Opinion
Civil 3:19-cv-01273-YY
06-15-2021
RODNEY JESSE ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. JOSIAS SALAZAR, Warden, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Youlee Yim You, United States Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner, an adult in custody at FCI Sheridan, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On June 9, 2017, in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Petitioner was sentenced to a 121-month term of imprisonment for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§84l(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 21 U.S.C. §846, Conspiracy to Distribute and Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances. Petitioner is incarcerated in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and is housed at FCI Sheridan. His projected release date is February 18, 2025.
In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges the BOP improperly calculated his inmate classification score in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, Petitioner contends the BOP incorrectly classified a prior state court conviction for rendering criminal assistance as a crime of violence. Petitioner alleges that, as a result of the alleged misclassification, he is unable to participate in or benefit from rehabilitation programs.
In his Traverse, Petitioner identifies the rehabilitation programs as the First Step Act and "other programs like BOP P.S. 5050.49, Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence."
Respondent concedes that Petitioner exhausted his available administrative remedies. Respondent argues, however, that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because his claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus and, in any event, the BOP has not violated Petitioner's rights under the Fifth or Eighth Amendments.
DISCUSSION
A district court has jurisdiction to consider a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the petitioner is challenging the legality of the "manner, location, or conditions of the execution of a sentence." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). However, habeas jurisdiction is absent where a successful challenge to the manner, location, or conditions would not accelerate the petitioner's release from custody. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). Claims that merely challenge a petitioner's classification by the BOP without potentially shortening the petitioner's sentence are not cognizable in a federal habeas action. See Fiorito v. Entzel, 845 F. App'x. 706 (9th Cir. 2021) (claim that BOP violated petitioner's right to due process by designating him a violent offender and increasing his custody score, which resulted in his classification as a medium-security inmate, was not cognizable in a habeas petition); Strausbaugh v. Shartle, No. CV-15-398-TUC-JAS (JR), 2017 WL 3017135, at *3 (D. Ariz. April 11, 2017) ("[c]laims that merely challenge a petitioner's classification by the BOP without potentially shortening the petitioner's sentence are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition"); see also Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 precludes judicial review of "any determination" by BOP made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624); BOP Program Statement 5100.08(1) ("[t]he [BOP's] classification, designation and redesignation procedures are consistent with the statutory authority contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)").
In appropriate circumstances, courts have the discretion to convert a habeas petition to a prisoner civil rights complaint. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936. However, recharacterization is appropriate only if the petition is "amendable to conversion on its face, meaning that it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief," and only after the petitioner is warned of the consequences of conversion and is provided an opportunity to withdraw or amend the petition. Id. Here, recharacterization would be inappropriate. Claims that challenge the conditions of confinement and would not necessarily impact the fact or duration of confinement do not fall within "the core of habeas corpus" and must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) ("requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action"); Nettles v. Grounds 830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016 (en banc) (same). In the federal context, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), provides a remedy for civil rights violations by federal actors.
Moreover, Petitioner has no due process liberty interest in his custody classification score or his security designation level. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (federal prison officials have "full discretion" to control prisoner classification and an inmate has "no legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process"); Arevalo v. Booker, 234 F. App'x. 814 (9th Cir. 2007) (prison officials' exercise of discretion to assign a security classification to an inmate does not violate the inmate's liberty interests; therefore, inmate's classification and placement in an enhanced security program did not violate due process). Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that the BOP denied him his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment lacks merit.
Finally, Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that the BOP violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[b]ecause the mere act of classification 'does not amount to an infliction of pain,' it 'is not condemned by the Eighth Amendment'") (citation omitted); Bryant v. McGrew, No. CV 13-46219-GW (DTB), 2014 WL 3789201, at *2 (CD. Cal. July 30, 2014) ("petitioner's allegations regarding his custody classification, facility designation, and inability to participate in rehabilitative programs are insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim under the Eighth Amendment").
RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED and a judgment of dismissal should be entered.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within 14 days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.