Opinion
14811 Index No. 655530/19 Case No. 2020–02032
12-09-2021
Robin H. Kyle, New York, for appellant. Fordharrison LLP, New York (Philip K. Davidoff of counsel), for respondents.
Robin H. Kyle, New York, for appellant.
Fordharrison LLP, New York (Philip K. Davidoff of counsel), for respondents.
Kapnick, J.P., Moulton, Gonza´lez, Rodriguez, Pitt, JJ.
Judgment (denominated decision and order), Supreme Court, New York County (John J. Kelley, J.), entered on or about February 20, 2020, denying petitioner's article 75 petition to vacate an arbitration award, dismissing the petition, and granting the cross petition to confirm the award, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
A court may vacate an arbitration award only where the award violates strong public policy, is irrational, or exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power (see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii] ; Matter of Falzone v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.3d 530, 534, 914 N.Y.S.2d 67, 939 N.E.2d 1197 [2013] ; Matter of Isernio v. Blue Star Jets, LLC, 140 A.D.3d 480, 480, 31 N.Y.S.3d 884 [1st Dept. 2016] ). None of those grounds provide any basis for vacating the arbitrator's award. Based on the testimony at the hearing, the arbitrator rationally found that petitioner was terminated for good cause. Nor did the arbitrator exceed her powers by creating a new agreement between the parties, as the commission agreement did not supersede the employment agreement; rather, those agreements pertained to two separate topics. The award also does not violate public policy, since the issue before the arbitrator, and the only one she resolved, was whether petitioner was terminated for good cause; the arbitrator did not reach the issue of the laws governing false claims and perjury.
Even assuming that this dispute is covered by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because the agreement was made "in commerce" ( 9 USC § 1 ), the result is the same. Under the FAA, an arbitrator may be deemed to have exceeded his or her powers by manifestly disregarding the law, but only "in those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrator is apparent" ( T.Co. Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339 [2d Cir.2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]); see Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 19 [2d Cir.1997] ). This proceeding does not present such an instance.
Petitioner makes no showing as to the need for discovery in connection with his claim under New York Civil Rights Law § 51.