the basis for [an] action" subject to administrative review. 7 C.F.R. § 226.6(k)(5)(i); see also Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co., 316 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1982) (stating that when "a . . . rule provides the manner, form, and time of notice, the notice must conform with the prescribed provisions" (quotation omitted)). "[Q]uasi-judicial proceedings do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required" to satisfy due process "in regular judicial proceedings."
See Schulte v. Transportation Unlimited, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 830, 832, 835 (Minn. 1984) (remanding for de novo consideration of the claimant's reemployment insurance eligibility, despite his untimely appeal, because the agency violated the Due Process Clause by not informing him of the consequences of a proposed adverse action); Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co., 316 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1982) ("[T]he requirements of a fair hearing include notice of the claims of the opposing party * * * ." (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 427, 77 S.Ct. 502, 508, 1 L.Ed.2d 438 (1957))).
And we recognized the due-process right in administrative proceedings to "notice of the claims of the opposing party and an opportunity to meet them." Id. at *8 (quoting Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co. , 316 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1982) ). We noted that the MDE appeal panel had determined that MDE "sufficiently informed relator of the reasons for denial and recovery because the inconsistencies were ‘blatant and ubiquitous’ " and that both MDE and the MDE appeal panel had identified examples of "red flags" and "irregularities." Id.
And we recognized the due-process right in administrative proceedings to "notice of the claims of the opposing party and an opportunity to meet them." Id. at *8 (quoting Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co., 316 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1982)). We noted that the MDE appeal panel had determined that MDE "sufficiently informed relator of the reasons for denial and recovery because the inconsistencies were 'blatant and ubiquitous'" and that both MDE and the MDE appeal panel had identified examples of "red flags" and "irregularities."
Brandt relies on Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co. to argue that this case should be reversed and remanded. 316 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1982). In Anderson, the supreme court reversed where an employer appealed an unemployment-benefits decision, but the employer's notice of appeal, containing the basis for the employer's appeal, was never sent to the employee.
When a statute provides "the manner, form, and time of notice, the notice must conform to the prescribed provisions." Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co., 316 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted). Whether the notice here conforms to the provisions of section 268.105 is a question of statutory construction, which this court reviews de novo.
The appeal was perfected by filing it with the Commissioner. Tester was given actual notice of the appeal, and was well aware of the issues on appeal. He did not request a continuance of the appeal hearing. We conclude that he was not prejudiced by not being served with a copy of the notice of appeal. See Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Company, 316 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1982). Finally, the Commissioner noted a serious lack of foundation regarding the videotape and disregarded it.
Thus the "correctness of the action" under review — whether the referee's decision reflected what really happened — was also compromised by the "material error" in procedure we have identified. See Anderson v. Moberg Rodlund Sheet Metal Co., Minn., 316 N.W.2d 286 (1982). Hence, we hold that a new hearing of Guerra's claim for unemployment compensation benefits is required.