Anderson v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. Little v. State

    739 So. 2d 539 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    "(4) A felony which has an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical injury." This issue has been resolved in our recent decisions in Anderson v. State, [Ms. CR-95-0768, May 8, 1998] 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), and Young v. State, [Ms. CR-95-2195, October 2, 1998] 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). In Anderson, this court held:

  2. Ex Parte State

    759 So. 2d 574 (Ala. 2000)   Cited 3 times

    SeeWimberly v. State, 759 So.2d 568 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999). The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was based on Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), and Young v. State, 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). That court wrote:

  3. Young v. State

    730 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that “[defendant's] custodial statement was wrongfully admitted in evidence because [defendant] was not informed that he had a right to communicate with his parent or guardian, as provided in Rule 11(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.”

    "(3) A felony which has an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical injury." This identical issue has been resolved in our recent decision in Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). We held in Anderson that there was "nothing in the language of § 12-15-34.

  4. State v. Banks

    734 So. 2d 371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 7 times

    COBB, Judge. The State appeals from the trial court's order suppressing a statement from defendant Ricky Banks. The trial court suppresed the statement because, at the time of his arrest, Banks was 17 years old, and he was not advised of his juvenile-Miranda rights before the custodial interrogation that resulted in the statement, as required by Rule 11(B), Ala.R.Juv.P. The trial court suppressed Banks's statement based on Anderson v. State, [Ms. CR-95-0768, May 8, 1998] 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998) and Young v. State, [Ms. CR-95-2195, October 2, 1998] 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). Banks was charged with first-degree robbery, see § 13A-8-41, Ala. Code 1975, a Class A felony, and first-degree burglary, see § 13A-7-5, Ala. Code 1975, also a Class A felony.

  5. Adams v. State

    955 So. 2d 1037 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)   Cited 44 times
    In Adams v. State, 955 So.2d 1037, 1081–83 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), writ. granted in part, reversed in part on other grounds, Ex parte Adams, 955 So.2d 1106 (Ala.2005), Adams argued that his cross-examination of a State's witness was improperly restricted because he was not allowed to question the witness concerning his prior convictions for encouraging the delinquency of a minor and for indecent exposure.

    The State filed the following response to Adams's motion to suppress: "Comes now the State of Alabama, by and through its District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Eleanor I. Brooks, and in response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress asserts that at this time, the Defendant's Motion is correct under the opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals of Anderson v. State, CR-95-0768 [ 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998)] because the Defendant, who was seventeen years of age was not read his Juvenile Miranda Rights, despite the fact the Defendant was charged as an adult. Anderson holds that a defendant who is under eighteen years of age must be read his Juvenile Rights before his statement is deemed voluntary.

  6. Adams v. State

    No. CR-98-0496 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    The State filed the following response to Adams's motion to suppress: "Comes now the State of Alabama, by and through its District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Eleanor I. Brooks, and in response to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress asserts that at this time, the Defendant's Motion is correct under the opinion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals of Anderson v. State, CR-95-0768 [ 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998)] because the Defendant, who was seventeen years of age was not read his Juvenile Miranda Rights, despite the fact the Defendant was charged as an adult. Anderson holds that a defendant who is under eighteen years of age must be read his Juvenile Rights before his statement is deemed voluntary.

  7. State v. Keller

    822 So. 2d 483 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    "(4) That if the child's counsel, parent, or guardian is not present, then the child has the right to communicate with them, and that, if necessary, reasonable means will be provided for the child to do so." Defense counsel further argued that because Keller had not been charged in Alabama for the offenses committed here, this Court's holding inAnderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), Wimberly v. State, 759 So.2d 568 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), and Little v. State, 739 So.2d 539 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), rendered the statements inadmissible because Keller had not been informed of his juvenile-Miranda rights. The trial court granted Keller's motion to suppress the statement.

  8. Wimberly v. State

    759 So. 2d 568 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)   Cited 11 times
    In Wimberly v. State, 759 So. 2d 568, 573-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that plain error occurred when victim-impact evidence similar to that at issue here was presented to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial.

    The State concedes that Wimberly was not advised of his "juvenile" rights set out in Rule 11(B), but it argues that, under these circumstances, adult Miranda warnings were sufficient and any error resulting from the failure to advise Wimberly of his juvenile rights was harmless. We resolved this identical issue in Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), and in Young v. State, 730 So.2d 1251 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998). We held in Anderson that there was "nothing in the language of § 12-15-34.

  9. Ward v. State

    105 So. 3d 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012)   Cited 10 times
    Recognizing that, under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, before a constitutional error can be deemed harmless, the appellate court must be able to declare that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

    We note, however, that this argument is contrary to what the State conceded in its brief on original submission. See (State's brief, p. 7) (“It would appear that Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), cited by the Defendant, which holds that the warning of Rule 11(B) is required even when the child must be prosecuted in the Circuit Court, is equally applicable here.”)

  10. D.H. v. State

    24 So. 3d 1166 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)   Cited 3 times

    1(a)(1) through (6), Ala. Code 1975." Anderson v. State, 729 So.2d 900, 902 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). The portion of § 12-15-34.