Opinion
No. 14-05-01286-CV
Opinion filed August 30, 2007.
On Appeal from 295th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-61577.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, EDELMAN, and FROST.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this dispute between various members of the New Birth Missionary Baptist Church of Houston, Inc. ("New Birth") and its pastor, Reverend Dwight E. Matthews, appellants Helen Anderson, Elija August, Cassandra Baker, Kathryn Baker, Delisa Bankston, Gwendolyn Brewer, Dale Carr, Alma Craft, Deidre Craft, Reverend Timothy Craft, Adele Davis, Inell Davis, Ethel Givens, Mary Harris, Delois Henderson, Joseph Henderson, Darren Hunter, Evelyn Hunter, Willie Jackson, Jewels Johnson, Joetter Majors, Ender Marshall, Reverend John Mozee, Ella Nunn, Sheree Owens, Jimmy Singletary, Joyce Thomas, Catherine Thompson, Augusta Woodworth, and Linda York (collectively "Members") challenge the summary judgment in favor of Matthews and the trial court's purported denial of their motion to disqualify Matthews's counsel. Concluding that the trial court properly dismissed this ecclesiastical dispute, we affirm.
Jewels Johnson is also referred to as "Jewel Johnson" in the record.
Reverend John Mozee is also referred to as "Reverend John Mosee" in the record.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 29, 2002, members of New Birth conducted a pastoral election, the results of which were summarized as follows: "Reverend Craft — 21; Reverend Matthews — 24; Reverend Mosee — 2; Reverend Thomas — 18." According to New Birth's bylaws, an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the members present at a meeting called for the purpose of electing a pastor is required to select a pastor. Even though none of the candidates received the requisite number of votes at this meeting, Matthews was offered the position and began officiating as pastor in early June 2002. New Birth's bylaws provide that "The pastor shall be the overseer for the caller and moderator and agendas [sic] of all meetings and the executive official overseer of all committees and auxiliary organizations of the church. The pastor shall be in full authority of the pulpit."
Matthews attested in an affidavit included with his summary judgment motion that he was unaware of the vote tally from this meeting.
Problems arose between Matthews and several church members over the next several months, apparently due to concerns with Matthews's alleged requests for so-called "love offerings." These problems culminated in a heated confrontation in the church on November 13, 2002, between Matthews and interveners John Mozee and Jimmy Singletary. By letter dated November 19, 2002, the Pulpit Committee of New Birth and several congregation members asked Matthews to temporarily vacate the pulpit due to a "lack of ministerial professionalism." Because Matthews refused to step down, on December 4, 2002, church member Ella Nunn and New Birth sought a temporary restraining order and temporary and permanent injunctions, and filed suit alleging breach of contract and several torts. When Matthews received notice of the lawsuit, he immediately called an emergency church meeting and informed the congregation about the suit. At this December 4, 2002 meeting, Matthews was authorized by a majority vote of the congregation members present to hire attorney Troy Wilson to represent him. On December 8, 2002, the annual meeting of New Birth was held pursuant to the bylaws. At this annual meeting, all executive offices were vacated and new members were elected to these positions. The minutes from this meeting indicate that the congregation voted to ratify the May 2002 election of Matthews as pastor of New Birth, as well as the actions taken at the December 4 emergency meeting.
According to New Birth's bylaws, the Pulpit Committee "shall be appointed by the church to seek out a pastor, and its recommendations will constitute a nomination." There is no other mention of this committee in the bylaws, nor do the bylaws address any process for the temporary suspension of the pastor.
On December 16, 2002, the trial court granted Matthews's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to all injunctive relief requested, leaving the rest of Nunn's and New Birth's claims pending. No one contests the trial court's dismissal of the petition for injunctive relief.
In its January 8, 2003 order on Matthews's motion to show authority, the trial court determined that Reginald McKamie, the trial attorney for Ella Nunn and New Birth, initially had authority to proceed with this lawsuit on behalf of New Birth because he was authorized to do so by board executive Jimmy Singletary. However, according to this order, McKamie's authority to represent New Birth ended on December 8, 2002, when the congregation replaced Singeltary, among others, as a board member.
Matthews filed a motion to show authority on December 13, contesting the authority of Reginald McKamie, the attorney representing Nunn and New Birth in their suit against Matthews, to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of New Birth. After a hearing on this motion on January 7, 2003, the trial court granted Matthews's motion and determined that McKamie no longer had authority to represent New Birth after the December 8, 2002 church meeting at which a new slate of officers was elected. The trial court subsequently signed an order on January 8, 2003, non-suiting New Birth's claims against Matthews.
Apparently, although not included in the appellate record, a motion to disqualify counsel was filed by Nunn and New Birth, seeking disqualification of Matthews's attorney.
Meanwhile, the Members continued their attempted ouster of Matthews by calling for a special meeting to determine his status. A letter was sent to church members on December 13, 2002, calling for a vote on December 29, 2002, to determine if members wanted to "keep [Matthews] as the permanent pastor." This letter detailed several concerns with Matthews's behavior during his "six-month probationary period" as pastor of New Birth. At the December 23 meeting, thirty members present voted that Matthews should not become the permanent pastor of New Birth, while seventeen members (fourteen of whom voted "under protest" that the election was improperly called) voted that he should. According to New Birth's bylaws, although a special meeting may be called with only one week's notice, involuntary termination of a pastor "must be by two-thirds vote of the members present at a meeting called for such purpose with three weeks['] notice."
Nothing in the bylaws provides for a probationary period for the pastor.
Appellees intervened in this lawsuit, asserting various tort and contract claims against Matthews. Intervener Mosee also asserted an assault claim against Matthews. Matthews moved for summary judgment on all claims brought by Nunn and each of the interveners. The trial court granted partial summary judgment and dismissed "all claims raised by plaintiff, Ella M. Nunn and each intervener in this matter except the assault claim raised by John Mosee against Dwight E. Matthews." The trial court later signed an order nonsuiting Mosee's assault claim, which made the judgment final. The Members timely filed notice of appeal.
II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
A. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment?
In their first issue, the Members contend the trial court erred in granting Matthews's motion for summary judgment because the conflicting sworn testimony and documentary evidence raises "a myriad of `genuine issues of material fact.'" However, Matthews moved for summary judgment based on an alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as well as several other grounds. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). The absence of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction, as well as by other procedural vehicles, such as a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 554. Matthews raised his challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in his motion for summary judgment.
In its partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the Members' claims without stating the grounds therefor. In addition, Matthews previously had sought dismissal of the Members' claims on jurisdictional grounds in his motion to dismiss, which was granted as to the injunctive relief requested on December 16, 2002.
In reviewing a traditional summary judgment, we consider whether the successful movant at the trial level carried its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). To be entitled to summary judgment, a defendant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). Under this traditional standard, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we make all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). When, as in this case, the order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm summary judgment if any of the independent summary-judgment grounds is meritorious. See Ramco Oil Gas Ltd. v. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 207 S.W.3d 801, 826 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Appellate courts reviewing a challenge to a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction review the trial court's ruling de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 n. 4 (2004). These clauses prohibit civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical matters involved in church-related disputes. See Hawkins v. Friendship Missionary Baptist Church, 69 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). "Even if wrongs exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and the administration of a church is inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle that it overshadows the inequities that may result from its liberal application." Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 58-59 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
Under the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, civil courts may not intrude into the church's governance of religious or ecclesiastical matters, such as theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of members to standards of morality. See Lacy v. Basett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In addition, courts should not involve themselves in matters relating to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972); Lacy, 132 S.W.3d at 123. The relationships between an organized church and its ministers are considered a church's "lifeblood" and matters involving those relationships are recognized as "of prime ecclesiastical concern." McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; Lacy, 132 S.W.3d at 123. However, a state may adopt an approach, including neutral principles of law, for resolving church disputes that do not involve consideration of doctrinal matters. See Lacy, 132 S.W.3d at 123. If an issue cannot be determined without resolving a religious controversy, a court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Id. Often, however, the difficulty arises in determining whether a particular dispute is ecclesiastical or simply a civil law controversy in which church officials happen to be involved. Id. To resolve the question, courts must look to the "substance and effect of a plaintiff's complaint to determine its ecclesiastical implication, not its emblemata." Id.
Although stated in terms of contract and tort claims, failure to abide by church bylaws, and various other legal "emblemata," the gravamen of the Members' complaint involves their dissatisfaction with Matthews's performance as pastor of New Birth and their desire to remove him from the pulpit, which is an ecclesiastical matter. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; Lacy, 132 S.W.3d at 123; Hawkins, 69 S.W.3d at 757-59; Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). Because civil courts should not involve themselves in matters relating to the hiring, firing, discipline, or administration of clergy, the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine applies. We conclude that the trial court correctly applied this doctrine and dismissed the Members' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we overrule the Members' first issue.
B. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to disqualify counsel?
In their second issue, the Members complain that the trial court erred in denying their motion to disqualify counsel and in granting Matthews's motion to show authority. As to the latter, the Members have provided no argument, analysis, or citations to authorities, thus waiving this portion of the second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Halim v. Richardson, 203 S.W.3d 482, 487 n. 7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Regarding the motion to disqualify counsel, our record indicates the trial court's ruling on Matthews's motion to show authority rendered this competing motion to disqualify moot. At the conclusion of the hearing held on this motion and Matthews's motion to show authority, the trial judge stated, "I am granting the motion to show authority because as of [December 8, 2003] the board of trustees has changed and the board of trustees no longer authorizes this lawsuit. . . . Now, given that I've granted the defendant's motion to show authority, that really makes moot the disqualification of Mr. Wilson with respect to the church." Even if the motion to disqualify counsel were not moot, nothing in our record shows that the trial court denied the motion to disqualify. Accordingly, we overrule the Members' second issue.
C. Should this court sanction the Members for filing a frivolous appeal?
In his appellee's brief, Matthews seeks just damages under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45. See TEX. R. APP. P. 45. The Supreme Court of Texas has not yet addressed the appropriate legal standard appellate courts should use to determine whether to assess appellate sanctions. Under Rule 45, the appellate court first must determine that an appeal is "frivolous" before it can consider awarding "just damages" to any prevailing party. Id. After the court determines that this prerequisite is satisfied, whether the court should award "just damages" is a matter of discretion that courts exercise with prudence and caution, after careful deliberation and only under truly egregious circumstances. See Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 78 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (en banc). This court requires the appeal to be both objectively frivolous and subjectively brought in bad faith or for purposes of delay before sanctions may be imposed under Rule 45. See Yazdchi v. Chesney, No. 14-05-00817-CV, 2007 237697, at *2 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 30, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that some courts only require that the appeal be objectively frivolous but holding that this court requires the appeal to be both objectively frivolous and subjectively brought in bad faith or for purposes of delay before Rule 45 sanctions may be assessed); Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 60, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (denying request for Rule 45 sanctions because record did not show that appeal was frivolous and brought for the purpose of delay). Presuming that this appeal is objectively frivolous, we conclude that the record does not show that the Members brought this appeal in bad faith or for purposes of delay. Therefore, we deny Matthews's request for just damages under Rule 45. See Yazdchi, 2007 237697, at *2 n. 6 (denying request for just damages under Rule 45 because appellants did not act in bad faith in appealing).
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the Members' claims in response to Matthews's summary-judgment motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction. We further determine that the Members' motion to disqualify counsel was never ruled on and in any event was rendered moot by the trial court's ruling on Matthews's competing motion to show authority. Due to inadequate briefing, the Members have waived any error regarding the trial court's order on the motion to show authority. Finally, we deny Matthews's request for Rule 45 damages because we conclude there is no evidence that the Members acted in bad faith.
Although this case was dismissed through summary judgment procedure, we note that lack of jurisdiction to decide a question may be determined through a plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.