Opinion
12-24-00041-CR
12-20-2024
MARIAH SHARNEA ANDERSON, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 114-1515-18)
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Hoyle Justice
Mariah Sharnea Anderson appeals the trial court's judgment adjudicating her guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In two issues, Appellant argues that, at the hearing on the State's motion to adjudicate, the court tried, convicted, and punished her for a new offense alleged by the State, in violation of her rights to due process of law and against cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.
Background
Appellant was charged by indictment in 2018 with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded "guilty," and the trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed her on community supervision for a term of ten years. In May 2023, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Appellant's guilt, alleging that she violated the conditions of her community supervision by failing to timely pay her monthly supervision fees, failing to timely obtain a GED, and committing the new offense of injury to a child. A few weeks later, the State moved to withdraw the motion to adjudicate, and the trial court amended Appellant's community supervision conditions to require that she spend one hundred days in jail, complete four hundred hours of community service restitution, obtain a GED within sixty days of release from jail, undergo intensive supervision until obtaining a GED, comply with all family court and Child Protective Services (CPS) orders, avoid contact with codefendant Keyshon Moore, and avoid contact with any children except under adult supervision and with CPS permission.
In November, the State again moved the court to adjudicate Appellant's guilt, alleging that she violated her community supervision conditions by failing to timely pay her supervision fees, possessing and drinking an alcoholic beverage, failing to submit to a random urinalysis, and committing the offense of injury to a child. At a hearing on the motion, the State produced evidence of each alleged violation. Thereafter, the trial court found the allegations "true," adjudicated Appellant "guilty," and assessed her punishment at imprisonment for a term of fifteen years. This appeal followed.
Propriety of Revocation Proceeding
In Appellant's two issues, respectively, she argues that we should reverse the trial court's judgment and reinstate her community supervision because the court improperly used the revocation hearing to try, convict, and punish her for the new offense of injury to a child, in violation of her rights (1) against cruel and unusual punishment and (2) to due process of law.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In revocation cases, the state has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the terms and conditions of community supervision have been violated. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence supports a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of community supervision. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In a revocation hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt after a defendant is placed on deferred adjudication community supervision is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.108(b) (West 2018).
Appellate review of a trial court's order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). One sufficient ground for revocation will support a trial court's order revoking community supervision. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Analysis
Before a complaint may be presented for appellate review, the record must show that it was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). An appellant fails to preserve error by failing to object when she has the opportunity. Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A sentencing issue may be preserved by objecting at the punishment hearing or when the sentence is pronounced. Id. at 577. An appellant may raise a sentencing issue for the first time in a motion for new trial only if she did not have an opportunity to object during the punishment hearing. Id. at 577 n.4.
Appellant did not object when her guilt was adjudicated or her sentence was pronounced. Because she had the opportunity to object to her adjudication and sentence and failed to do so, we conclude that she failed to preserve her issues for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Burt, 396 S.W.3d at 577-78.
Furthermore, even if Appellant preserved her issues, we could not grant her relief because the record does not support her claim that the trial court used the revocation proceeding to try, convict, and punish her for the injury to a child allegation. Appellant bases this claim on the following comments by the court:
And while you were waiting for that to kick in, or waiting for that to come about, his exact words were it's going to be a gamble as to what happens during that sort of period. And it's a gamble we're taking with your children. And I think that the smarter move here is to protect those kids the extent I can.
And I do find the evidence to be troubling, to be difficult. And I think it warrants, in this case, a consequence more severe than continuing you again on probation.
For context, the court refers here to licensed clinical social worker supervisor Russell Bailiff's testimony regarding the possibility of successfully treating Appellant's complex post-traumatic stress disorder to ameliorate her future risk of engaging in child abuse.
Appellant interprets these comments to "explicitly state" that the court "was handing out 'a consequence more severe than continuing [her] again on probation' in order to 'to [sic] protect those kids' because 'the evidence' was 'troubling' and 'warrant[ed]' a 15-year-sentence." We disagree with this interpretation. Without explanation, Appellant assumes that the "consequence" believed warranted by the trial court was the fifteen-year sentence, even though it could instead refer to the revocation of community supervision. Based on the following statements, made by the court immediately after those quoted above, we consider the latter alternative more likely correct:
So I am going to find paragraphs 1 through 7 to be true. And based on that, I'm going to invoke the previously imposed term of deferred adjudication community supervision, find you to be guilty of this offense and sentence you to serve fifteen years' confinement . . . which I'll tell you was less than I might have otherwise.
And I say that so that you know that you're not getting the maximum here, although I think it is probably deserved. And I hope you take advantage of that additional time to make decisions when you get out, to take advantage of the time, that sort of bonus time you will get with your kids, and that you have put yourself in a position to have a healthy, productive relationship with them when this is behind you.
The court heard evidence of Appellant's background, five young children, relatively low psychopathy score, complex post-traumatic stress disorder, and relatively high chance of treatment success if she chose to pursue treatment.
With this additional context, it appears that the court based its revocation decision, at least in part, on the "troubling" nature of the injury to a child evidence but did not punish her more harshly because of it, and perhaps even assessed a shorter sentence than it would have based solely on the aggravated assault charge.
Appellant further contends that because CPS was actively involved in her children's welfare, the trial court's attempt to further the children's "protection" was unnecessary and an abuse of discretion. Regardless of whether the court's protection was necessary, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by adjudicating Appellant's guilt and revoking her community supervision. "[A] trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on a revocation motion." State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Appellant cites no authority stating that a trial court's consideration of child protection in making a revocation decision is improper, and we know of none. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring brief to contain clear and concise argument with appropriate citations to authorities). Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that the State established each of her community supervision violations by a preponderance of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court did not violate Appellant's rights to due process and against cruel and unusual punishment or abuse its discretion by adjudicating Appellant's guilt, revoking her community supervision, and assessing her punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Waters, 560 S.W.3d at 661; Burt, 396 S.W.3d at 577-78; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 342; Caddell, 605 S.W.2d at 277. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's first and second issues.
Disposition
Having overruled Appellant's two issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.