ANDERSON v. KELLEY ET AL

16 Citing cases

  1. Rock v. Fisher

    216 P. 668 (Okla. 1923)   Cited 5 times

    In Farmers' State Bank of Jefferson v. Jordon, 61 Okla. 15, 160 P. 53, this court said: "In a long line of cases our court has held that a demurrer to the evidence admits all the facts which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all the inferences and conclusions which may logically and reasonably be drawn from the evidence; some of the more recent cases being Marshall Mfg. Co. v. Dickerson et al., 55 Okla. 188, 155 P. 224, and Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167." In Cottrell v. Livergood, 82 Okla. 301, 200 P. 185, it is said:

  2. Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.

    1986 OK 83 (Okla. 1986)   Cited 36 times

    In Samuels Shoe Co. v. Frensley, 151 Okla. 196, 3 P.2d 216, 221 (1931), this Court, after finding that a mortgage procured from a father by threats of the arrest and prosecution of his son could be set aside regardless of the son's innocence or guilt, held that: See Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167, 1169 (1916); Dawson, "Economic Duress โ€” An Essay In Perspective," 45 Mich.L.Rev. 253, 289 (1947). 1. Duress exists if one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform some act under circumstances depriving one of the exercise of a free will.

  3. Peyton v. McCaslin

    1966 OK 4 (Okla. 1966)   Cited 41 times

    But, in such cases, the jury is acting in a purely advisory capacity, and its verdict is not binding upon the court. Gamel v. Hynds, 69 Okla. 204, 171 P. 920; Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167. The action of a court in rejecting an advisory jury verdict in an equity action, and entering its own judgment contrary thereto, is not error. Anderson v. Kelley, supra.

  4. Levine v. Teal

    145 P.2d 386 (Okla. 1944)   Cited 2 times

    It was contended by the defendants that Johnnie was in no manner threatened or promised immunity from prosecution, but that Johnnie voluntarily confessed his former thefts and of his own free will desired to pay for the merchandise taken and to secure installment payments with the deed. If plaintiffs' evidence is taken as true, there was intimidation and duress and plaintiffs did not act voluntarily in executing the deed and the disposition of the cause is controlled by Samuels Shoe Co. v. Frensley, 151 Okla. 196, 3 P.2d 216; Harris-Lipsitz Co. v. Oldham, 56 Okla. 124, 155 P. 865; Anderson v. Kelly, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167, Pendleton v. Greever, 80 Okla. 35, 193 P. 885, and Rice v. Victor, 97 Okla. 106, 222 P. 979. Further, if plaintiffs' evidence is true, there was no debt to defendants and fraud and lack of consideration are also shown.

  5. Ames v. American Nat. Bank

    163 Va. 1 (Va. 1934)   Cited 99 times
    Instructing that "[provisions should] be harmonized so as to effectuate the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract considered as a whole"

    But the text of this paragraph expresses the holding of the Virginia cases as we comprehend them, and it is supported by a great weight of authority from other jurisdictions. See 49 C.J., p. 436, section 544, and cases cited in note 68; cases collected in Dec. Dig., Pleading, section 214(1) and section 214(4); Browning v. Browning, 85 W. Va. 46, 100 S.E. 860; Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1; Lamb v. S. Cheney Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 125 N.E. 817, affirming 181 App. Div. 960, 168 N.Y.S. 1115; Paggi v. Rose Mfg. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S.W. 962; Berndt v. Kloss (Tex. Civ. App.) 263 S.W. 949; Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167; Kee v. Armstrong, etc., Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 P. 494, 5 A.L.R. 1349; Manning v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 188 N.C. 648, 125 S.E. 555; Torgerson v. Minneapolis, St. P., etc., Ry. Co., 49 N.D. 1096, 194 N.W. 741; Oliveros v. Henderson, 116 S.C. 77, 106 S.E. 855; Churchill Township v. Cummings Tp., 51 Mich. 446, 16 N.W. 805.Scott v. Wilson, 185 Iowa 464, 170 N.W. 761.

  6. Nolan v. Mathis

    295 P. 801 (Okla. 1931)   Cited 9 times

    "The question in each such case is, Was the person so acted upon by threats of the person claiming the benefit of the contract, for the purpose of obtaining such contract, as to be bereft of that quality of mind essential to the making of a contract, and was the contract thereby obtained?" Anderson v. Kelly, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167; Pendleton v. Greever, 80 Okla. 193 P. 885. This answer was unverified, a copy of the lease is set out and execution thereof is alleged in the petition.

  7. Oilton State Bank v. Butler

    131 Okla. 199 (Okla. 1928)   Cited 1 times

    "The question presented on a motion to direct a verdict is whether, admitting the truth of all the evidence in favor of the party against whom the action is contemplated, together with such inferences and conclusions as may be reasonably drawn from it, there is enough competent evidence to reasonably sustain a verdict in favor of such party." Chickasha Investment Co. v. Phillips, 58 Okla. 760, 161 P. 223; Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167. Under this rule then it must be taken as true that when Butler gave Smith the check for $4,500, Smith stated that he would send over and get a draft for it as soon as Butler arranged the account so as to cover the check; that plaintiff made defendant his agent to collect the check is plain.

  8. Slater v. Gittleman

    142 A. 358 (N.J. 1928)   Cited 3 times

    But while the point discussed may not have been there involved, it seems to me that the reasoning of Vice-Chancellor Emery is sound and supported by respectable authority. While there is undoubtedly a conflict of opinion on this question, his is said to be the better view. 9 R.C.L. tit. "Duress" 719 ยง 9; notes26 L.R.A. 48; 20 L.R.A. ( N.S.) 486; 42 L.R.A. ( N.S.) 329 ; Williamson Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502; 20 L.R.A. ( N.S.) 484; Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109; Colclough v. Bank,150 Ga. 316; Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Featherly, 74 Mont. 531. In my judgment, the question is not one of the guilt or innocence of the accused, but of the unlawful subjection of the will of the actor to that of the accuser.

  9. Rice v. Victor

    222 P. 979 (Okla. 1924)   Cited 3 times
    In Rice v. Victor, 97 Okla. 106, 222 P. 979, cited by defendant to sustain this contention, the rule is recognized that duress renders a contract voidable and it was applied to a plaintiff who sued to foreclose a real estate mortgage given to secure a note, executed by the defendant therein for the debt of his father.

    The only question of fact to be determined in a case of this character is whether or not the defendant was moved and induced to execute the instrument sued on by reason of threats of prosecution. And as said in Anderson v. Kelley et al., 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167: "No arbitrary standard can be fixed in determining what in fact constitutes duress or menace in any given case, for what would accomplish that result in one instance might totally fail in another."

  10. Exchange Trust Co. v. Ireton

    213 P. 309 (Okla. 1923)   Cited 3 times

    The defendant complains of numerous instructions given by the trial court, but this was an action of purely equitable cognizance. Watson v. Borah et al., 37 Okla. 357, 132 P. 347. In such actions it has been held that questions of fact may be submitted to the jury, but its verdict is merely advisory, and alleged errors in instructions to the jury in such cases offer no grounds for review upon appeal. Anderson v. Kelley, 57 Okla. 109, 156 P. 1167; Success Realty Co. v. Trowbridge, 50 Okla. 402, 150 P. 898; Ball v. White, 50 Okla. 429, 150 P. 901; Crump v. Lanham, 67 Okla. 72, 168 P. 43; Gamel v. Hynds, 69 Oklahoma, 171 P. 920. As stated above, the trial court adopted and approved the verdict of the jury, and, in addition, made special findings in harmony therewith, and this court will not review the instructions given to the jury.