Anderson v. Laws

15 Citing cases

  1. Holland v. Lentz

    239 Or. 332 (Or. 1964)   Cited 25 times
    In Holland v. Lentz, 239 Or. 332, 397 P.2d 787 (1964), the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant made various misrepresentations concerning the sale of a house.

    "A Not — not a cent." Defendant relies on Dorr et ux v. Janssen et al, 233 Or. 505, 378 P.2d 999; Conzelmann v. N.W.P. D. Prod. Co., 190 Or. 332, 225 P.2d 757; Anderson v. Laws et al, 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201. The doctrine of these cases is that where a person who claims that he has been defrauded enters into a new contract in respect of the alleged fraudulent transaction after he knows that he has been deceived he waives his right to maintain an action for the alleged fraud. But this rule cannot be applied to this case as a matter of law because the evidence of the plaintiffs as to the circumstances attending the making of the new agreement renders uncertain the intention of the plaintiffs when they accepted the concession offered by the defendant.

  2. Dorr v. Janssen

    378 P.2d 999 (Or. 1963)   Cited 9 times
    In Dorr et ux v. Janssen et al, 233 Or. 505, 378 P.2d 999 (1963), the plaintiff, who was one of the parties to an exchange of properties, was unable to make all of the payments required under the exchange.

    It is undisputed that the parties, after Dorr had knowledge of all the facts, made a new agreement, supported by consideration, respecting and materially changing the rights and duties arising out of the first transaction, which Dorr claimed he had been fraudulently induced to enter. By his participation in the new agreement, Dorr relinquished all right to damages arising out of the alleged misrepresentations. Anderson v. Laws et al., 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201 (1945). "* * * In 24 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, 42, § 214, it is said to be the general rule that `if one induced by misrepresentations or fraud to deal or acquire, or to enter into a contract for the acquisition or use of property thereafter, with knowledge of the deception, receives from the party guilty of fraud some substantial concession or enters into a new contract in respect of the transaction, he thereby relinquishes all right to recover or recoup damages because of the misrepresentations.' So far as we have been able to ascertain, the validity of this principle has never been questioned by any court. It may be found enunciated and applied in numerous cases cited in the foregoing text and in the annotation in 106 A.L.R. 172 to the case of Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Anderson, 186 Wn. 226, 57 P.2d 1046, 106 A.L.R. 166."

  3. Nielsen v. Stephens

    997 P.2d 257 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times
    Reviewing post-Conzelmann decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court

    As we will see, subsequent cases show that the second sentence states the applicable rule. In Anderson v. Laws et al., 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201 (1945), the first significant Oregon case on this point, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants made representations that induced the plaintiff to purchase stock in a new corporation. After the organization of the corporation, the plaintiff and the defendants entered into an agreement to satisfy the plaintiff's claims concerning the purchase.

  4. State Farm Fire v. Sevier

    272 Or. 278 (Or. 1975)   Cited 45 times
    Declining to decide whether, absent actual knowledge of fraud, an insurer has the duty to investigate before issuing automobile liability insurance.

    In this case plaintiff did not attempt to rescind the policy until July 7, 1971. See Briscoe v. Pittman, 268 Or. 604, 607, 522 P.2d 886 (1974), and Anderson v. Laws et al, 176 Or. 468, 472-73, 159 P.2d 201 (1945). In this case plaintiff at first retained the premiums received by it and gave notice that its policy would terminate as of July 7, 1971, the date on which it would expire unless renewed.

  5. Chester v. McDaniel

    264 Or. 303 (Or. 1973)   Cited 8 times

    The great weight of authority also holds that where the defrauded party has performed a contract in part before he learns of the fraud he may continue to perform and still recover damages for the fraud. Mr. Justice LUSK in Anderson v. Laws et al, 176 Or. 468, 472-473, 159 P.2d 201 (1945), stated the rule as follows: "It should be observed that the question here does not relate to a mere waiver of the right to rescind the contract.

  6. Williams v. Pilgrim Turkey Packers

    264 Or. 36 (Or. 1972)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that agent has fiduciary duty as to matters within the scope of agency, but not necessarily as to matters in which agent is not employed

    Plaintiff contends that even if the contract was voidable or unenforceable because of such a fiduciary relationship, it was nevertheless ratified and reaffirmed by Pilgrim in that after first informing Williams that Pilgrim would not pay the contract price because of his fiduciary capacity, it subsequently paid him the full contract price. Thus, although conceding that an intent to do so is necessary to the ratification of an otherwise invalid contract, plaintiff contends that "where the facts are not in dispute the law conclusively presumes the intent from the person's conduct," citing Anderson v. Laws et al, 176 Or. 468, 478, 159 P.2d 201 (1945), and Conzelmann v. N.W.P. D. Prod. Co., 190 Or. 332, 356, 225 P.2d 757 (1950). Both Anderson and Conzelmann were cases in which, after discovery of fraud, the wronged party nevertheless entered into a new agreement with the wrongdoer.

  7. Asbury Trans. v. Cons. Freightways

    501 P.2d 321 (Or. 1972)   Cited 3 times
    In Asbury Trans. v. Cons. Freightways, 263 Or. 53, 501 P.2d 321 (1972), this court had occasion to interpret similar provisions.

    " The defenses upon which defendant relies all present questions of fact. Anderson v. Laws et al., 176 Or. 468, 478, 159 P.2d 201 (1945); Samuels v. Mack-International Etc. Corp., 128 Or. 600, 605, 275 P.2d 596 (1929) (waiver); 31 CJS Estoppel 784, § 163 (estoppel); Lenchitsky v. H.J. Sandberg Co., 217 Or. 483, 343 P.2d 523 (1959) (accord and satisfaction); Blair v. United Finance Co., 235 Or. 89, 383 P.2d 72 (1963) (mitigation of damages). There was substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that defendant had failed to establish any of these defenses.

  8. Atherton v. Collins

    401 P.2d 15 (Or. 1965)   Cited 1 times
    In Atherton v. Collins, 240 Or. 265, 401 P.2d 15 (1965), the Supreme Court again emphasized that a waiver requires that the parties enter into the subsequent agreement "to make adjustments of their former rights and obligations because of one party's claim of fraud."

    See Note, 34 Mich L Rev 384 (1936). Anderson v. Laws, 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201 (1945), illustrates some of the problems. Plaintiff sued for damages alleging defendants had fraudulently induced him to purchase an interest in defendants' business organization.

  9. Bridgmon v. Walker

    344 P.2d 233 (Or. 1959)   Cited 11 times
    In Bridgmon, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in denying a directed verdict against the plaintiff's breach of contract claim by which the plaintiff sought and received compensatory damages.

    It is contended that the plaintiffs waived the fraud by entering into an agreement with Ruschka pursuant to which they obtained substantial concessions respecting the subject matter of the alleged fraud. The defendants rely on Conzelmann v. Northwest Poultry Dairy Products Co., 190 Or. 332, 225 P.2d 757 (1950); Anderson v. Laws, 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201 (1945); Weiss and Hamilton v. Gumbert, 191 Or. 119, 227 P.2d 812, 228 P.2d 800 (1951). Assuming that the concessions obtained from Ruschka were sufficient to constitute a waiver of plaintiffs' claim against him, this would not necessarily indicate an intent on the part of the plaintiffs to waive their rights against the defendants Walker and Celoria.

  10. Wellens v. Beck

    84 N.W.2d 345 (N.D. 1957)   Cited 3 times

    "It is well established by the authorities that when one who has been induced by fraud to enter into a contract, subsequently, with knowledge of the fraud, enters into another agreement respecting the same transaction with the one guilty of the fraud, he, the injured party, thereby waives and relinquishes all right to damages on account of such fraud. If he receives some substantial concession from the one guilty of such fraud, he waives his right to insist further upon holding the wrongdoer responsible in damages for the fraud. Anderson v. Laws, 176 Or. 468, 159 P.2d 201; Phillips v. Malone, 223 Ala. 381, 136 So. 793; Burne v. Lee, 156 Cal. 221, 104 P. 438; Bonded Adjustment Co. v. Anderson, 186 Wn. 226, 57 P.2d 1046, 106 A.L.R. 166."