"(4) A felony which has an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical injury." This issue has been resolved in our recent decisions in Anderson v. State, [Ms. CR-95-0768, May 8, 1998] 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), and Young v. State, [Ms. CR-95-2195, October 2, 1998] 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). In Anderson, this court held:
SeeWimberly v. State, 759 So.2d 568 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was based on Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), and Young v. State, 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). That court wrote:
"(3) A felony which has an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical injury." This identical issue has been resolved in our recent decision in Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). We held in Anderson that there was "nothing in the language of § 12-15-34.
COBB, Judge. The State appeals from the trial court's order suppressing a statement from defendant Ricky Banks. The trial court suppresed the statement because, at the time of his arrest, Banks was 17 years old, and he was not advised of his juvenile-Miranda rights before the custodial interrogation that resulted in the statement, as required by Rule 11(B), Ala.R.Juv.P. The trial court suppressed Banks's statement based on Anderson v. State, [Ms. CR-95-0768, May 8, 1998] 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998) and Young v. State, [Ms. CR-95-2195, October 2, 1998] 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). Banks was charged with first-degree robbery, see § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975, a Class A felony, and first-degree burglary, see § 13A-7-5, Ala. Code 1975, also a Class A felony.
The State filed the following response to Adams's motion to suppress: "Comes now the State of Alabama, by and through its District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Eleanor I. Brooks, and in response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress asserts that at this time, the Defendant's Motion is correct under the opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals of Anderson v. State, CR-95-0768 [ 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998)] because the Defendant, who was seventeen years of age was not read his Juvenile Miranda Rights, despite the fact the Defendant was charged as an adult. Anderson holds that a defendant who is under eighteen years of age must be read his Juvenile Rights before his statement is deemed voluntary.
The State filed the following response to Adams's motion to suppress: "Comes now the State of Alabama, by and through its District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Eleanor I. Brooks, and in response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress asserts that at this time, the Defendant's Motion is correct under the opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals of Anderson v. State, CR-95-0768 [ 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998)] because the Defendant, who was seventeen years of age was not read his Juvenile Miranda Rights, despite the fact the Defendant was charged as an adult. Anderson holds that a defendant who is under eighteen years of age must be read his Juvenile Rights before his statement is deemed voluntary.
"(4) That if the child's counsel, parent, or guardian is not present, then the child has the right to communicate with them, and that, if necessary, reasonable means will be provided for the child to do so." Defense counsel further argued that because Keller had not been charged in Alabama for the offenses committed here, this Court's holding inAnderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), Wimberly v. State, 759 So.2d 568 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), and Little v. State, 739 So.2d 539 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), rendered the statements inadmissible because Keller had not been informed of his juvenile-Miranda rights. The trial court granted Keller's motion to suppress the statement.
The State concedes that Wimberly was not advised of his "juvenile" rights set out in Rule 11(B), but it argues that, under these circumstances, adult Miranda warnings were sufficient and any error resulting from the failure to advise Wimberly of his juvenile rights was harmless. We resolved this identical issue in Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), and in Young v. State, 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). We held in Anderson that there was "nothing in the language of § 12-15-34.
We note, however, that this argument is contrary to what the State conceded in its brief on original submission. See (State's brief, p. 7) (“It would appear that Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), cited by the Defendant, which holds that the warning of Rule 11(B) is required even when the child must be prosecuted in the Circuit Court, is equally applicable here.”)
1(a)(1) through (6), Ala. Code 1975." Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900, 902 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). The portion of § 12-15-34.