( Premier Electric Construction Co. v. La Salle National Bank (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 638, 450 N.E.2d 1360.) The consequences of confusing code sections may be severe. For example, in Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 289 N.E.2d 27, this court reversed the dismissal of a complaint on a motion under the predecessor of section 2-619. One of the arguments defendant made in support of the dismissal was that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

( City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1945), 392 Ill. 195, 205-06, 64 N.E.2d 450; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 410 N.E.2d 925, appeal denied (1981), 82 Ill.2d 585.) Mere similarity in pleadings is not determinative of the issue of res judicata. Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 976, 289 N.E.2d 27. When determining the identity of causes of action for res judicata purposes, one line of Illinois cases considers whether the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases.

Be that as it may, a defense of laches has not been made out, since the defendant's motion to dismiss did not allege that the plaintiffs were aware of the extension proceedings at the time that these took place, and since it failed to show in what way the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiffs' failure to proceed more expeditiously. Cf. Baumrucker v. Brink, 373 Ill. 82, 87;Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co., 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 976-7. The defendant's final contention is that the complaint was not properly verified.

Failure to state a cause of action is not the type of matter which falls within the purview of section 48(1)(i). Rather, such a motion is to be made under section 45. (See Michigan Avenue National Bank v. State Farm Insurance Cos. (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 507, 512, 404 N.E.2d 426, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 593; Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 977, 289 N.E.2d 27; see also Laycock, Dispositive Pre-trial Motions in Illinois, 9 Loy. Chi. L.J. 823, 831-38 (1978).) Thus, despite Peters' protestations to the contrary, he has indeed filed a hybrid motion in this case.

A failure to state a cause of action is not one of them. A motion premised on the contention a complaint failed to state a cause of action is not a section 48 motion but a section 45 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 45) motion. ( Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 289 N.E.2d 27.) It would be improper and unjust to allow the defendants to attack the pleadings after failing to file a motion pointing out specifically the defects complained of as required by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 45(1)), since the purpose of the statute is to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the objection and to cure the defect in the trial court. Hild v. Avland Development Co. (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 173, 360 N.E.2d 785, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 630.

• 3 Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim, which, taken together with a lapse of time and circumstances causing prejudice to the opposite party, will bar a complaint in equity. ( Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 289 N.E.2d 27, citing Schoenbrodv. Rosenthal (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 112, 183 N.E.2d 188.) " Laches * * * is not merely the passage of a given time period, but is a question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced where the complainant has not been vigilant in enforcing his rights resulting in detriment to an adverse party.

Under this section, Ford asserts, the trial court could properly go beyond the face of the complaint and consider the parties' affidavits in finding that there was no agency relationship and no breach of the peace. • 2 The parties' contentions raise once again the recurring question of the relationship between motions to dismiss under sections 45 and 48. (See generally, e.g., Dangeles v. Marcus (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 662, 373 N.E.2d 645; Cain v. American National Bank Trust Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 574, 325 N.E.2d 799; Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 289 N.E.2d 27; Laycock, Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions in Illinois — Sections 45, 48 and 57 of the Civil Practice Act, 9 Loy. Chi. L.J. 823 (1978) (hereinafter Laycock).) Perhaps the most troublesome area of this inquiry concerns the proper scope of section 48(1)(i), quoted above; that is, in the context of the case at bar, whether section 48(1)(i) is broad enough to encompass defenses such as the nonexistence of an agency relationship, the first basis for the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 45; see Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co., 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 977, 289 N.E.2d 27.) Consequently, the rules governing a Section 45 motion control, and not those governing a Section 48 motion. • 9 Under a section 45 motion, all facts well pleaded by the complaint are taken as true.

Defendant Mintjal alleges that during this period he has entered into possession of the property and expended large sums of money in improving it. Defendants must establish they have been prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay in filing its action. ( Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co., 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 289 N.E.2d 27.) This is in addition to the requirement that there be a neglect or omission to assert a right after having had reasonable knowledge of all the facts necessary to the assertion of the claim. Gill v. Gill, 8 Ill. App.3d 625, 290 N.E.2d 897.