Andrews v. Norvell

13 Citing cases

  1. Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Palladino

    276 Ga. 612 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 51 times
    Holding hospital not liable to patient under respondeat superior for hospital employee's alleged misconduct in manipulating patient's genitals during patient's stay at hospital

    See note 4, supra, and accompanying text. The dissent's reliance upon cases such as Jump v. Anderson, 58 Ga. App. 126, 129 (197 S.E. 344) (1938); Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241 ( 15 S.E.2d 808) (1941); and Miller v. Honea, 163 Ga. App. 421 ( 294 S.E.2d 629) (1982) is misplaced. The first of these three cases, Jump, involved an employee truck driver who, while driving a truck on the employer's business, injured someone.

  2. Clark v. Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P.C.

    240 Ga. App. 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 S.E.2d 808) (1941) (finding the master liable for the servant's practical joke on another). Accord Hobbs v. Principal Fin. Group, 230 Ga. App. 410, 412 ( 497 S.E.2d 243) (1998) (finding that a master is not liable when a servant's tort is "entirely disconnected" from his employment); Coffee Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge v. Nasworthy, 198 Ga. App. 757 ( 403 S.E.2d 453) (1991) (finding that the master is not liable when a servant's tort occurred during a "purely personal" mission); Curtis v. Kelley, supra at 119; May v. Phillips, 157 Ga. App. 630 ( 278 S.E.2d 172) (1981); Sparks v. Buffalo Cab Co., 113 Ga. App. 528, 530 ( 148 S.E.2d 919) (1966); Cooley v. Tate, 87 Ga. App. 1, 4 ( 73 S.E.2d 72) (1952).

  3. McCranie v. Langdale Ford Co.

    335 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 12 times
    In McCranie, as here, plaintiff was allegedly knocked to the ground and injured by an employee on the employer's premises.

    Jones v. Reserve Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 176, 178 (3) ( 253 S.E.2d 849). Thus, where there is evidence that the act of the servant was not purely personal (see in this connection Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 S.E.2d 808)), a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the capacity in which the servant was acting when he committed the tort and summary judgment is inappropriate. Miller v. Honea, 163 Ga. App. 421 ( 294 S.E.2d 629). In Miller v. Honea, supra, plaintiff Miller sustained injuries by the hands of Honea, an assistant business agent for the union.

  4. Retirement Care Associates, Inc. v. United States

    3 F. Supp. 2d 1434 (N.D. Ga. 1998)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that plaintiffs were not entitled to jury trial on tax claims pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7431 and § 7433

    "In the scope of his business," "in the scope of his employment," and similar expressions, have sometimes been given too narrow a meaning. If the act done by the employee is done in the prosecution of the business of the employer, that is, if the employee is at the time of the commission of the wrongful act engaged in serving his employer, the wrongful act is done "in the prosecution and within the scope of the employer's business.Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 243-44, 15 S.E.2d 808 (1941). See also, American Security Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 724, 176 S.E. 798 (1934) ("if the act is done in the prosecution of the master's business, that is, if the servant is at the time engaged in serving the master, the latter will be liable" (emphasis in original)).

  5. Leo v. Waffle House

    298 Ga. App. 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 39 times
    Ruling that restaurant employee’s conduct in preparing a concoction containing corrosive dishwasher detergent and daring plaintiff to drink it, resulting in injuries to plaintiff, did not give rise to actionable negligent supervision claim against restaurant, absent evidence that restaurant knew or should have known that employee had engaged in such reckless behavior previously

    Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to this claim. See Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 819-820 (3) (b) ( 670 SE2d 469) (2008) (holding that a manager's battery of customer during an exchange about service at the restaurant was within the scope of employment); McCranie v. Langdale Ford Co., 176 Ga. App. 281, 283 ( 335 SE2d 667) (1985) (holding that jury question existed as to whether the battery of a customer by a salesperson after the customer verbally assaulted the salesperson was within the scope of employment); Miller v. Honea, 163 Ga. App. 421, 422 ( 294 SE2d 629) (1982) (same, regarding the act of a union official whose duties included the handling of grievances and who, while discussing a grievance with a union member, became enraged and assaulted him); Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 SE2d 808) (1941) (same, regarding the act of the saloon employee, while performing his duty to assist and direct customers in regard to seating, of playing a practical joke by having a customer sit where he had placed a substance that would burn a person's flesh); Jump v. Anderson, 58 Ga. App. 126, 129 ( 197 SE 644) (1938) (same, regarding the act of the employee, while driving a truck on his employer's business, playfully turned the truck toward the plaintiff, and then did not turn back soon enough, so that a portion of the truck struck the plaintiff). See Piedmont Hosp. v. Palladino, 276 Ga. 612, 613 ( 580 SE2d 215) (2003) (act of sexual assault on patient by medical worker not within the scope of employment even though worker was authorized to touch patient's genitals in furtherance of his job duties); Dowdell, 291 Ga. App. at 471 (1) (acts of striking plaintiff in the face and fighting with him were not connected to or in furtherance of defendant's cashier duties at restauran

  6. Feist v. Dirr

    609 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 6 times
    Affirming summary judgment on immunity grounds in favor of university professor on breach of contract, fraud, conversion, negligent bailment, and deceptive trade practices claims — where all of the claims arose out of the same conduct

    Hardin v. Phillips, supra at 543 (1). Where the state employee acts "in the prosecution and within the scope of" the employer's business, intentional wrongful conduct comes within and remains within the scope of the employment. Jones v. Dixie Ohio Express, 116 Ga. App. 155, 156-157 (1) ( 156 SE2d 388) (1967); Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 243-244 ( 15 SE2d 808) (1941). (c) Under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, absent a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity after proper notice, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider such case, because constitutional sovereign immunity deprives Georgia courts of the power to consider such claims.

  7. Rubin v. Mikart, Inc.

    306 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    ]' [Cits.]" Jones, supra at 178 (2). "`[T]o exonerate the master from liability it is essential that the [employee's] deviation should be for purposes entirely personal to the servant, where the servant, notwithstanding the deviation, is engaged in the master's business within the scope of his employment, it is immaterial that he join with this some private purposes of his own.' Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 S.E.2d 808) (1941)." Miller v. Honea, 163 Ga. App. 421, 422 ( 294 S.E.2d 629) (1982).

  8. Miller Individually and as Administratrix v. Honea

    294 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 10 times

    Since to exonerate the master from liability it is essential that the deviation should be for purposes entirely personal to the servant, where the servant, notwithstanding the deviation, is engaged in the master's business within the scope of his employment, it is immaterial that he join with this some private purposes of his own." Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 S.E.2d 808) (1941). See also Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778 ( 171 S.E. 470) (1939); Brown v. Union Bus Co., 61 Ga. App. 496 ( 6 S.E.2d 388) (1939).

  9. Dupree v. Babcock

    100 Ga. App. 767 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 5 times

    See Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 ( 77 S.E. 618)." Andrews v. Norvell, 65 Ga. App. 241, 243 ( 15 S.E.2d 808). Applying this law to the facts alleged and admitted in the present case where admittedly the defendant Brandt was engaged in the scope of his employment up until the time he began firing the pistol or dummy machine gun and where his duties included entertaining the customers in Mrs. DuPree's establishment, and where he fired the gun as a "prank" in the presence of such customers it cannot be denied that he was in fact acting within the scope of his employment when he fired the "blanks" so close to the plaintiff as to burn him as the hot gunpowder exploded.

  10. Taff v. Life Insurance

    50 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948)   Cited 3 times
    In Taff v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 77 Ga. App. 839 (50 S.E.2d 154), it was expressly pointed out that the facts differed from the Schwartz case in that it was not alleged that the agent was engaged in his master's business.

    There is no room for argument on this question. The next case on which the plaintiff relies for reversal is Andrews v. Norvell. 65 Ga. App. 241, 245 ( 15 S.E.2d 808). The headnote of that case states: "The proprietor of a saloon is bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence to see that one who enters his saloon as a customer and patron is protected from wilful misconduct and practical jokes which cause bodily harm to the patron and customer, perpetrated by one employed by the proprietor to operate such saloon." We have but to analyze the facts in that case, which we will not do here, to readily discern that the case differentiates itself from the instant case under its facts.