All were found guilty. The convictions of co-defendants George Anderson and Michael Foster were consolidated for review and affirmed in Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456 ( 582 S.E.2d 575) (2003). Construed to support the verdict, the evidence presented at trial, set forth more fully in Anderson v. State, supra, 261 Ga. App. 456, 457-460(1), showed that George Anderson, Jr., Michael Foster, Jr., James Moses II, Shawn Knott, and Kenny Mitchell decided to invade the home of the victims, a married couple, in Cherokee County, to steal approximately $150,000 from a safe located in a workshop behind the victims' house.
When deciding whether an independent offense should be admitted, the trial court's proper focus is on the similarity, not the differences, between the offense and the crime for which the defendant is being tried. Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461 (3) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003). Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the similar transaction evidence.
But see Nelson v. State , 302 Ga. App. 583, 584-85 (1), 691 S.E.2d 363 (2010) (noting that forgery may be proved by circumstantial evidence and that the necessary intent to defraud can be shown by delivery or use of the writing, or by flight, and reversing conviction for forgery when there was no evidence of intent to use counterfeit bill when it was discovered in an inventory of the defendant's belongings while booking him into jail on charges of child molestation).See Anderson v. State , 261 Ga. App. 456, 463 (5), 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003) (comparing language contained in information attached to certified copy of conviction from Missouri to conclude that the activity for which defendant was there convicted of "first degree robbery, armed criminal action, kidnapping, and tampering in the first degree" would have also constituted the felony of armed robbery in Georgia); see also Bette s v. State , 329 Ga. App. 13, 15 (1), 763 S.E.2d 366 (2014) (noting that in the context of forgery, "[b]oth knowledge and intent to defraud may be proven by circumstantial evidence" (punctuation omitted) ). Cf. Lewis v. State , 263 Ga. App. 98, 99 (2), 587 S.E.2d 245 (2003) (vacating and remanding for resentencing when documents from foreign jurisdiction provided no details as to the conduct that gave rise to aggravated assault conviction because foreign jurisdiction permitted convictions for aggravated assault in many different manners, one of which would not necessarily have been felonious under Georgia law); Wal
We disagree. We will not disturb a trial court's ruling that similar transaction evidence is admissible absent an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 261 Ga.App. 456, 461(3), 582 S.E.2d 575 (2003). [S]imilar transaction evidence is admissible if the State establishes that (1) the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose; (2) sufficient evidence shows that the accused committed the separate act; and (3) there is sufficient connection or similarity between the separate act and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to establish the latter.
(Punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461-462 (3) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible.
Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196, 199 (5) ( 552 SE2d 818) (2001).Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 460 (2) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003).Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 686 (2) ( 531 SE2d 84) (2000).
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling that similar transaction evidence is admissible absent an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461 (3) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003). [S]imilar transaction evidence is admissible if the State establishes that (1) the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose; (2) sufficient evidence shows that the accused committed the separate act; and (3) there is sufficient connection or similarity between the separate act and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to establish the latter.
We will not disturb a trial court's ruling that similar transaction evidence is admissible absent an abuse of discretion. Before similar transaction evidence can be introduced, the State must show that: (1) the evidence is being offered for a proper purpose, such as illustrating the defendant's identity, course of conduct, or bent of mind; (2) the accused committed the separate offense; and (3) the transaction is sufficiently similar to the crime charged such that the former tends to prove the latter. See Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461 (3) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003). See id. at 461-462.
Id. at 461 (3). Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461-462 (3) ( 582 SE2d 575) (2003). Kendrick contends that the similar transaction evidence was not admitted for a specific purpose.
As they walked around the area, the victim pointed out the suspects, one of whom, Williams, was carrying the victim's stolen bag. Anderson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 456, 461(3) ( 582 S.E.2d 575) (2003). On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited evidence that the victim told Williams's brother that Williams did not rob him.