Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1353-14T3
08-24-2016
CHRISTOPHER A. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and SAINT BARNABAS MEDICAL CENTER, Respondents.
Christopher A. Anderson, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro, & Murphy, attorneys for respondent Saint Barnabas Medical Center (Timothy D. Cedrone, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sabatino and Suter. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 006,469. Christopher A. Anderson, appellant pro se. Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro, & Murphy, attorneys for respondent Saint Barnabas Medical Center (Timothy D. Cedrone, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Christopher A. Anderson (claimant) appeals from a decision by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (Department)'s Board of Review that disqualified claimant from unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We vacate the decision and remand.
I.
Claimant was employed as a part-time driver and fire safety instructor for the Burn Foundation, a subsidiary of Saint Barnabas Medical Center (Saint Barnabas). He resigned that position effective October 1, 2013 because he wanted to spend more time travelling. He also held a part-time position as a fire extinguisher inspector with another subsidiary of Saint Barnabas, the Community Medical Center (Community Medical). He received one paycheck and had one employee number for the two part-time positions. Community Medical reimbursed the Burn Foundation for claimant's wages. When claimant resigned the position as a driver for the Burn Foundation, he worked and was paid for two more days as an inspector for Community Medical. After that, no more assignments were given to him by Community Medical. Claimant alleges he was terminated from the second position, which was "reassigned due to restructuring and budget reductions[,] thus eliminating availability of hours for his secondary job."
We were not advised if the paycheck and employee identification number were issued by Saint Barnabas, the Burn Foundation or Community Medical. --------
In December 2013, claimant applied for unemployment benefits for the Community Medical Center position, but was disqualified by the agency. He appealed and, following a hearing, the disqualification was affirmed by the Department's Appeal Tribunal on April 9, 2014. The Appeal Tribunal found that claimant worked two part-time jobs "for this employer" and "once he resigned, he was not given any more assignments with the other job." The Appeal Tribunal relied on a statute that requires an individual to be disqualified for benefits if he left his job voluntarily "without good cause attributable to such work" and "for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
At the hearing, claimant was told by the Appeal Examiner he had not "total[ed] out [his] voluntary quit from the first job as a driver educator[.]" To do so, claimant "would have had to work eight weeks and earn . . . ten times [his] weekly benefit rate of $266.00 or [he] would have had to earn $2,666.00 in order to toll out the voluntary quit." The Appeal Tribunal found that claimant "left the work voluntarily because he wanted to travel," which was "a personal reason" and not connected to claimant's work.
Claimant appealed to the Department's Board of Review, alleging he had not voluntarily left the Community Medical job, but was not allowed to work there because they "did not know how to pay me." When the fire extinguisher inspections were not completed, they were reassigned to a "security guard and some maintenance men[.]"
On August 28, 2014, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, finding there was no "valid ground for a further hearing" and "agree[d] with the decision reached."
On appeal, claimant raises the following issues.
Point I:
CLAIMANT SHOULD NOT BE DISQUALIFIED FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AS NEW JERSEY COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT AN EMPLOYEE WHO VOLUNTARILY QUITS ONE JOB WHILE STILL BEING EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE, MAY NOT BE DISQUALIFIED FROM BENEFITS UNDER N.J.S.A. 43:21.5.
Point II:
THE APPEAL TRIBUNAL INCORRECTLY APPLIED N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) IN RENDERING THEIR JANUARY 23, 2014 OPINION AS CLAIMANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE HIS POSITION AT COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER.
II.
We begin by recognizing that our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). Administrative agency decisions are sustained unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record; or contrary to express or implied legislative policies. Saccone v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014); Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014). "[A]n appellate court should give considerable weight to a state agency's interpretation of a statutory scheme that the [L]egislature has entrusted to the agency to administer." In re Election Law Enforcement Comm'n Advisory Op. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010); see also GE Solid State v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 306 (1993). Although we "defer[] to an administrative agency's findings of fact," we owe no deference to an agency's conclusions of law and are "not 'bound by [the] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue[.]'" Lavezzi, supra, 219 N.J. at 172 (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Intermodal Props., LLC, 215 N.J. 142, 165 (2013)).
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, a person must be "unemployed". N.J.S.A. 43:21-4. Under N.J.S.A. 43:21- 19(m)(1)(A), "[a]n individual shall be deemed 'unemployed' for any week during which: (A)[t]he individual is not engaged in full-time work and with respect to which his rate of remuneration is less than his weekly benefit rate[.]" However, an unemployed claimant can be disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5. "[D]isqualification applies 'when a person gives up partial employment for none at all,' thus 'voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Merkel v. HIP of N.J., 240 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting Zielinski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46, 53 (App. Div. 1964)).
A person "shall be" disqualified for unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment[.]" N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). A worker who chooses to terminate employment for personal reasons is disqualified from collecting unemployment benefits. Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 457 (1982). The burden rests upon the claimant to show entitlement to unemployment benefits. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218.
Claimant left his position as a driver for the Burn Foundation voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. If that were his only position, he would be disqualified for unemployment because he resigned for personal reasons not related to the work. However, he also had another part-time position with the same employer from which he was involuntarily terminated and did not resign.
In Merkel, we held that "an individual who quits a part-time job while continuing to be employed full time by another employer cannot be found to have 'left work voluntarily' within the intent of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)." Merkel, supra, 240 N.J. Super. at 439. Merkel was not "unemployed" under the statute and was not eligible for unemployment benefits as long as she held her full-time position. However, when she was involuntarily discharged by the second employer, which employment "established her basic benefit eligibility," we held she was not disqualified under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), even though she had resigned voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work from her part-time job two weeks before her full-time job involuntarily terminated her. Id. at 437. In Merkel, the claimant was "forced into the ranks of the unemployed" not by voluntarily leaving her part-time job, but by her involuntary termination from the full-time job. Id. at 438-440.
The Department's regulations address the situation of a worker holding two jobs with two employers, one of which may be part time. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2. Where a worker "is employed by two or more employers on a part-time basis and . . . leaves one employer voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, [the worker] shall be subject to disqualification for voluntarily leaving work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(b). If, however, one of the positions were full time and the worker was involuntarily separated, but then voluntarily left the part-time employment thereafter, the worker would be subject to a partial disqualification for voluntarily leaving the part-time position. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.2(a).
In this case, claimant voluntarily quit one of his part-time positions with Saint Barnabas. However, in contrast with the regulations cited, claimant was not employed by two employers. His sole employer was Saint Barnabas, because he had one employee number. When he resigned from the Burn Foundation part-time job, he continued to be employed part time by the same employer. He had not yet joined the ranks of the unemployed. In this regard, the reasoning in Merkel is persuasive. We disagree with the Board of Review's interpretation of Merkel that the second employment had to be full time to qualify for benefits. Our unemployment statute anticipates that benefits may be based on part-time employment if that employment meets the criteria set forth in the statute. N.J.S.A. 43:21-20.1.
When Saint Barnabas no longer had work for claimant in his part-time position with Community Medical, it was then that he became unemployed. He applied for benefits based on his termination from that position. We disagree with the Board's decision that he should be disqualified for benefits based on a "voluntary quit" from the Burn Foundation job. We do not see this as a situation where claimant had to "toll out his voluntary quit" through other employment. He remained employed by Saint Barnabas, but was terminated from his second position after he resigned the first for personal reasons.
Here, it was not claimant's resignation from the Burn Foundation that added him to the "ranks of the unemployed," but his involuntary and unexpected termination from Community Medical. The statutory scheme seeks to ease the burden of "[i]nvoluntary unemployment," N.J.S.A. 43:21-2, and should apply in this situation.
Vacated and remanded for the calculation and payment of the benefits owed to claimant consistent with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION