" Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). Although historically the "viva voce" (with the living mouth) election was common in the United States, in this century most states, including West Virginia, have embraced the secret ballot, either statutorily or constitutionally, as an indispensable means of holding elections free from "violence, intimidation, bribery and other corrupt practices" which so often accompany elections where secrecy is not preserved. Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Taylor v. Bleakley, 55 Kan. 1, 39 P. 1045 (1895).
It did not. Plaintiffs reliance on Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir.1981), to support its assertion that sore loser statutes cannot be applied to presidential candidates is misplaced. The Kentucky sore loser statute being challenged in Mills, provided that: “No candidate who has been defeated for the nomination for any office in a primary election shall have his name placed on voting machines in the succeeding general election as a candidate for the same office of the nomination to which he was a candidate in the primary election.”
Surely if such a fact were as self-evident as Plaintiffs suggest, it would have at least merited comment by the Supreme Court in these contexts. It did not. Plaintiffs reliance on Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981), to support its assertion that sore loser statutes cannot be applied to presidential candidates is misplaced. The Kentucky sore loser statute being challenged in Mills, provided that: "No candidate who has been defeated for the nomination for any office in a primary election shall have his name placed on voting machines in the succeeding general election as a candidate for the same office of the nomination to which he was a candidate in the primary election."
The inquiry, then, turns to the second analysis under Anderson v. Celebrezze: the identification and evaluation of the State's interests justifying the membership requirement. In Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981), the court acknowledged "the chilling effect" of an affiliation requirement like the membership requirement at issue in this case on associational and voting rights: It is only those electors wishing to sign a petition who must declare their desire to vote for a specific individual.
Further, there is no specific requirement that the petitioners declare their intention to actually vote for the candidate on the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue in Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir 1981). In that case, the court found a Kentucky petition-signature statute unconstitutional.
[6] Further, there is no specific requirement that the petitioners declare their intention to actually vote for the candidate on the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue in Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981). In that case, the court found a Kentucky petition-signature statute unconstitutional.
We have previously held that the 5,000–signature requirement to petition for statewide-office ballot access is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Anderson v. Mills , 664 F.2d 600, 606–07 (6th Cir. 1981). The Eastern District of Kentucky has also upheld the 5,000–signature requirement in a challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments involving appellant Libertarian Party of Kentucky.
This principle takes on such significance because it safeguards the purity of our election process by eliminating the fear of scorn and ridicule, as well as lessening the evils of violence, intimidation, bribery and other corrupt practices which can be incumbent in non-secret elections. 664 F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir.1981).
In numerical terms, the statute requires only a nominal demonstration of support to place a candidate's name on the ballot. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (requiring support equivalent to five percent of vote cast in preceding election is constitutional); Hall v. Simcox, 766 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir.) (two percent), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986); Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Davis, 766 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring support of 200 voters from each congressional district); Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (five percent); Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1983) (three percent), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Arutonoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982) (five percent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981) (5,000 signatures). But see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (fifteen percent support requirement is unconstitutional).
We now reverse. Anderson also prevailed on First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause grounds in Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898, 905 (NM 1980), and on state-law grounds in Greaves v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283 (ED Ky. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 600 (CA6 1981). I