In many, if not most, instances, the circuit court's order does not determine and conclude the rights of the parties. For example, if, applying the appropriate standard of review, the court finds that there was not substantial evidence to support the agency decision or that the agency made an error of law, it will likely remand the case to the agency, which will ultimately determine the parties' rights by applying the law as directed by the circuit court. Such a remand may appear to be non-final in nature, but under the principles of finality in Maryland law outlined above, many such remands are appealable final judgments. See, e.g., Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290, 295, 52 A.2d 605 (1947) (remand order to agency was a final judgment because it terminated the proceedings in the circuit court, even though proceedings continued before the agency); but cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 298, 708 A.2d 296 (1998) (remand for master to conduct additional proceedings was not a final judgment because the court intended that additional proceedings occur and, as master was part of the circuit court, the case remained pending in that court).See A. Rochvarg, Maryland Administrative Law (2d ed.2007) at 176.
but under the principles of finality in Maryland law outlined above, many such remands are appealable final judgments. See, e.g., Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290, 295, 52 A.2d 605 (1947) (remand order to agency was a final judgment because it terminated the proceedings in the circuit court, even though proceedings continued before the agency); but cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 298, 708 A.2d 296 (1998) (remand for master to conduct additional proceedings was not a final judgment because the court intended that additional proceedings occur and, as master was part of the circuit court, the case remained pending in that court). Indeed, the federal courts and a majority of state courts consider such remands to be non-final orders that are not appealable unless the failure to grant immediate review would foreclose appellate review altogether, the collateral order doctrine applies, the dismissal is for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the defect cannot be cured, or the agency is directed to perform only a collateral task.
"The underlying policy of the final judgment rule is that piecemeal appeals are disfavored." Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614, 440 A.2d 388, 389 (1982); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 297, 708 A.2d 296, 298 (1998). Generally barring appellate review until the entry of a final judgment results in a single review of all claims of error throughout an entire proceeding, thus both expediting litigation and conserving judicial and other resources. See Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 356, 384 A.2d 91, 93 (1978); see also Huber v. Nationwide, 347 Md. 415, 423, 701 A.2d 415, 418-19 (1997) ("[P]iecemeal appeals . . . are not consistent with efficient judicial administration.").
We do not perceive this to be such a circumstance. The Court of Special Appeals in Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md. App. 474, 700 A.2d 844 (1997), vacated on other grounds, 349 Md. 294, 708 A.2d 296 (1998), examined whether a parent was entitled to receive a credit against child support for social security retirement benefits being paid directly to his minor children. Judge Eyler, writing for the court, stated:
In an above-guidelines case such as this, the trial court must consider a child's Social Security benefits "as simply one fact of the many available to it upon which to base an award." Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md.App. 474, 489, (1997), vacated on procedural grounds, 349 Md. 294 (1998). Such benefits are income for Colin.
In an above-guidelines case such as this, the trial court must consider a child's Social Security benefits "as simply one fact of the many available to it upon which to base an award." Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md.App. 474, 489, (1997), vacated on procedural grounds, 349 Md. 294 (1998). Such benefits are income for Colin.
Judge Kevin F. Arthur, FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS AND OTHER APPELLATE TRIGGER ISSUES 5 (3d ed. 2018) ("FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS"). "[T]o be a final judgment in a controversy involving multiple claims, the order must dispose of all claims in the action." Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC , 412 Md. 555, 565-66, 989 A.2d 210 (2010) ; see alsoAnderson v. Anderson , 349 Md. 294, 297-98, 708 A.2d 296 (1998) (dismissing an appeal because, although the trial court had decided the central legal issue concerning child support, it had remanded the case to a special master to prepare a child-support worksheet, and, therefore, the trial court anticipated further findings of fact before entering a final judgment).There exist three limited exceptions to the final-judgment rule.
See Tucker v. Tucker, 156 Md. App. 484, 492 (2004) ("'[A]ctual income' means income from any source, including Social Security benefits." (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md. App. 474, 483 (1997), vacated, 349 Md. 294 (1998)) (internal citations omitted)). Nevertheless, we have already explained that the expectations of the divorce court are also relevant as to whether a change in circumstances has occurred.
The case law indicates a trial court need not use a strict extrapolation method to determine support in an above Guidelines case. Rather, the court may employ any "rational method that promotes the general objectives of the child support Guidelines and considers the particular facts of the case before it." Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 410 (2003) (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md. App. 474, 478 n.1 (1997), vacated on other grounds, 349 Md. 294 (1998). In Chimes v. Michael, the Court of [Special] Appeals noted that "the legislative history and case law do not obscure the fact that the Legislature left the task of awards above the guidelines to the Chancellor precisely because such awards defied any simple mathematical solution."
Some states have adopted a case-by-case approach, leaving the matter to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 868 N.E.2d 862, 868–69 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (stating that “the proper treatment of the Social Security retirement benefits received by a child in calculating child support should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court”); Anderson v. Anderson, 117 Md.App. 474, 476, 700 A.2d 844, 845 (1997), judgment vacated on other grounds, 349 Md. 294, 708 A.2d 296 (1998) (holding that Social Security benefits received directly by a dependent child as a result of the parent's retirement do not offset such parent's child-support obligation as a matter of law but that the trial court may consider such benefits when deciding whether to deviate from the child-support guidelines or in any case that “involves parents with above-guidelines income levels”). Other states take the position that there is a rebuttable presumption favoring a credit for Social Security dependent retirement benefits.