Opinion
22-16086
05-19-2023
NICHOLAS D. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. SCOTT, #2251; J. BERMUDEZ, #1832; K. SHORE, #0102, Lt.; M. GAYNOR, #2139; C. NEWMAN, #2088; AVONDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT; J. MENDEZ, (#2145) Officer; DOES, unknown parties, possibly named: J Neader #2145; Phil Cf, Risk Management; Chief of Police Avondale Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01510-GMS-ESW G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Nicholas D. Anderson appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal of an action as time-barred); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Anderson's action as time-barred because Anderson's claims accrued more than two years before Anderson filed this action, and even with the benefit of any applicable tolling, Anderson's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Federal courts in § 1983 actions apply the state statute of limitations from personal-injury claims and borrow the state's tolling rules."); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that civil rights claims accrue, based on federal law, "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action;" and that "[i]n Arizona, the courts apply a two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims").
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).