Opinion
CV 99-418 (JBW)
July 19, 2000
Judgment, Memorandum and Order
I. Introduction
This case began as a dispute between neighbors. It represents a missed opportunity to utilize New York state's mediation system. Instead, it culminated in arrests and a lawsuit against the police. Because the police acted appropriately and had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, the complaint is dismissed.
II. Facts
There was a series of disputes between plaintiff Yvonne Anderson and her neighbor Annette Cline. Their problems produced numerous altercations, many calls to the police, and the arrest of Cline. Following the arrest, Anderson was granted an order of protection against Cline.
The problems between Anderson and Cline came to a head on May 7, 1998. Cline approached Anderson carrying the "Club," a car security device, and swearing at her. Anderson then threw a container in (line's direction. Officers John Dorst and Cameron Foster investigated the incident at the scene. They arrested both women. Anderson and Cline subsequently dropped their cases against each other, and all charges were dropped.
Plaintiff now claim that her constitutional rights were violated by the two officers and the City of New York. She sues under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. Claims against the other defendants have been dropped. She asserts false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against the officers and a Monell claim against the City of New York. She also alleges that her constitutional rights to equal protection and to redress grievances have been violated. The defendants motion for summary judgment as to all claims is granted.
II. Law
A. False Arrest
A section 1983 claim for false arrest is substantially the same as a claim for false imprisonment under New York state law. See Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999);Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1998). A false imprisonment claim has four elements: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff (2) the plaintiff was conscious of confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 118.
1. Probable Cause
Probable cause is a complete defense. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). Probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). Generally, probable cause exists when officers have reasonably trustworthy information of circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.See Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. "The function of law enforcement officers `is to apprehend those suspected of wrongdoing, and not to finally determine guilt through a weighing of the evidence.'"Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp.2d 128, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989)).
The defendants has probable cause to arrest Anderson. The plaintiff admitted at the scene that she had thrown a container at Cline. Cline also told the police that a bottle had been thrown at her and signed a statement to that effect. "An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim's veracity." Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. Because Cline's allegations were substantially corroborated by Anderson, there was no reason to doubt Cline's veracity nor to be concerned that Cline had an ulterior motive in a her because of their past disputes. See Mistretta, 5 F. Supp.2d at 133. There was no requirement that the officers investigate further.
Plaintiff also argues that her conduct did not rise to the level of reckless endangerment. Under New York law, "a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person." N.Y. Penal Law § 120.20. Serious physical injury is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ." N.Y. Penal Law § 10.10.
Plaintiff denies that she told police she threw a bottle. Regardless, she admitted throwing an object in Cline's direction. While it may be doubtful whether Anderson could actually have been convicted, Anderson's and Cline's statements gave the officers reason to believe that Anderson had committed crime by acting in a way that could have caused injury to Cline. Officers are not required to fully adjudicate the case at the scene. See Mistretta, 5 F. Supp.2d at 135.
Plaintiff finally contends that the defendants had an improper motive in arresting her. The test for probable cause is an objective one. Anderson's contention about an improper motive, even if true, is irrelevant because the officers had probable cause to arrest her. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 118; see also Mistretta, 5 F. Supp.2d at 135 (officer's motive of wanting to defuse a domestic dispute is irrelevant because facts gave him probable cause to arrest the plaintiff).
2. Qualified Immunity
Even if the claim were not to be dismissed for the reasons already stated, Dorst and Foster are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The right not to be arrested without probable cause is clearly established. See Soares v. State of Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993). Even if the plaintiff's right is clearly established, however, the officers are still entitled to immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that they h d probable cause or if officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether probable cause existed. See Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1994). Given the statements of both Anderson and Cline, it was objectively reasonable for Sergeant Dorst and Office Foster to believe that they had probable cause to arrest Anderson.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Malicious prosecution has four elements: (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding; and (4) malice. See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997). At a minimum, plaintiff has provided no evidence to create a disputed factual question regarding the third element.
Under New York law, probable cause in a malicious prosecution chum is "`the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for prosecuting the defendant in the manner complained of'" Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Pandolfo v. U.A. Cable Systems, 171 A.D.2d 1013 (N.Y. A.D. 1991)). the evidence as stated in the police report and Anderson's and Cline's depositions are persuasive that there was a reasonable belief that there were grounds to prosecute Anderson for reckless endangerment. As with the false arrest claim, the existence of probable cause is enough to defeat this claim as a matter of law.
C. Monell Claim
Anderson next contends that her constitutional rights were violated by the City of New York. A municipality may Le held liable under section 1983 if "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort."Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). If there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal official, the municipality y not be held liable. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992).
Even if an underlying constitutional violation did occur, Anderson must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the result of a municipal policy or custom. See Monell, 426 U.S. at 691. Such a policy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as a failure to properly train municipal employees regarding constitutional rights. See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1992). An assertion that a municipality has such a policy without some allegations of fact supporting the inference is insufficient. See id. Additionally, a single incident alleged in a complaint is generally not enough to establish the existence of a custom or policy, particularly if the incident involves only officials below the policy making level. See id. at 101.
In this case, Anderson alleges only one incident of overreaching by a city employee (her encounter with the defendants). The defendants are police officers, not policymakers. Although the plaintiff makes general assertions in her complaint that the officers were not adequately trained regarding the rights of citizens she alleges no facts supporting the existence of some municipal policy or custom leading to the deprivation of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff's Monell claim is without merit.
D. Equal Protection
To state a valid cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must show that she was selectively treated compared with others similarly situated and that such selective treatment resulted from the defendants' malicious intent to injure her. See Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1996). A claim can be made on behalf of a class of one. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000) (per curiam). Anderson must show that she was treated differently than Cline and that there was no rational basis for this treatment.See also id. at 1074 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stressing that an extra factor of "vindictive action" or "ill will" must be present).
Anderson contend that she was selectively treated because the defendants were friendly with Cline, as shown by the fact that the defendants visited Cline at the police station and brought her cigarettes. Anderson does not, however, claim that the defendants treated her differently than Cline in any constitutionally significant manner; she does not even allege that she asked for cigarettes and was denied them. The plaintiff presents no evidence that the defendants treated her selectively; in fact, they arrested both Cline and Anderson.
E. Redress of Grievances
The First Amendment gives individuals the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. See Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992). While, the contours of this right are clear it includes the right of access to the courts and arguably extends to other forms of redress such as the right to lodge complaints with the police. See generally McDonald v. Smith, r 472 U.S. 479, 482-3 (1985) (discussing "redress of grievances" clause).
Anderson makes two arguments in support of this claim. First she argues that the defendants arrested her in retaliation for calling the police. She states that this police action had a chilling effect on her own reactions. Plaintiff also contends that she felt compelled to drop her claim against Cline to avoid defendants lying about her in court.
Plaintiff's first claim is merely a restating of her false arrest claim. In the First Amendment context, it is arguable that a claim could be made if she could prove that the officer had an improper motive, i.e. they arrested her for making a complaint. Plaintiff presents no evidence that the defendants acted with such an illicit purpose.
The second part of plaintiff's claim is completely speculative. She presents no credible evidence that the defendants actually lied about her. She does not claim that the officer told her they would lie about her in court. Instead, she merely states her own conclusion that they would lie. Even if they were mistaken about the details of the incident, such a lapse of memory does not constitute perjury. She cannot sue them on the hypothesis made up out of whole cloth that they would have lied about her in court
III. Conclusion
The case is dismissed. Costs and disbursements to the defendants.
SO ORDERED.