Anderson v. Warden

Full title: Francis Anderson #139042 v. Warden

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Feb 10, 2017

TSRCV134005263S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2017)

Opinion

TSRCV134005263S

02-10-2017

Francis Anderson #139042 v. Warden

Vernon D. Oliver, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Vernon D. Oliver, J.

The petitioner, Francis Anderson, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming various due process violations in the disciplinary hearing process that resulted in the retroactive loss of Risk Reduction Earned Credits (hereinafter " RREC").

The petitioner makes the due process claim in his petition that his prison advocate's actions, inactions and lack of " independence" deprived him of due process.

The petitioner seeks an order from this court reinstating his previously earned 55 days of RREC. The respondent denies the claims and asserts that the petitioner has received all required constitutional protections.

I

DISCUSSION

The court conducted the trial of this matter on January 4, 2017. The petitioner submitted his own testimony. The respondent submitted exhibits and the testimony of Department of Correction hearing officer Capt. Eric Pensavalle.

In order to prevail on his due process claim, the petitioner must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property or liberty interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property or liberty interest has occurred without due process of law. (Citations omitted.) Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 241, 106 A.3d 266 (2014). In Vandever, our Supreme Court set forth the analysis of due process requirements in the context of prison:

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the United States Supreme Court considered the process that is due to a prisoner prior to his placement in administrative segregation. " The requirements imposed by the [due process] [c]lause are, of course, flexible and variable [depending on] the particular situation being examined . . . In determining what is due process in the prison context, we are reminded that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison . . . Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security . . . These considerations convince [the court] that [prison officials are] obligated to engage only in an informal, non-adversary review of the information supporting [an inmate's] administrative confinement, including whatever statement [the inmate] wishe[s] to submit, within a reasonable time after [placement in] administrative segregation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 472; see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2001) (" [t]he [United States] Supreme Court requires that, assuming the existence of a liberty interest, a prisoner placed in administrative segregation be provided some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

" In a variety of contexts, [including the prison context] the [United States Supreme] Court has [also] recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); see also Taylor v. Rodriguez, supra, 238 F.3d 194 (when inmate has liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more restrictive conditions of confinement, decision to transfer must be supported by " some evidence"). This standard is a lenient one, requiring only " a modicum of evidence" to support the challenged decision. Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at 455. " Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id., 455-56; see also Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 2013) (characterizing test as 'minimally stringent'").

Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 244-45. The court went on in addressing the bases upon which the respondent might base his decision when it wrote:

The petitioner provides no authority for the proposition that department officials were not permitted to consider his interest in learning about perimeter security, and the fact that he previously had escaped from Osborn and attempted to escape on two other occasions, in evaluating whether he should be placed in administrative segregation, and our independent research has uncovered no such authority. This is not surprising, because we cannot perceive of any reason why it was improper for department officials to consider this information. To the contrary, it is well established that prison officials, in determining the appropriate security classification for inmates, often and for good reason must rely on an inmate's past conduct as a predictor of his or her future behavior. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (" [t]ransfers between institutions, for example, are made for a variety of reasons and often involve no more than informed predictions as to what would best serve institutional security or the safety and welfare of the inmate"); Crawford v. Lappin, 446 Fed.Appx. 413, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting inmate's claim that his placement in administrative segregation violated due process because decision was predicated, in part, on conduct for which he already had been disciplined, and explaining that " due process is not violated by placing an inmate in administrative custody based on past conduct when that conduct provides a basis for predicting [future misconduct]"); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) (" [e]ven [if the court] conclude[d] that [the prisoner's] continued confinement in administrative custody [was] based solely on his past crimes, the process he received would nonetheless pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likely future behavior based on a generally volatile criminal character have been upheld by the [United States] Supreme Court").

Id., 246-47. In the instant matter, the petitioner seeks to challenge the process by which 55 days of RREC time was revoked based on guilty findings for assaulting three Department of Correction employees. Along those lines, the Vandever, court further emphasized that:

" [A] prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hewitt v. Helms, supra, 459 U.S. 474. It therefore is not the role of this court to second-guess that decision, especially when, as in the present case, there is ample reason, based on the undisputed evidence, to support it. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at 455 (" that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision . . . does [not] imply that a disciplinary board's . . . decisions . . . are subject to second-guessing upon review"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (" [p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security").

Id., 245-46. Although addressing the issue of administrative segregation, it is clear to this court that the same analysis applies to the RREC issue in the instant matter.

As in Vandever, this court need not resolve the issue of the existence of a property or liberty interest because, even assuming that the petitioner has a liberty in RREC credits, he received all of the process to which he was constitutionally entitled. In the instant matter, this court did examine the entire record as provided by the parties, including additional physical exhibits, testimony of witnesses and the weighing of evidence and credibility. The court finds that the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that he was denied due process prior to being found guilty of assaulting DOC employees and prior to losing past RREC. The weight of the evidence supports the position that the notice to the petitioner regarding the purpose of the hearing, both verbally and in writing, the notice of the claims against him, the hearing itself and the findings of the respondent were not violative of due process in that they were based on sufficient evidence and were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court finds that any apparent flaws in the hearing process resulted from the petitioner's refusal to cooperate with his assigned advocate and the hearings process.

II

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Judgment shall enter for the respondent.