Opinion
02 Civ. 2985 (LAK).
April 29, 2002
ORDER
This is an action to confirm and enforce an arbitration award in which petitioner purports to invoke jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 9. This effort is misguided:
"It is well-established . . . that the FAA, standing alone, does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 852, 861 n. 9, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n. 32, 103 S.Ct. 927, 942 n. 32, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (`The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction.'); Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1051 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1990). Before a district court may entertain a petition under the FAA, there must be an `independent basis of jurisdiction.' Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Communications, Int'l Union, Local 261, 912 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1990)." Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, there is no basis in law for petitioner's claim of federal question jurisdiction.
Although petitioner has not properly invoked subject matter jurisdiction, the petition suggests the possibility that diversity of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional amount exist. In consequence, the action is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice to the filing, on or before May 13, 2002, of an amended petition sufficiently alleging the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.