Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank

7 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. Citizens c. Nat. Bank

    245 Ga. 515 (Ga. 1980)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that the trial court properly granted a motion to set aside a garnishment judgment because the face of the record showed the absence of notice of the hearing

    A judgment or order based upon a trial or hearing entered against a party without notice to that party of the trial or hearing is subject to a motion to set aside where the lack of notice appears on the face of the record. Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, 243 Ga. 518 ( 255 S.E.2d 40) (1979); Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155 ( 245 S.E.2d 860) (1978); Hopkins v. Donaldson, 137 Ga. App. 786 (2) ( 224 S.E.2d 788) (1976); Wilkes v. Ricks, 126 Ga. App. 266 ( 190 S.E.2d 603) (1972); see also Barber v. Canal Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 738 ( 168 S.E.2d 868) (1969). We have held that publication of the trial calendar in the official county newspaper is notice of trial pursuant to Code Ann. § 81A-140 (c). Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, supra.

  2. City of Pendergrass v. Skelton

    628 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 3 times

    In other judicial hearings, both parties should be notified of the hearing with an opportunity of attending and voicing any objection that may be properly registered. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. Fulton Natl. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155, 156 ( 245 SE2d 860) (1978).Biggs v. Heriot, 249 Ga. App. 461, 462 ( 549 SE2d 131) (2001).

  3. Biggs v. Heriot

    549 S.E.2d 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. Fulton Natl. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155, 156 ( 245 S.E.2d 860) (1978). See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-40 (b) (on reasonable notice to the parties, a trial court may try and determine issues for which a jury trial is not required or has been waived); 9-11-60 (f) ("Reasonable notice shall be afforded the parties on all motions.").

  4. Southwest Community Hosp. Med. Cen. v. Thompson

    165 Ga. App. 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 9 times
    Observing that due to hospital's default, hospital had admitted every material allegation in the complaint, except the amount of damages, and, thus, the element of proximate cause, as well as negligence, were admitted and required no further proof

    See Brown v. C S Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515, 517 ( 265 S.E.2d 791). This nonamendable defect appearing on the face of the record, the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion to set aside predicated upon Code Ann. § 81A-160 (d) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239, 240; 1974, p. 1138) (now OCGA § 9-11-60, effective November 1, 1982). Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155 ( 245 S.E.2d 860); Shelton v. Rodgers, 160 Ga. App. 910 ( 288 S.E.2d 619). 2.

  5. Scott v. Morris Brown College

    297 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    Brown v. C. S. Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515, 518 ( 265 S.E.2d 791); C. S. Nat. Bank v. Burden, 145 Ga. App. 402, 404 (2) ( 244 S.E.2d 244). See Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155, 156 ( 245 S.E.2d 860). See also Davis and Shulman, Ga. Prac. Proc. 278, § 18-2 (4th Ed.).

  6. East India Co. v. Marsh McLennan

    287 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    " Where in a case there are multiple defendants or other parties whose interests may be inimical, or at least far from identical, an ex parte or other judicial hearing as to which one of the defendants is not notified and given the opportunity to defend is a denial of due process. Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155 ( 245 S.E.2d 860) (1978). The trial court recognized this rule, but as to the contention that the calendar entry printed in the Fulton County Daily Report was insufficient to constitute notice to the plaintiffs, he correctly held the notice provision sufficient under the facts of this case.

  7. Brown v. Wilson Chevrolet-Olds

    258 S.E.2d 139 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 27 times

    But the defect has been held fatal and subject to the motion in proceedings under the Personal Property Foreclosure Act where the relief granted was not statutorily authorized ( Wallace v. Aetna Finance Co., 137 Ga. App. 580 ( 224 S.E.2d 517) (1976)), and in general in matters which could be said to have constitutional importance, as in the case of a bench trial in the absence of jury waiver ( Redding v. Commonwealth of America, 143 Ga. App. 215, 216 (1) ( 237 S.E.2d 689) (1977), disapproved other grounds Wise c. Assoc. v. Rosser White c. Inc., 146 Ga. App. 789, 795-96 ( 247 S.E.2d 479) (1978)), and where there has been failure of notice of hearing which could affect a party's interests or liabilities. Anderson v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 155 ( 235 S.E.2d 860) (1978). Given this division in the cases, we hold the defect fatal and subject to motion to set aside.