Also, a recent decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is not persuasive for the plaintiffs in this case. In Anderson v. South Carolina Retirement System, 293 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 1982), the court said, in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to retroactive benefits on a successful application filed in 1979 instead of relating the benefits back to an unsuccessful application filed in 1975, that the right to benefits does not arise until an application is made and proof is submitted as the statute requires. This case was between a claimant and the Retirement Board and concerned no act of the employer's.
Finally, we address McKinney's claim that certain correspondence from respondent to him constituted a contractual "offer" which he accepted, thereby creating a binding contract between himself and respondent. McKinney miscontrues the nature of his right to retirement benefits: the source of his right is the statutes, not a contract. SeeAnderson v. South CarolinaRetirement System, 278 S.C. 161, 293 S.E.2d 312 (1982). Neither McKinney nor respondent have the authority to convert this statutory right into a contractual one.
Accordingly, Employees' right to relief is entirely statutory, and therefore the action is one at law. See McKinney v. SouthCarolina Police Officers Retirement Sys., 311 S.C. 372, 429 S.E.2d 797 (1993) (holding the source of a right to PORS benefits is statutory, not contractual); Anderson v. South CarolinaRetirement Sys., 278 S.C. 161, 293 S.E.2d 312 (1982) (stating the right to retirement benefits is purely statutory). Furthermore, "[u]nless the cause of action and the relief sought in a declaratory judgment action are distinctly equitable, the action will be considered one at law."
1998). Entitiement to State retirement benefits is purely statutory.Anderson v. South Carolina Retirement System 278 S.C. 161, 293 S.E.2d 312 (1982). These benefits are statutorily exempted from any process such as assignment, garnishment, or levy except as provided in the statutes.