To carry this burden, the defendant must present evidence, from any source, but cannot rely on mere speculation or conjecture. Id. Because the defendant may not actually know the nature of the informant's testimony, the defendant need make only a plausible showing of how the informant's testimony may be important, i.e., how that testimony could be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Id.; Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); see Tex.R.Evid. 508(c)(2). The defendant must still show that the informant's potential testimony would significantly aid him. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318.

This rule creates a four-step process for resolving prosecution claims of privilege for informers; namely, 1) the evidence must show that the informer may be able to give necessary evidence, 2) the prosecution must invoke the privilege, 3) the trial court must permit the prosecution to show in camera whether the witness can give the testimony, and 4) if the court determines the informer can give the testimony, and the prosecution does not disclose their identity, the charge must be dismissed. In Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), the court addressed the effect of Rule 508(c)(2). In doing so, it noted the common law standard formerly followed in Texas was based on Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), which held that an informant's identity must be disclosed if they participated in the offense, were present at the time of the offense or arrest, or were otherwise shown to be a material witness to the transaction.

Rule 508 is broader than the former law, which held that disclosure was not required unless the informant (1) participated in the offense, (2) was present at the time of the offense or arrest, or (3) was otherwise shown to be a material witness to the transaction or about whether the defendant knowingly committed the offense charged. Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Lopez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). Under rule 508, the defendant has the burden to make a plausible showing that the informant could give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt. Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72; Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318; Lopez, 824 S.W.2d at 300.

The exception to the informer identity privilege is no longer restricted to the three traditional instances where the informer either participated in the offense, was present at the time of the offense or the arrest, or was otherwise shown to be a material witness to the transaction or regarding whether the defendant knowingly committed the offense. Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Rather, a defendant is now "only required to make a plausible showing that the informer could give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt."

For instance, in Anderson v. State , we held that the requirements of Rule 508 were met where the defendant made a drug sale to an undercover officer who was accompanied by an unnamed informant. 817 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We found the informant's testimony was "necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt, innocence" because he was an eyewitness to the sale.

Id. at 508(c)(2). Under this exception, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the confidential informant may be able to provide testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). To be "necessary," the informant's testimony must "significantly aid" in the determination of guilt or innocence. Id.; Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). However, because the defendant may not actually know the nature of the informant's testimony, all that is required to satisfy this threshold burden is a "plausible showing" of the potential importance of the testimony. Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Long v. State, 137 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. ref'd). Nevertheless, mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient, and the mere filing of a motion to disclose will not compel disclosure. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318; Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant for an abuse of discretion. Sanchez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). Several cases have held that a defendant can satisfy the initial burden by showing that the confidential informant was an eyewitness to the search or participated in the transaction for which the defendant was indicted. See, e.g., Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72; Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318; Sanchez, 98 S.W.3d at 356. In these cases, the informant's testimony was deemed potentially "necessary" because the informant had first-hand knowledge of the events upon which the

necessary to a fair determination . . . on guilt or innocence in a criminal case, and the public entity invokes the privilege, the court shall give the public entity an opportunity to show in camera facts relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony.Id. at 508(c)(2). Under this exception, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the confidential informant may be able to provide testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). To be "necessary," the informant's testimony must "significantly aid" in the determination of guilt or innocence. Id.; Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). However, because the defendant may not actually know the nature of the informant's testimony, all that is required to satisfy this threshold burden is a "plausible showing" of the potential importance of the testimony. Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Long v. State, 137 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, pet. ref'd). Nevertheless, mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient, and the mere filing of a motion to disclose will not compel disclosure. Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318; Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd). We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant for an abuse of discretion. Sanchez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). Several cases have held that a defendant can satisfy the initial burden by showing that the confidential informant was an eyewitness to the search or participated in the transaction for which the defendant was indicted. See, e.g., Anderson, 817 S.W.2d at 72; Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 318; Sanchez, 98 S.W.3d at 356. In these cases, the informant's testimony was deemed potentially "necessary" because the informant had first-hand knowledge of the events upon which the

The provisions of Rule 508 are broader than the requirements that formerly applied under the prior law. Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Rule 508(c)(2) requires only that there be a reasonable probability that the informer can give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt.

That rule requires that there be a reasonable probability that the informant can give testimony "necessary to a fair determination of the issues of guilt, innocence." TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 508(c)(2); see Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The exception to the informant identity privilege is no longer restricted to the three categories set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d at 71-72; Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d at 318.

Even though appellant never specifically asked the trial court to order Escalante to reveal the identity of the informant, it is apparent from the record that such revelation was appellant's desire and what the State sought to prevent. Pursuant to Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 71, n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), appellant preserved error for appellate review. Rule 508 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence allows the State to invoke a privilege and refuse to disclose an informant's identity.