Opinion
HDSP181799
02-26-2016
Richard Anderson v. Antoinette Ledgister
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON ACTION FOR SUMMARY PROCESS
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
On December 10, 2015, the plaintiff landlord Richard Anderson filed a summary process action seeking to obtain possession of the dwelling unit at 60 Elmer Street, 3rd Floor, in East Hartford, CT (the premises), claiming to have leased the premises to Antoninette Ledgister in exchange for her agreement to pay $650 per month in rent. Self-represented, Anderson filed what the court considers to be a two-count complaint, alleging on Form JD-HM-20 that the lease has terminated by lapse of time and alleging in a separate document that Ledgister once had the right or privilege to occupy the premises, but that such right or privilege has terminated. On November 25, 2015, Anderson had State Marshal Keith D. Niziankiewics serve Ledgister with a notice to quit (the first notice to quit) identifying three alternative bases for the landlord's intended summary process action: " LAPSE OF TIME. Once had the right to occupy but no longer does & non compliance." (Emphasis in original.)
" There is a presumption of truth afforded to the statements in the marshal's return. Knipple v. Viking Communs., 236 Conn 602, 607 n.9, 674 A.2d 426 (1996)." Donnie Dickerson, Adminstrator v. Jayne F. Pincus, 154 Conn.App. 146, 153, 105 A.3d 338 (2014). Ledgister's claim that she was not served with this notice to quit is insufficient to overcome this presumption.
Ledgister filed her self-appearance with the court on December 14, 2015 at 4:45 p.m. She filed special defenses and her answers to both counts of the complaint on December 14, 2015 at 5:02 p.m. The court file also contains a copy of document entitled " notice to quit" appearing to have been signed by Anderson, bearing the issue date of November 16, 2015, stating that the landlord is terminating his rental agreement with Ledgister so a member of his family can occupy the premises, and ostensibly informing Ledgister that she " must vacate and surrender the Premises to the Landlord by 12 noon on December 31, 2015" (the second notice to quit). This document was filed with the court on December 14, 2014 at 5:08 p.m. An additional document appearing to be a copy of a notice to quit using Form JD-HM-7, appearing to have been signed by Anderson on November 25, 2015 and bearing the stamp and seal of a state marshal (the third notice to quit) was also filed with the court on December 14, 2014 at 5:08 p.m. Neither of these two latter documents was accompanied by a marshal's return. The court infers from the totality of these events that Ledgister filed the copies of the second and third notices to quit and the on December 14, 2015 within minutes of filing her appearance, her special defenses, and her answers to both counts of the complaint.
The marshal's stamp upon this third " notice to quit" reads: " A TRUE COPY ATTEST. (Signature) Keith D. Nieziankiewcisz. Connecticut State Marshal. Indifferent Person." This notice ostensibly informs Ledgister that she was required to end possession of the premises on or before November 30, 2015 due to " Lapse of time & non compliance. Once had the Right to occupy but no longer does." This document thus uses language that differs in form, if not in content, from the language used by the notice to quit that the state marshal served upon Ledgister on November 25, 2015.
The matter was presented to the court on February 23, 2016.
The trial had been scheduled for hearing on January 11, 2016; on January 6, 2016, the court granted Anderson's motion to continue the trial to a later date.
" Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance . . . is a condition precedent to a summary process action . . ." Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn.App. 833, 839, 115 A.3d 497 (2015), quoting Cornfield Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Cummings, 148 Conn.App. 70, 76, 84 A.3d 929 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 433 (2015); see also Pollansky v. Pollansky, 144 Conn.App. 188, 194, 71 A.3d 1267 (2013) (service of a valid notice to quit itself serves to terminate a previously existing privilege or right to occupy). However, a defective notice to quit " 'deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction . . .' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Firstlight Hydro Generating Co. v. First Black Ink, LLC, 143 Conn.App. 635, 639, 70 A.3d 174, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 913, 76 A.3d 629 (2013)." Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn.App. 278, 281, 109 A.3d 543 (2015) (notice to quit properly presented alternative grounds of nonpayment of rent and lack of privilege to occupy).
" '[Summary process] is preceded by giving the statutorily required notice to quit possession to the tenant . . . Service of a notice to quit possession is typically a landlord's unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the termination of the lease. The lease is neither voided nor rescinded until the landlord performs this act and, upon service of a notice to quit possession, a [leasehold] is converted to a tenancy at sufferance.' (Citation omitted.) Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988)." Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!, 133 Conn.App. 1, 22, 33 A.3d 848 (2012).
On its face, the plaintiff's complaint, whether based on lapse of time of termination of a previous privilege of occupancy, relies upon the first notice to quit served by the state marshal upon Ledgister on November 25, 2015. (Count One ¶ 5 and Count Two ¶ 4, Complaint, 12/10/15.) The court finds that the first notice to quit, although duly served, was rendered equivocal and thus invalid and defective by the reasonably inferred delivery to Ledgister of the second notice to quit that was filed on December 14, 2014, appearing to have been signed by Anderson and ostensibly informing Ledgister that she " must vacate and surrender the Premises to the Landlord by 12 noon on December 31st 2015, " not by November 30, 2015 as previously declared. As both counts of Anderson's complaint rely upon allegations related to the first notice to quit that was rendered equivocal, defective and therefore invalid by the plaintiff landlord's signature upon the second notice, ostensibly requiring Ledgister to leave the premises on or before December 31, 2015, the court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process claim.
The third notice to quit, bearing the state marshal's stamp, further renders the first notice to quit at best confusing, and likely equivocal and invalid, as well.
See Wilkes v. Thomson, supra, 155 Conn.App. 281. " Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Richardson v. Commissioner of Correction, 298 Conn. 690, 696, 6 A.3d 52 (2010). Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102, 107 (2012).
This summary process action is therefore DISMISSED.