Opinion
C/A 6:24-cv-01241-HMH-KFM
04-22-2024
Michael Isaiah Anderson, Jr., Petitioner, v. Director Florence County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking habeas relief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
The petitioner's petition was entered on the docket on March 14, 2024 (doc. 1). By order dated March 19, 2024, the petitioner was given an opportunity to provide the necessary information to bring the case into proper form, including paperwork regarding payment of the filing fee (doc. 5). The petitioner complied with the Court's Order, bringing his case into proper form. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the petitioner's § 2241 petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file an answer or return.
ALLEGATIONS
This is an action filed by the petitioner, a pretrial detainee at the Florence County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) (doc. 1). Of note, the plaintiff's claims in this action appear related to the plaintiff's pending charges in the Florence County Court of General Sessions for possession of a stolen vehicle, possession of a weapon during a violent crime, conspiracy, kidnapping, and first degree burglary. See Florence County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2022A2120400036, 2022A2120400037, 2022A2120400038, 2022A2120400039, 2022A2120400040) (last visited April 22, 2024).
The petitioner alleges that his rights are being violated in his pending criminal proceedings based on a lack of a preliminary hearing, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false charges, ineffective counsel, and because of delay/lack of a speedy trial (doc. 1 at 2, 6). The petitioner contends that he has appealed his complaints to the Florence County General Sessions Court, the Solicitor's Office, and to the Public Defender's Office (id. at 2-3).
Ground one for relief in this matter is lack of preliminary hearing or speedy trial (id. at 7). Ground two for relief is ineffective assistance of counsel (id.). Ground three is malicious prosecution, delay, and false imprisonment (id.). For relief, the petitioner seeks to have his charges dismissed, to be released from custody, and money damages (id. at 8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The undersigned has reviewed the petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and other habeas corpus statutes. As a pro se litigant, the petitioner's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The petitioner, a pretrial detainee, filed this action seeking habeas relief. However, as outlined below, the petition is subject to summary dismissal. A habeas corpus application allows a petitioner to challenge the fact, length, or conditions of custody and seek immediate release. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). A pretrial detainee's exclusive federal remedy for alleged unconstitutional confinement is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), but only after fully exhausting the available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); See United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995); Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that “[u]ntil the State has been accorded a fair opportunity by any available procedure to consider the issue and afford a remedy if relief is warranted, federal courts in habeas proceedings by state [inmates] should stay their hand.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Watkins v. Cartlege, C/A No. 3:13-cv-01129-CMC, 2013 WL 3282913, at *4 (D.S.C. June 26, 2013) (“Hence, pretrial detainees involved in state criminal proceedings who seek to bring challenges to their custody pursuant to § 2241, as well as state prisoners who seek to challenge their custody on any basis that may properly be raised pursuant to § 2241, must first exhaust their state-court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.”). Additionally, a petitioner must show the existence of special circumstances to justify federal intervention. Johnson v. Salmon, C/A No. 7:22-cv-00081, 2022 WL 446033, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2022) (internal citations omitted).
Here, as noted above, the petitioner's criminal charges are still pending - with the most recent filings indicating that the petitioner has been appointed a new lawyer and has filed a renewed motion to be released on bond. See Florence County Public Index (enter the petitioner's name and 2022A2120400036, 2022A2120400037, 2022A2120400038, 2022A2120400039, 2022A2120400040) (last visited April 22, 2024). However, the petitioner has not asserted in his petition that he has exhausted his remedies in the trial and appellate courts. For example, the publicly available filings with the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the South Carolina Supreme Court do not reflect any filing by the petitioner seeking relief based upon the allegations raised in the instant matter. As such, the petitioner has not exhausted his remedies in the state trial and appellate courts, and as outlined below, has alleged no exceptional circumstances sufficient to excuse this failure. Thus, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the petition without prejudice.
Younger Abstention
Alternatively, the court may not proceed with this action because federal courts cannot interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the petitioner has the opportunity to argue that his right to a preliminary hearing, his speedy trial rights, and his right to effective counsel have been violated in the South Carolina state court proceedings. In light of the foregoing, the petitioner has not made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). In examining extraordinary circumstances, federal courts have essentially analyzed whether procedures exist which would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention - meaning no extraordinary circumstances are shown where a threat to the petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, such as that the petitioner was denied a preliminary hearing, his counsel was ineffective, or that his speedy trial rights were violated (as alleged herein). See Brown v. Dir. of Florence Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 2:20-cv-02951-JD-MGB, 2021 WL 6139411, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 6137483 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 2021) (collecting cases noting that speedy trial claims could be raised during trial and on direct appeal and did not meet the standard of extraordinary circumstances to justify federal court intervention in the state criminal proceedings (internal citations omitted)). Further, the petitioner's assertion of inordinate delay (because his charges have been pending for two years) - even ignoring the extra time the charges have been pending because the petitioner requested a new attorney - fail to demonstrate “special circumstances” to justify federal court interference in his pending criminal charges. See Rose v. Demory, C/A No. 4:23-cv-00130-HMH-TER, 2023 WL 2394398, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2023) (rejecting claims of inordinate delay when charges had been pending for multiple years), report and recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 2388713 (D.S.C. May 7, 2023), appeal dismissed 2023 WL 4197981 (4th Cir. 2023). Therefore, to the extent the petitioner seeks dismissal of his pending charges and to be released from pretrial detention, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
The plaintiff also requests money damages in his petition; however, he may not seek money damages in this habeas action. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494 (noting that “[i]n the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the petitioner cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his petition. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 2022 WL 3590436 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (mem.) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a
complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).