Opinion
CV-21-01051-PHX-MTL
10-27-2022
Philana Andreason, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Philana Andreason's appeal of an Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) denial of her applications for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of that denial. (Doc. 1.) The Court now addresses Andreason's Opening Brief (Doc. 16, Pl. Br.), the Commissioner's Response Brief and Countermotion for Remand (Doc. 20, Def. Br.), and the Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 21, Reply), as well as the Administrative Record (“R.”). For the reasons expressed herein, the Court reverses the ALJ's decision and remands for additional proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Andreason filed an Application for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act on May 14, 2015, based on a disability beginning on April 14, 2014. (R. at 27.) The claims were denied initially on October 1, 2015, and upon reconsideration on February 6, 2016. (Id.) After this denial, Andreason testified at a hearing before the ALJ in November 2017. (R. at 45, 80-81, 118-19.) Following the hearing, the ALJ found Andreason was not disabled. (R. at 27-36.) The Appeals Council denied Andreason's request for review and she then appealed to a court in this District. (R. at 1056-62.) On February 13, 2020, the court reversed the ALJ's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. (R. at 1066-78.) On March 29, 2021, after the remand, a different ALJ denied Andreason's claims. (R. at 967-93.) The Appeal's Council denied Andreason's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the agency's final decision. (R. at 956-66.) Andreason now seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Upon reviewing the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated Andreason's disability based on the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, generalized osteoarthritis, major depressive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (R. at 972.) The ALJ found that Andreason “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 973.) next, the ALJ calculated Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
[Andreason] has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour day, and sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and vibration. The claimant can follow simple instructions and perform simple tasks with occasional contact with coworkers and the public.
(R. at 975.) The ALJ found that Andreason can perform jobs that exist in the national economy. (R. at 980-81.) Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Andreason was not disabled from the alleged disability onset date through the date of the decision. (R. at 791.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the district court reviews only those issues the parties raised in challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The parties, however, agree that the ALJ did not support his decision with substantial evidence. (Def. Br. at 14.) The Commissioner concedes that there is reversible error regarding the ALJ's evaluation of medical source opinions and remand is appropriate to evaluate these opinions. (Id. at 2.) The only issue that remains is whether to remand the case for additional investigation or for the calculation of benefits.
III. CREDIT-AS-TRUE ANALYSIS
Andreason's preferred remedy is for the Court to remand this case for immediate computation of benefits under the “credit-as-true” rule. (Pl. Br. at 25.) This remedy is rare and discretionary. Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court only applies the rule when three factors are met: (1) the ALJ must have rejected evidence for legally insufficient reasons; (2) the record has to be fully developed without any outstanding issues necessary to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the social security regulations; and (3) the record must, with certainty, reflect that a remand should result in a finding that the claimant is disabled. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100-01. In the Ninth Circuit, even if the three factors are met, the law is unclear as to whether applying the credit-as-true rule is mandatory or the Court has discretion to remand for further proceedings. Compare Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2009), and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-23 (9th Cir. 2014), with Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099-02. Courts “frequently exercise[] [their] discretion to remand for further proceedings, rather than benefits.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102. Here, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that applying the credit-as-true rule is not appropriate in this case.
The parties agree that the decision was legally insufficient, thus satisfying factor one. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 5, 2016) (finding the first element is met where the issue is undisputed.) The other two factors preclude remand for computation of benefits. First, the record contains outstanding issues better resolved by an ALJ. Andreason asserts that the ALJ did not adequately evaluate the medical opinions of Dr. Alpern, Mr. Chukwuemeka, and Dr. Coehlo that, if credited as true, would require finding Andreason disabled. (Pl. Br. at 1-2, 14-20.) The Commissioner agrees remand is appropriate because the ALJ improperly discounted one of Dr. Alpern's opinions but argues Mr. Chukwuemeka and Dr. Coehlo's opinions conflict and require further investigation. (Def. Br. at 15-16.) Regarding Dr. Alpern's opinion, the parties agree that the ALJ incorrectly stated that Dr. Alpern based his opinion that Andreason had sedentary limitations and would miss three days of work a month on medication side effects. (R. at 979-80, 1014.) Rather, the monthly absences are associated with “problems with pain, mostly, dizziness, [and] fatigue[.]” (R. at 1014.) And as Andreason notes (Pl. Br. at 20), the vocational expert testified that a person who would miss two to three days of work would not sustain employment (R. at 66.) Even if Dr. Alpern's opinion is credited as true, further administrative proceedings would be useful and an ALJ would not be required to find Andreason disabled because the record is not entirely consistent. The ALJ would need to weigh other medical record evidence against Dr. Alpern's opinion. For example, both Dr. Hutchinson and Dr. Maloney opined that medical evidence did not establish chronic fatigue and that Andreason was capable of working. (R. at 101-03, 111-12.) Dr. Maloney also opined that medical evidence did not support her alleged pain. (R. at 121-23, 129-31.) The ALJ did not address these inconsistencies between the expert opinions in his decision.
Regarding Mr. Chukwuemeka and Dr. Coehlo's opinions, Andreason argues that the ALJ did not provide specific reasons for rejecting the opinions. (Pl. Br. at 21-22.) The Commissioner argues that even if the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinions, they conflict about Andreason's mental limitations. (Def. Br. at 16.) The Court agrees that the two opinions appear to conflict as to Andreason's mental impairments. Mr. Chukwuemeka opined that Andreason had a poor ability to function in a work setting because of her physical limitations and mood disorders. (R. at 747.) Dr. Coehlo opined that despite her limitations, Andreason was able to carry out simple instructions, could remember work-related instructions and procedures, could work with others, and could respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (R. at 471-72.) The ALJ reasoned that medical evidence in the record did not support Mr. Chukwuemeka's opinions. (R. at 979.) The ALJ also reasoned that it gave “some weight” to Dr. Coelho's opinions because it supports that Andreason's limitations are largely physical and not mental. (Id.) Crediting both of the opinions as true does not necessarily require finding a disability because if even the ALJ gives them full weight, they appear to conflict. The ALJ is better suited to evaluate the opinions and consider the medical record evidence on remand to determine the severity of Andreason's physical or mental limitations.
Further proceedings would also be useful to evaluate Andreason's symptom testimony. Andreason argues that crediting her symptom testimony as true requires finding her disabled. (Reply at 9.) The Court disagrees. Even if Andreason's subjective symptom testimony is credited as true, the ALJ may find discrepancies with her testimony in comparing it to other medical record evidence. For example, an emergency room report shows that, while Andreason claimed her pain was so severe she could not stand up and refused to do so, when medical staff were not looking, she stood up, changed her clothes, and moved without difficulty. (R. at 1699.) Other medical record evidence shows that Andreason complained of chronic neck pain, but medical examinations did not substantiate her claims. (R. at 2043.) And as the Commissioner notes, Andreason appeared to have good motor strength, a normal gait, and unremarkable neurological testing at several examinations. (See R. at 457-58, 1269, 1527, 2033.)
Andreason's arguments do not establish that crediting the medical opinions or symptom testimony as true would require the ALJ to find her disabled. The Court finds there are outstanding issues and ambiguity in the record that preclude applying the credit-as-true rule. Thus, the Court remands this case for further administrative proceedings to evaluate the record as necessary to determine Andreason's disability status.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant's Countermotion to Remand (Doc. 20).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with the Order.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.