Anderson v. City of St. Paul

41 Citing cases

  1. Paterson Tav. Grill Owners Assn. v. Bor. of Hawthorne

    57 N.J. 180 (N.J. 1970)   Cited 14 times

    Goesaert was relied upon by this Court in Guill v. Mayor and Council of Cityof Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 585 (1956) which the Appellate Division, as an intermediate judicial tribunal, properly considered binding upon it in the case at hand. 108 N.J. Super. at 442; seeHargens v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 263 Cal.App.2 d 601, 69 Cal.Rptr. 868 ( Ct. App. 1968); Henson v.City of Chicago, 415 Ill. 564, 114 N.E.2d 778 (1953); but cf. Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So.2d 870, 871 (1947); Loring, C.J., dissenting in Anderson v. City of St.Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538, 548-552 (1948). Though Goesaert has not been overruled ( cf. McCrimmon v.Daley, 418 F.2d 366, 369 (7 Cir. 1969)) its holding has been the subject of academic criticism (Kanowitz, supra, 11 St. Louis University L.J. at 328-29; Oldham, "Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws," 44 Denver L.J. 344, 373-74 (1967)) and its sweeping statement that the States are not constitutionally precluded from "drawing a sharp line between the sexes" ( 335 U.S. at 466, 69 S.Ct. at 199, 93 L.Ed. at 165) has been the subject of increasing limitation.

  2. Mitchell v. Steffen

    504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that a Minnesota statute that reduced general assistance benefits to indigents who had not resided in Minnesota for at least 6 months was unconstitutional

    [i]f any reasonable distinction between the subjects * * * can be found, the legislative classification should be sustained. Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 194-95, 32 N.W.2d 538, 543 (1948) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927)). We further noted that

  3. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby

    5 Cal.3d 1 (Cal. 1971)   Cited 220 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Invalidating state ban on female bartenders

    Even if they were not, many bars employ bouncers whose sole job is to keep order in the establishment. Furthermore, the experience in the states which permit women to tend bar indicates that the dire moral and social problems predicted by the Attorney General do not arise. (See, e.g., Paterson Tavern G.O.A. v. Borough of Hawthorne (1970) 57 N.J. 180, 186 [ 270 A.2d 628, 631]; Anderson v. City of St. Paul (1948) 226 Minn. 186, 209 [ 32 N.W.2d 538, 550-551] (dissenting opinion by Loring, C.J.).) Second, the Attorney General argues that the statute was designed to protect women since fewer women can be injured by inebriated customers if they are not permitted to work behind a bar.

  4. Nephew v. Liquor Control Com'n

    57 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. 1953)

    t, though in this case similar, nature which might, in the allowable legislative judgment, operate to eliminate or reduce the social and moral problems otherwise attendant on female bartending. From the 1949 amendment it clearly appears to have been the legislative belief that the responsibilities of ownership and the qualifications pertaining thereto, as well as the hazards of losing a liquor establishment license worth, as plaintiffs allege, $15,000 or more on sale or transfer, together with the business in connection therewith, for infractions of the law or failure to maintain a reputable place, also constitute "other factors" which are likely to eliminate or reduce, in the case of bartending by women owners or their daughters, the moral and social evils otherwise believed, in the allowable legislative judgment, to result from bartending by women in general. In support of the validity of classification based on that view, see People v. Jemnez, 49 Cal.App.2d 739 ( 121 P.2d 543) and Clara Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186 ( 32 N.W.2d 538). To borrow from the language and reasoning of Goesaert, we consider the judgment of the legislature in that regard to be within the bounds of "allowable legislative judgment," its belief in relation thereto to be "entertainable," and the line drawn by it in that regard to be "not without a basis in reason.

  5. Stabs v. City of Tower

    229 Minn. 552 (Minn. 1949)   Cited 27 times
    Stating that the court should not impose rules on a well-regulated area of law that the legislature did not impose when it considered the matter

    Licenses are granted by governmental authority to permit a business, which without the license would be illegal, to be legally operated. Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538; Blatz Brg. Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal.App.2d 639, 160 P.2d 37; Commonwealth v. Mutual Union Brg. Co. 252 Pa. 168, 97 A. 206; 53 C.J.S., Licenses, §§ 1 and 2. See, State ex rel. Interstate, etc., v. M.-St. P. Metropolitan Airports Comm. 223 Minn. 175, 25 N.W.2d 718, supra; Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm. 75 App. D.C. 315, 128 F.2d 280, certiorari denied, 317 U.S. 652, 63 S.Ct. 48, 87 L. ed. 525. Publicly owned liquor dispensaries, including municipal liquor stores, are established pursuant to statutory authorization.

  6. State v. Rohan

    834 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 15 times
    Serving alcohol to underage person in bar or restaurant

    It is well established that the due-process clause of the Minnesota Constitution does not extend greater protection against governmental interference than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 826 (Minn.2005) (citing Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)). But see State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn.1986) (striking down a statute “specifically and exclusively” under Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, while expressing confidence that the United States Supreme Court would take the same action under the Fourteenth Amendment).

  7. State v. Rohan

    No. A12-2256 (Minn. Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2013)

    Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 826 (Minn. 2005) (citing Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)). But see State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn.

  8. Investment Co. Institute v. Hatch

    477 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 3 times

    Moreover, the party challenging the statute's constitutionality must demonstrate the statute's infirmity beyond a reasonable doubt. Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 788, see also Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 194, 32 N.W.2d 538, 543 (1948) (persons challenging classification bear burden of showing that classification is essentially arbitrary). Appellant contends that because the entire statute embodies a regulatory scheme, subdivision 1(b) must be a pure licensing fee, enacted pursuant to the state's police powers, which cannot be used to collect extra revenues for the state treasury.

  9. McDonald v. City of Saint Paul

    679 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2012)   Cited 78 times
    Holding that no property interest arises where state law leaves "considerable discretion" in the hands of the school board

    “The due process protection provided under the Minnesota Constitution is identical to the due process guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn.1988) (citing Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)); see also Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 510 (8th Cir.2009) (same). To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove “(1) violation of a constitutional right, (2) committed by a state actor, (3) who acted with the requisite culpability and causation to violate the constitutional right.”

  10. Flesner v. City of Ely

    863 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    Stating that " release has been defined as a relinquishment, the concession or the waiver of a right, claim or privilege by the person in whom it exists to the person against whom it might have been enforced"

    Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 401, 61 N.W.2d 508, 519 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949, 74 S.Ct. 680, 98 L.Ed. 1096 (1954). See, also, Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 229 N.W.2d 144 (1975); Sabes v. City of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 166, 120 N.W.2d 871 (1963); Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948); Paron v. City of Shakopee, supra; Abein v. City of Shakopee, 224 Minn. 262, 28 N.W.2d 642 (1947). Thus, whether or not a tacit property right in an existing license could be identified for due process purposes (see, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 [1972]), it is plain that appellants cannot be said to have possessed such an interest in their inactive off-sale license.