Opinion
05 Civ. 436 (KNF).
April 30, 2007
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This amended Memorandum and Order, which supplants the Memorandum and Order dated April 13, 2007, contains a modification to the Court's analysis of the petitioner's Miranda Violation Claim.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dean Anderson ("Anderson"), proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Anderson alleges he is in the custody of the state of New York unlawfully because: (1) no probable cause for his arrest existed; (2) statements he made to law enforcement officials, while in custody, were not made voluntarily, but were obtained via deceptive tactics and should have been suppressed by the trial court; and (3) statements he made prior to receiving warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1996), should have been suppressed by the trial court. The respondent opposes the petition. He contends: (a) the petitioner cannot present claims for federal habeas corpus review concerning constitutional violations alleged to have occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea; (b) the petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas corpus review; and (c) the petitioner's claims, that statements he made to law enforcement officers were either not made voluntarily or were made prior to the petitioner's receipt of Miranda warnings, are meritless.
II. BACKGROUND
Anderson was indicted by a New York County grand jury. It charged Anderson with two counts of third-degree burglary and one count of third-degree grand larceny arising out of his theft, on March 29, 2001, of a laptop computer from an office building in Manhattan. Anderson tendered a plea of guilty to one count of burglary in the third degree to dispose of all charges made against him in the indictment. He was later permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and was assigned different counsel. Following Anderson's withdrawal of his guilty plea, he made a motion to suppress evidence of: (1) an out-of-court identification of him, as the burglar who stole the laptop computer, made by the crime victim; and (2) inculpatory statements he made to law enforcement officers while he was in custody. Anderson also asked the trial court to determine whether the police officers who seized him had probable cause to effect his arrest.
The trial court conducted a combined Wade, Huntley andDunaway hearing to address the matters raised in Anderson's suppression motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that the officers who seized Anderson had probable cause to effect his arrest and that no basis existed for suppressing evidence of either an out-of-court show-up identification of Anderson as the burglar who stole the laptop computer, or the inculpatory statements Anderson made while in police custody, notwithstanding the fact that officers induced Anderson to make some of those statements by deceptively suggesting that they possessed evidence of the petitioner's guilt: a videotape, when no videotape existed. The court also found Anderson's claim, that Miranda warnings had not been given to him by police personnel, prior to questioning him, incredible.
A pretrial hearing, held pursuant to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967), is to determine whether the pretrial identification of a criminal defendant resulted from impermissibly suggestive law enforcement procedures.
A pretrial hearing, held pursuant to People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965), is to determine the voluntariness of inculpatory statements made by a criminal defendant to law enforcement officers.
A pretrial hearing, held pursuant to Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979), is to determine whether probable cause existed for a criminal defendant's arrest.
Following the completion of the combined suppression hearing referenced above and just prior to the commencement of his trial, Anderson tendered a plea of guilty to one count of third-degree burglary. His guilty plea was made in full satisfaction of all charges that had been preferred against him, as a result of negotiations with the prosecution and a promise from the trial court that Anderson would receive an indeterminate sentence, as a predicate felony offender, of three to six years imprisonment.
Anderson appealed from the judgment of conviction to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. Anderson urged that court to grant him relief because: (1) the trial court concluded, erroneously, that probable cause existed for his arrest; (2) the trial court acted improperly when it failed to suppress Anderson's written inculpatory statement, which was the product of deceptive police tactics and improper promises by law enforcement officers; and (3) Anderson's sentence was excessive. The Appellate Division affirmed Anderson's conviction unanimously. The court reasoned that the record generated during the suppression hearing supported the trial court's determination that probable cause existed for Anderson's arrest and, further, that the record demonstrated that Anderson's statements to law enforcement officers were made voluntarily. In addition, the Appellate Division found that the trial court determined correctly that, contrary to Anderson's contention, police personnel did not make any promises to the petitioner to induce him to confess. Moreover, according to the Appellate Division, the trial court acted properly in finding that deceptive statements made by police officials to Anderson did not render Anderson's confession inadmissible, such that it should have been suppressed. Furthermore, based on its review of the record as a whole, the Appellate Division found no basis existed for reducing Anderson's sentence. See People v. Anderson, 308 A.D.2d 407, 764 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App.Div. 1st Dep't 2003).
Anderson applied for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. In his application, Anderson asked that court to consider the three issues he had presented to the Appellate Division when he sought relief from that court. Anderson's application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. See People v. Anderson, 1 N.Y.3d 567, 775 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2003). The instant application for a writ of habeas corpus followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Fourth Amendment Claim
Anderson maintains that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, in part, because he was arrested without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The respondent contends Anderson's Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.
Where a state has a mechanism for adjudicating a Fourth Amendment claim, like the petitioner's claim concerning his arrest, habeas corpus review of the claim is precluded. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3046 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." In this judicial circuit, "federal courts can review the Fourth Amendment claims otherwise precluded by Stone only `(a) if the state has provided no corrective procedures at all to redress the alleged fourth amendment violations; or (b) if the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from using that mechanism because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process.'" Montero v. Sabourin, No. 02 Civ. 8666, 2003 WL 21012072, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2003) (quotingCapellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 [2d Cir. 1992]).
New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §§ 710, et seq. provide a procedure for litigating Fourth Amendment claims. Specifically, CPL § 710.60 provides for a pretrial hearing, or hearings, to determine whether evidence sought to be used at a trial is inadmissible because it violates the rule set forth, inter alia, in Dunaway.
In the case at bar, the trial court provided Anderson a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim that he was arrested without probable cause, when it granted his request made pursuant to CPL Article 710, and held a Dunaway hearing. Since Anderson does not allege that he was precluded from using the procedure New York provides for challenging arrests allegedly made without probable cause, due to an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying procedure, the Court finds that Anderson's claim, that the officers who arrested him lacked probable cause to do so, is not cognizable in this habeas corpus proceeding.
Inculpatory Statements
Anderson asserts his confession was coerced because: (i) a police officer told him of the existence of a videotape showing the vicinity of the office from which the laptop computer was taken; and (ii) he was promised leniency if he agreed to become a confidential informant. As noted above, Anderson raised this claim in the state court and it was adjudicated in that forum. The respondent contends Anderson failed to show that the state court's decision on this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus where a state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim raised in a federal habeas corpus petition only if the state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court has interpreted "the contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) as having independent meaning. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). A state-court decision is "contrary to" the Supreme Court's precedent: (i) "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law;" or (ii) "the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite" to that reached by the Supreme Court. Id. at 405, 120 S. Ct. at 1519. A state-court decision is based on an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if: (a) "the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case;" or (b) "the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407, 120 S. Ct. at 1520. If a state prisoner's federal claim was adjudicated on the merits, a federal court must presume any determination of a factual issue made by a state court to be correct and a habeas corpus petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Anderson's claim, that inculpatory statements he made to police personnel were not made voluntarily, was adjudicated on the merits in the state courts. In support of his habeas corpus petition, Anderson repeats the same arguments he presented to the Appellate Division on direct appeal. However, Anderson has failed to identify how the state-court decision on his claim concerning the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, Anderson has failed to show that the Appellate Division's decision on this claim was grounded on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record generated at the hearing held by the trial court. Moreover, Anderson has not presented any evidence to the Court that rebuts the presumption of correctness that is accorded to the factual findings made in the state court respecting his claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Therefore, the Court finds that the petitioner failed to meet the burden imposed on him by the relevant statute; and, consequently, Anderson is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on this claim.
Miranda Violation Claim
Anderson contends his Miranda rights were violated by the police officers who arrested and questioned him and, therefore, written and oral statements he made to them should have been suppressed by the trial court. The respondent asserts the petitioner's claim is meritless and no constitutional violation occurred, in part, because after Anderson was seized, and beforeMiranda warnings were given to him, a police officer made a statement to Anderson but did not question him. Thereafter, the petitioner responded to the officer, without making any inculpatory statements. According to the respondent, in such a circumstance, where no custodial questioning was done by a law enforcement officer, and no inculpatory statement was made by Anderson, suppressing the petitioner's response to the officer was not warranted. In addition, the trial court found thatMiranda warnings were given to Anderson before he made his written statement.
Here, Anderson is challenging both the written and oral post-arrest statements he made. However, the Court finds the claim, that Anderson's written and oral statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, is not exhausted because Anderson did not fairly present it to the Appellate Division for resolution. "An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
To protect against violations of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Supreme Court held in Miranda, that the police may not interrogate a suspect in custody unless that person is "warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630; accord Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda). The suspect may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, after receiving such warnings, and agree to answer any questions or make statements. See id.
In the instant case, the trial court found Anderson's statement, that he was willing to cooperate with the police, was not made in response to any questioning and that Anderson: (a) made other statements after he received Miranda warnings; (b) understood those warnings; and (c) waived his right to an attorney. Furthermore, to the extent that Anderson's Miranda — based claim is premised on his written statement, the state court's factual finding, that Miranda warnings were given to the petitioner prior to his preparation of the written statement, is presumed to be correct and Anderson has not rebutted that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The respondent contends, correctly, that generally, a guilty plea extinguishes a criminal defendant's right to attack collaterally claimed antecedent constitutional violations that do not relate to actual guilt. See e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1607 (1973). However, the Supreme Court has made clear that a criminal defendant's guilty plea does not foreclose a collateral attack on all antecedent constitutional violations. See e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241 (1975); and Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S. Ct. 2368 (1983). Inasmuch as the Court has determined that Anderson is not entitled to the relief he seeks — for the reasons outlined above — no detailed analysis of the effect Anderson's guilty plea has on his ability to obtain habeas corpus relief needs to be made by the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Anderson has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a federal right, and appellate review is therefore not warranted. Grotto v. Herbert, 316 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2003). The Court also finds, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445, 82 S. Ct. 917, 921 (1962).SO ORDERED: