Millis. Where an Article (Article 4A of Chapter 160A) has two distinct sections ( 160A-38 (h) and 50 (h)) dealing with related matters, an amendment to one section is not an amendment to the other because it is presumed that if the legislature had intended the amendment to apply to both sections, it would have expressed such intent. See, Arrington v. Stone Webster Engineering Corp., 264 N.C. 38, 140 S.E.2d 759 (1965) (dealing with two subsections within one statute); see also, Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 264 S.E.2d 99 (1980) (legislature clearly expressed its intent in G.S. 97-29 to amend G.S. 97-38). The result is that G.S. 160A-38 (h) provides for appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases involving less than 5,000 people and G.S. 160A-50 (h), pursuant to which the appeal was taken in this case, provides for appeal to the Supreme Court in cases involving 5,000 or more people.
We thus turn to the merits of defendants' argument. Although the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed, see Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968), `"[j]udges must interpret and apply statutes as they are written,'" Andrews v. Nu-Woods, Inc., 299 N.C. 723, 726, 264 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), "ensur[ing] that the legislative intent is accomplished," Radzisz v. Harley Davidson of Metrolina, 346 N.C. 84, 88, 484 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1997) (citation omitted). Statutes should be reconciled with each other whenever possible, avoiding interpretations that would create conflicts between two or more statutes.