Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98CV-214-S
December 27, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, Inland Paperboard and Packaging, Inc. ("Inland"), and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiffs, William and Lisa Anderson. By previous order, this Court granted a joint motion to dismiss made by the Plaintiffs and Defendant United Paperworkers International Local 737 to dismiss Local 737 as a defendant in this case, leaving only Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Inland. Plaintiffs have filed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.010 et seq. Both claims assert that Plaintiffs were discriminated against by Inland, their employer, because of their disabilities. Because we find that Inland is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we will grant its motion and deny the Plaintiffs' motion by separate order.
FACTS
Inland Paperboard and Packaging produces corrugated boxes. Its plant runs a continuous twenty-four hour operation during the week. Plaintiff William Anderson was employed by Inland as a "slitterman." The slitterman is responsible for setting up the corrugator to produce the correct size sheets. Without the slitterman, the entire operation will have to be shut down. Normally, three slitterman each work one eight-hour shift each day, but if one of the three cannot work because of vacation or illness, the other two slittermen each have to work four hours of overtime unless someone can cover the shift.
In October, 1996, William Anderson was injured in a non-work related motorcycle accident. After a leave of absence, he returned to work in March, 1997, with the restriction that he could not work more than eight hours per day. Anderson's doctor was to determine by September, 1997, whether the eight-hour restriction would be permanent, but in August, 1997, both William and Lisa Anderson were injured in another motorcycle accident, also non-work related. It is undisputed that Lisa Anderson still has not been able to return to work due to the injuries suffered in that accident. It is also undisputed that William Anderson was able to return to work in June, 1998, but with the permanent limitation that he cannot work more than eight hours per day. Inland would not allow William Anderson to return to the slitterman position because he could not work overtime, and he did not request to be permitted to work any other position at Inland's plant. When William Anderson's leave time ran out, he was terminated on August 6, 1998.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party's failure to establish an element of proof essential to his case and upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial constitutes a failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Andersons have sued Inland under the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which both prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation which he must describe, he is able to perform the essential functions of the job, and (3) the employer terminated him because of his disability." Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Inc., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998).
Clearly, Lisa Anderson does not make out a prima facie case of discrimination, as it is undisputed that she cannot return to work at this time under any conditions. Therefore, she does not meet the second part of the test, because she cannot perform the essential functions of her job at Inland. Lisa Anderson's claims against Inland under the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act must therefore be dismissed.
William Anderson does not present a prima facie case of discrimination either, as he is not a disabled person with the meaning of the ADA. The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg. U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1997). William Anderson claims that he suffers an impairment of two major life activities: working and walking or standing.
The injuries that William Anderson suffered in his motorcycle accidents prevent him from working more than eight hours per day, and Anderson asserts this is a substantial limitation on his ability to work. This argument has been rejected by numerous courts that have considered it. Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999); Wade v. General Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29, 1998 WL 639162 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion); Muthler v. Ann Arbor Mach., Inc., 18 F. Supp.2d 722 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Shpargel v. Stage Co., 914 F. Supp. 1468 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
This Court also rejects the argument that the inability to work overtime constitutes a substantial limitation. "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg, U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). William Anderson's inability to work the slitterman position at Inland's plant because it requires overtime does not constitute a substantial limitation upon his ability to work.
Nor has William Anderson shown that he has a substantial limitation upon his ability to walk or stand. No evidence has been presented that Anderson has any significant difficulty walking. The only evidence presented of a substantial limitation on his ability to stand is the "Return to Work" statement of his doctor which permits him to return to work with the limitations of eight hours per day with "limited standing." However, the job of slitterman, which Anderson has stated he can perform except for the mandatory overtime, would require him to stand approximately 60% of the time.
It bears repeating that for a person to be considered "disabled" under the ADA, a major life function must be substantially limited. Being able to perform a major life function only "moderately below average" is insufficient to meet this requirement. 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.2(j). Specifically with regard to the major life activity of walking, a person would be substantially limited if she could "only walk for very brief periods of time." Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a plaintiff who could walk no more than a mile and could not jog at all was nonetheless not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 1996). "Impairments that result in only mild limitations are not disabilities." Id. at 107(quoting 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 902, at 902-19). The Court therefore finds that William Anderson at best has a mild limitation upon his ability to walk or stand, not a substantial limitation, and is not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. He thus cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADA or the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
William and Lisa Anderson have also made claims of disability harassment. To succeed upon a claim of disability harassment, "a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination." Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1998). Neither Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, and thus summary judgment will be granted for the Defendant on these claims as well.
CONCLUSION
William Anderson is not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, and Lisa Anderson cannot perform the essential functions of her job because she cannot return to work. Thus, neither Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of the Defendant by separate order.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered this date and the court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion of the Defendant for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Plaintiffs is DENIED. The Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice with regard to all claims.