Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-3010 SECTION "K"(5)
April 15, 2004
MINUTE ENTRY
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Rec. Doc. 9) filed by defendant City of New Orleans. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for reasons stated below.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ricky Allen Anderson, appearing here pro se, was a New Orleans resident from 1997-1998 and worked as a security counselor for the Orleans Parish School Board. On October 7, 1997, plaintiff was arrested by the New Orleans Police Department ("N.O.P.D.") for a drug violation. These charges against plaintiff were dismissed in 1998 "for like [sic] of prosecution." Complaint (Rec. Doc. No. 2) at ¶ 7, 11. On August 26, 2002, plaintiff discovered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Magistrate Judge Hansen recalled this warrant on August 26, 2002. and ordered plaintiff to return to court on September 23, 2002. New Orleans police officers Gary Calico. and Charles Baehr, two of the defendants in the underlying suit, failed to appear on September 23, 2002. plaintiff's trial took place on October 28, 2002, and Criminal District Court Judge Marie Bookman found plaintiff to be not guilty.
Plaintiff submitted a request to proceed in forma pauperis (Rec. Doc. No. 2) in the underlying claim to the court clerk on October 27, 2003. plaintiff's request was denied by Magistrate Judge Alma Chasez in an Order (Rec. Doc. No. 1) signed October 31, 2003 due to plaintiff's failure to fully complete the form. Plaintiff submitted a reconsideration of this denial and an amended in forma pauperis application (Rec. Doc. No. 3) to the court clerk on November 24, 2003. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 4, 2003 (Rec. Doc. No. 4) and plaintiff's complaint was thereby filed on December 4, 2003. In his complaint, plaintiff requests relief for mental, physical, and financial damages resulting from defendant's (1) illegal search of plaintiff's vehicle, (2) false arrest of plaintiff, (3) defamation of plaintiff's character, and (4) malicious prosecution of plaintiff.
Plaintiff's complaint states: "defendants . . . have interfered with [plaintiff] emotion, physical well being, interfered with the [plaintiff] everyday character trustworthy of life, whereas the defendants illegally searched the [the plaintiffs] vehicle without consent and without a warrant, false arrest based on hearsay and malicious wholesale prosecution." Complaint at ¶ 12.
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on February 2, 2004, claiming that plaintiff claims are prescribed, and plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Opposition (Rec. Doc. No. 13) on March 12, 2004.
II. LEGAL STANDARD ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To determine whether a motion to dismiss has merit, Jefferson Parish v. Lead Ind. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997) instructs that "[t]he standard to be applied to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is a familiar one." When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), district courts should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, assuming all factual allegations to be true and resolving any ambiguities and doubts in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Monies v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); see Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284-85. However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284; Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the prescriptive period has run. White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983); McKinley v. Larpenter, No. Civ. A 01-0836, 2001 WL 1178348 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2001). The filing date that governs the time of filing for statute of limitations purposes is the date the clerk of court received the plaintiff's complaint, rather than the formal filing date. Hernandez v. Aldridge, 902 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1990); Martin v. Demma, 831 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).; Cooper v. Taylor, 9:93-CV-142, 1995 WL 311980, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 1995). Delay in the formal filing of an in forma pauperis complaint does not affect the timeliness of a plaintiff's suit. See Kambitsis v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, 1993 WL 414647 (E.D. LA. 1993). Thus, the prescriptive period is still governed by the date the clerk of court received the in forma pauperis complaint and application, regardless of whether the complaint was formally filed at a later date. Ynclan v. Dept. of Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1392 (5th Cir. 1991). Additionally, when an in forma pauperis applicant files an application that is denied, and they subsequently either pay the filing fee or get their application approved, their complaint and application are treated as received by the clerk on the date the clerk received the original complaint and application. See Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 575 F.2d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1987); Melancon v. Assoc. Catholic Charities, No. Civ. A. 96-2084, 1997 WL 194620 (E.D. La. April 22, 1997). plaintiff's submittal of his complaint and in forma pauperis application on October 27, 2003, is therefore the governing date for defendant's statute of limitations claim. For statute of limitations purposes plaintiff's claim should be treated as filed on October 27, 2003, and not, as defendant suggests, on December 4, 2003 (the date plaintiff's complaint was logged into the docket sheet) or December 22, 2003 (the date defendant claims is the filing date).
Plaintiff does not explicitly classify his suit as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") action. However, the City of New Orleans characterizes plaintiff's suit as a § 1983 claim. In short, defendant contends that plaintiff's suit is time barred because federal courts must borrow the prescriptive period for personal injury suits from the forum state in which the district court sits.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy for the deprivation of rights under color of state law, and is the statute under which citizens may pursue personal injury claims against the government. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-48 (1985). In general, § 1983 "creates a cause of action where there has been injury, under color of state law, to the person or to the constitutional or federal statutory rights which emanate from or are guaranteed to the person." Id. at 1948 (citing Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972)). plaintiff's claims are personal injury claims premised on defendant's denial of plaintiff's civil rights, and therefore the Court shall treat them as § 1983 claims.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."
The Court notes that plaintiff has alleged, inter alia, malicious prosecution, a claim that's freestanding constitutional validity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was called into question by the 5th Circuit in Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003). In Castellano, the court held that "`malicious prosecution' standing alone is no violation of the United States Constitution, and that to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest upon a denial of rights secured under federal and not state law." Id. at 942. "[N]o such freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists." Id. at 945. The city is hereby instructed to file another motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), with supporting briefing, based on Castellano so that the Court can determine the legal viability of any claims the plaintiff is urging.
There is no federal statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts presiding over § 1983 claims must borrow the statute of limitations provisions of the state in which the federal court sits. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989) (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)); see also Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1989); Rodriquez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1992). plaintiff's § 1983 claim is therefore governed by Louisiana's statute of limitations provisions. See id. Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 sets forth the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in federal court, and provides for a prescriptive period of one year. Elzy, 868 F.2d at 794. This prescriptive period "commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492. plaintiff's cause of action, therefore, must have accrued one year before October 27, 2003, the date the clerk of court received plaintiff's original complaint and in forma pauperis application. See Martin, 831 F.2d at 71; Owens, 488 U.S.at 236; Elzy, 868 F.2d at 794.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492.
"Although state law controls the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal law determines when a cause of action accrues." Rodriquez, 963 F.2d at 803 (citing Brummet v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1991)). Under the federal standard, a cause of action accrues when "the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured." Id. (citing Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987)).
In his complaint, plaintiff requests damages for an illegal search of his car and his false arrest based on hearsay. It is unclear whether these allegations relate to plaintiff's arrest in 1997 or his trial in 2002. From the facts plaintiff provides in his complaint, it appears that the search of plaintiff's car could only have taken place during plaintiff's 1997 arrest. Since this arrest took place in 1997, however, and the charges were dismissed in 1998, any such allegations would be time barred; the cause of action accrued over a year before October 27, 2003, the date at which the court clerk received plaintiff's complaint and in forma pauperis application. Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED IN PART and any claims arising out of injuries plaintiff sustained from his 1997 arrest and 1998 trial are hereby dismissed as prescribed.
On the other hand, plaintiff's claims stemming from his 2002 trial accrue on October 28, 2002, the date on which plaintiff's case went to trial and was dismissed. Because plaintiff submitted his complaint and in forma pauperis application on October 27, 2003, within the one-year prescriptive period mandated by LA . CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492, defendant's contention that these claims have prescribed is without merit. Thus, defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is hereby DENIED IN PART as to plaintiff's claims arising out to his 2002 trial. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims for illegal search and unlawful arrest stemming out of his 1997 arrest are hereby DISMISSED as prescribed