Opinion
No. 34142.
June 10, 1940. Suggestion of Error Overruled September 4, 1940.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Where trial judge found that defendants' admission of guilt was free and voluntary, refusal to permit defendants to withdraw their pleas of guilty of crime of burglary pursuant to which pleas defendants had been sentenced was not an abuse of discretion.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
A sound discretion is vested in trial court either to allow or to refuse the withdrawal of pleas of guilty.
APPEAL from circuit court of Leflore county; HON. S.F. DAVIS, Judge.
Gordon L. Smith, of Greenwood, for appellants.
The rule seems to be well settled in this state that it is within the legal discretion of the trial judge to set aside, or refuse to set aside, a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty.
Mastronada v. State, 60 Miss. 86; Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691; Fortenberry v. State, 147 Miss. 91; Haywood v. State, 151 Miss. 536; McDonald v. State, 151 Miss. 566; Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245.
If it appears that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, the ruling should be affirmed. On the other hand, it is not incumbent upon the defendant to prove his innocence before being allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty.
Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245.
A plea made under duress should be set aside.
Turner v. State, 121 Miss. 68.
W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee.
The only question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in overruling this motion to set aside the plea of guilty. The motion came on the last day of the term and after the juries had been discharged. If the defendants did not understand the effect of their pleas, or if it appeared to the court that they did not understand such effect, then, under the case of Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 724, it would have been the duty of the court to have cleared up the matter. Here, however, the defendants, at the time they were sentenced, according to the trial judge, freely admitted to him that they were guilty of the crime charged against them and that there was nothing to put the trial judge on notice of anything which would indicate that the pleas were not the full, frank, and voluntary admissions of their guilt.
The matter of setting aside pleas in a case of this kind is primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and if it be not shown that the trial judge manifestly abused such discretion, this court will affirm his ruling, the judgment entered thereon. As to how these matters are reviewed by this court, see McWilliams v. State, 105 Miss. 844, 63 So. 270; McDonald v. State, 151 Miss. 566, 118 So. 628; Fortenberry v. State, 147 Miss. 91, 113 So. 193.
Argued orally by Gordon L. Smith, for appellants.
The error assigned on this appeal is that the court below should have permitted the appellants to withdraw their pleas of guilty of the crime of burglary, pursuant to which pleas they had been sentenced to serve a term of seven years in the state penitentiary.
The pleas of guilty were entered on November 24, 1939, and the appellants were sentenced four days later. On the next day following the pronouncement of the sentence they filed and presented the motion to be allowed to withdraw the pleas, which was during the last week of the term, and after the jurors and witnesses had been finally discharged.
The question presented by this appeal could be readily disposed of on the ground that the motion was not seasonably made, except for the fact that we are not advised as to what opportunity the appellants may have had to communicate with an attorney for that purpose between the date of the entry of the pleas and the imposition of the sentence. However, the record does disclose that when the trial judge inquired of the appellants, before pronouncing the sentence, what, if anything, they had to say as to why the sentence of the court should not then be imposed, they again admitted that they went into the store which was alleged to have been burglarized; and we do not think that the proof on the hearing of the motion on the next day presented a case wherein we would be justified in holding that the sound discretion vested in the trial court either to allow or to refuse the withdrawal of such pleas can be said to have been abused, within the meaning of the rule announced in the following cases: McWilliams v. State, 105 Miss. 844, 63 So. 270; McDonald v. State, 151 Miss. 566, 118 So. 628; Fortenberry v. State, 147 Miss. 91, 113 So. 193.
It is not contended that the appellants did not understand the nature and effect of their pleas; but they testified that they had previously been beaten in an effort to induce them to admit their guilt, and that they entered the plea of guilty to avoid any further beating. This proof on the motion was allowed to go undisputed by the state, except that in a question asked by the state's attorney it was intimated that they had not been beaten to obtain a confession, but rather because they had been impudent to the officers.
We would not hesitate, under the state of this record, to reverse and remand the case on account of the duress under which the pleas of guilty are alleged to have been entered, except for the fact that the trial judge stated into the record, on the hearing of the motion, his version of what had transpired at the time the sentences were imposed, and found as a fact from what the appellants personally stated to him in open court, that their admission of guilt was free and voluntary. The case must therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed.