Opinion
Civil No. 98-2217 (JRT/RLE)
February 10, 2003.
Steven Kenneth Marden, MARDEN LAW OFFICE, for plaintiff.
John J. O'Donnell, KNUTSON, FLYNN DEANS P.A., for defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
Plaintiff Duane "Dewey" Anderson brought this action against defendants Independent School District Number 97 ("School District") and Superintendent Nancy Kaldor after Anderson was suspended from his job as a school bus driver for failing to provide an adequate urine sample during a random controlled substance test. The case was tried to a jury in November of 2001. At the conclusion of testimony, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"). The Court granted JMOL as to all claims except plaintiff's claim of wrongful disclosure of private government data under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act ("MGDPA") and dismissed Kaldor as a defendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the wrongful disclosure of private government data claim. The School District then moved for judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claim, which the Court granted on September 25, 2002. Plaintiff's appeal of that judgment is pending. The School District now requests an award of costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees, pursuant to numerous civil rights and other statutes and rules. Defendant also requests an award of attorney's fees as a sanction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motions are denied.
Specifically, defendant brings this motion pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1920; 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Fed.R.Civ.P. 54; Local Rule 54; the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.14; and the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. § 13.08.
Although a notice of appeal has been filed, this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether sanctions and attorney's fees are appropriate. See Gundacker v. Unisys Corp., 151 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 1999). A notice of appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction only of those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 587 (8th Cir. 1996). Where the issues of attorney's fees and sanctions are not before the court of appeals, the district court may consider those issues. Id. See also Phillips v. Grendahl, 2001 WL 1110370 (D.Minn. September 19, 2001) (holding that a district court retains jurisdiction over collateral matters, including attorney's fees, pending appeal).
I. Attorney's Fees
Each statute under which defendant brings this petition allows the Court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205; 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd. 3; Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4. None of these statutes, however, requires that a prevailing party be awarded attorney's fees. In fact, in civil rights cases, where the prevailing party is the defendant, courts should hesitate to award fees, because of the potential deterrent effect such an award would have on future plaintiffs. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (reasoning that to allow an award of attorney's fees simply because defendant prevailed "would substantially add to the risk inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote vigorous enforcement" of the civil rights laws).
A. Civil Rights Statutes
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act all provide that the court may award a prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. Although prevailing plaintiffs usually are entitled to an award of fees, prevailing defendants are not. Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, Iowa, 191 F. Supp.2d 1051, 1064 (N.D.Iowa 2002) (citing Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 49 F.3d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)); see Schutts v. Bentley Nevada Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1549, 1555-56 (D.Nev. 1997) (citations omitted). However, if a prevailing defendant can show that a plaintiff's lawsuit was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, an award of fees might be warranted. Hahn, 191 F. Supp.2d at 1556 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980)); see also Flowers, 49 F.3d at 392 (stating "[a] court may award prevailing defendant's attorney's fees . . . only if the plaintiff's claim was `frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so'") (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422)). Courts apply the frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless standard to lawsuits brought under the ADA, as well as in those brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. Halasz v. University of New England, 821 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.Me. 1993); Settlegoode v. Portland Public Schools, No. CV-00-313-ST, 2002 WL 31495823 (D.Or. May 16, 2002). Minnesota courts apply this same standard in Minnesota Human Rights Act cases. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 722-23 (Minn. 1986) (reasoning that "[p]olicy reasons support adoption of the federal standard for awarding attorney fees" and holding that "a trial court may, in its discretion, award attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, pursuant to section 363.14, subd. 3, only upon a finding that the employee's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, or was brought in bad faith").
See 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (providing in relevant part that "the court . . . in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee"); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (providing that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."); Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd. 3 (providing that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
Applying that standard in this case, the Court finds that defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees. While plaintiff's evidence, taken as a whole, was insufficient to overcome the judgment as a matter of law, it was not so deficient as to make his case frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Plaintiff began this lawsuit with a plausible claim, and at least some evidence that the school district regarded him as disabled. See, e.g., Peel v. Unified School District 501, Topeka, 2000 WL 374931 (March 27, 2000) (denying successful defendant's motion for attorney's fees where the case was "largely built on the plaintiff's jaded perception of his circumstances"). The Court finds that a trial on the merits was required to determine that plaintiff's evidence did not suffice to support his claims of disability discrimination. However, the Court notes that it did not have the benefit of pretrial motions by defendant that might have narrowed and focused the case. Defendant might have been able to avoid at least a portion of its expenses had it brought the appropriate motions. In sum, plaintiff's lawsuit cannot be described as frivolous, there is no evidence that it was brought in bad faith, and attorney's fees are not appropriate.
B. Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
Under the MGDPA, the prevailing government authority may be awarded fees and costs if an individual brought a claim that is "frivolous and without merit and a basis in fact." Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4. Plaintiff's claims under the MGDPA cannot be described as frivolous, and therefore no award of attorney's fees is proper. Plaintiff pursued three claims under the MGDPA. Two of those claims, untimely disclosure of demanded data, and failure to correct inaccurate data, were dismissed at the close of evidence, and were not submitted to the jury. Although those two claims were dismissed, plaintiff had plausible, if unavailing, arguments for each claim. Plaintiff's third claim, that of wrongful disclosure of private government data, was sufficient to survive defendants' initial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that a number of alleged statements had been made concerning plaintiff and his controlled substance test, and one of those claims presented a factual issue for the jury to resolve. As with plaintiff's claims of discrimination, his claims under the MGDPA cannot be described as frivolous. Therefore, no award of attorney's fees is appropriate.
II. Sanctions
Defendant also moves for an award of attorney's fees against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Defendant only requests those fees incurred after this Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Section 1927 states that "any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." The cases make clear that an award of fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 requires at least a finding of objective bad faith. O'Connell, 812 F.2d at 395 (holding § 1927 contains objective standard but declining to decide whether § 1927 requires subjective bad faith). See also N.A.A.C.P. — Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1990) (indicating that the language of § 1927 requires both a finding of objectively unreasonable behavior and a finding of bad faith).
"The imposition of sanctions is a serious matter and should be approached with circumspection." O'Connell, 812 F.2d at 395. The Court finds that sanctions are not called for in this case. The Court finds no evidence of bad faith or evidence that counsel engaged in dilatory or vexatious tactics. Although the Court eventually determined that plaintiff's claims were without merit, the conduct at issue here is clearly less egregious than that sanctioned by courts in other cases. See, e.g., Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 965 F.2d 597, 600-01 (8th Cir. 1992) (approving of sanctions under § 1927 where the sanctioned attorney, among other things, persistently pursued unsupported factual allegations against defendant's employee during discovery). Additionally, the Court notes that defendant likely could have avoided a portion of its expenses by making appropriate pretrial dispositive motions to resolve legal issues that could have narrowed and focused the case. Defendant's motion for sanctions is therefore denied.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's motion for costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees [Docket No. 143] is DENIED; and
2. Defendant's application for sanctions [Docket No. 147] is DENIED.