Opinion
CASE NO. 21-60793-CIV-SINGHAL
2022-02-25
Sharilyne ANDERSON and Vera Melnyk, Plaintiffs, v. Gurmeet AHLUWALIA, Niel Heselton, Dynamic Yacht Management, LLC, Dream Holdings, Ltd., and Nigel Burgess, Inc., in personam, Defendants.
Matthew John Valcourt, Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs. Christopher Rogers Fertig, Darlene M. Lidondici, Fertig & Gramling, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants Gurmeet Ahluwalia, Dynamic Yacht Management, L.L.C., Dream Holdings Ltd. Ana Maria Barton, Edward Maurice Mullins, Reed Smith LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Nigel Burgess Inc.
Matthew John Valcourt, Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Christopher Rogers Fertig, Darlene M. Lidondici, Fertig & Gramling, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants Gurmeet Ahluwalia, Dynamic Yacht Management, L.L.C., Dream Holdings Ltd.
Ana Maria Barton, Edward Maurice Mullins, Reed Smith LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Nigel Burgess Inc.
OMNIBUS ORDER
RAAG SINGHAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Dynamic Yacht Management, LLC and Gurmeet Ahluwalia's Motion to Dismiss (DE [6]), Defendant Nigel Burgess Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay All Court Proceedings and Accompanying Memorandum of Law (DE [15]), Defendant Dream Holdings Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Memorandum of Law (DE [26]), and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production and Memorandum of Law (DE [37]). All motions are fully briefed. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
On April 12, 2021, Plaintiffs Sharilyne Anderson and Vera Melnyk ("Plaintiffs"), residents of Canada, filed the present maritime tort action against: (1) Defendant Gurmeet Ahluwalia ("Ahluwalia"), who is believed to be domiciled in the State of Florida; (2) Defendant Niel Heselton ("Captain Heselton"), a British national residing in England; (3) Defendant Dynamic Yacht Management, LLC ("Dynamic"), a Florida limited liability company with its principal place of business in Coral Springs, Florida; (4) Defendant Dream Holdings, Ltd.’s ("Dream Holdings"), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands with an address in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands; and (5) Defendant Nigel Burgess, Inc. ("NBI"), a Florida for profit corporation with its principal place of business in Miami Beach, Florida. Plaintiffs were guests on a private charter of a 196.9-foot luxury motor yacht called M/Y DREAM (the "Vessel"), navigating through Bahamian waters between December 22, 2020 and January 1, 2021. This lawsuit arises from Plaintiffs’ allegedly unpleasant experience during the charter. They assert counts of negligence (Count I), false imprisonment (Count II), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) against all Defendants. Plaintiffs seek in excess of five million dollars in damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and punitive damages on all counts against all Defendants, jointly and severally.
Plaintiffs also filed suit in this Court against the Vessel. See Case Number 21-60863.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint (DE [1]) alleges, in sum, the captain's navigational route resulted in their experiencing rough seas and severe seasickness, and the captain failed to properly ensure their safety and refused to allow them to disembark via a tender due to the dangerous ocean swell. Plaintiffs claim they accepted the "Charterer's invitation to spend Christmas aboard the ‘superyacht’ " where they expected "a world class luxury cruise" managed by "highly professional crew" but instead received "a crew headed by an angry, arrogant, dismissive, and grossly negligent captain." (Compl. (DE [1]) at 1–2). Plaintiffs allege Captain Heselton refused to take the Vessel "between the island of Andros and the archipelago to the east called the Exuma District" despite being ordered to do so by Charterer pursuant to his authority under the "Charter Agreement." Id. Plaintiffs allege the Charterer entered into the Charter Agreement on December 18, 2020, with: (1) Defendant Ahluwalia, who is purportedly Dream Holdings’ agent, (2) Dream Holdings, a Cayman management company which owns the Vessel, and (3) NBI, a Florida company which manages the Vessel and its charter staff. (Compl. (DE [1]) at ¶ 18). Plaintiffs do not identify who or what the "Charterer" is anywhere in their twenty-five page Complaint (DE [1]). Nor do Plaintiffs attach said Charter Agreement to the Complaint (DE [1]) despite referencing it seven times including: in alleging proper venue because the Charterer entered into the agreement in Fort Lauderdale, Florida; in claiming the Charter Agreement guaranteed a qualified captain; in asserting the captain was required to follow the Charterer's orders; and in claiming the Charterer had authority to direct the voyage. (Compl. (DE [1]) ¶¶ 4, 10, 31, 37, 38).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 17, 2021, Defendant Dynamic Yacht Management, LLC and Gurmeet Ahluwalia filed a Motion to Dismiss (DE [6]) for lack of jurisdiction. On September 20, 2021, Dream Holdings filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Memorandum of Law (DE [26]). Additionally, Dream Holdings filed a Declaration of Nicole Ramroop in Support of Dream Holdings, Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE [27]), which asserts, inter alia , that Dream Holdings has no office or business address in Florida and does not engage in business in Florida. On October 1, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Allow Jurisdictional Discovery of Dream Holdings (DE [29]), which was granted in part by this Court. See (Order (DE [33]), entered Nov. 10, 2022). On December 3, 2021, Dream Holdings responded to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, however, Plaintiffs take issue with several responses provided and have filed a Motion to Compel Production and Memorandum of Law (DE [37]).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
"A defendant can move to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by either facial or factual attack." Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc. , 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). "A ‘facial attack’ on the complaint ‘require[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.’ " McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta—Richmond Cnty. , 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) ). "Factual attacks," on the other hand, serve to "challenge ‘the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered.’ " Id.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. "A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the law of the forum state and the Constitution's Due Process Clause." Am. Univ. of the Caribbean v. Caritas Healthcare , 484 Fed. Appx. 322, 326 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd. , 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002) ). "A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer , 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). "Where, as here, the defendant challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, ‘the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.’ " Id. (quoting Meier , 288 F.3d at 1269 ).
"A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute, and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." United Techs. Corp. , 556 F.3d at 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais , 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). As the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, this Court must construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd. , 94 F.3d 623, 631 (11th Cir. 1996). In International Shoe Co. v. Washington , the U.S. Supreme Court "held that in order to subject a defendant to an in personam judgment when he is not present within the territory of the forum, due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais , 554 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1989). "[T]he test is whether the defendant's conduct in connection with the forum state is ‘such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ " Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ).
C. Failure to State Claim
At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8(a) does not require "detailed factual allegations," it does require "more than labels and conclusions ... a formulaic recitation of the cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must be sufficient "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court's review is generally "limited to the four corners of the complaint." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc. , 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty. , 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) ). Courts must review the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ; Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez , 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). However, pleadings that "are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8 requires a complaint to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The opposite of a short and plain statement of the claim is what is known as a "shotgun" pleading. " ‘Shotgun’ pleadings are cumbersome, confusing complaints that do not comply with these pleading requirements." See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). "Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings." Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets , 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018).
There are four basic types of shotgun pleadings: (1) those in which each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) those that do not re-allege all preceding counts but are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) those that do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into different counts; and (4) those that assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which applies to which. See Weiland , 792 F.3d at 1321–23 (quotations omitted); see also Strategic Income Fund, LLC. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp. , 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). "The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to ... give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Id. at 1323.
Shotgun pleadings make it "virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief." Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College , 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, "shotgun pleadings are routinely condemned by the Eleventh Circuit." Real Estate Mortg. Network, Inc. v. Cadrecha , 2011 WL 2881928, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2011) (citing Pelletier v. Zweifel , 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991) ); see also Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. , 516 F.3d 955, 979 n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[S]ince 1985 we have explicitly condemned shotgun pleadings upward of fifty times."); Strategic Income Fund, LLC , 305 F.3d at 1295 n.9 ("This court has addressed the topic of shotgun pleadings on numerous occasions in the past, often at great length and always with great dismay."); Byrne v. Nezhat , 261 F.3d 1075, 1131 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Shotgun pleadings, if tolerated, harm the court by impeding its ability to administer justice.").
D. Compel Arbitration
The primary purpose of the FAA is to "[ensure] that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. , 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) ; see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton , 514 U.S. 52, 53–54, 115 S.Ct. 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d 76 (1995). There is an "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Courts are to construe "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ... in favor of arbitration." Id. at 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346. According to the FAA, arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," however, "arbitration is a matter of contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 ; Griggs v. Kenworth of Montgomery, Inc. , 775 Fed. Appx. 608, 612 (11th Cir. 2019).
The presumption of arbitrability, however, "does not apply to the determination of whether an arbitration agreement exists." Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc. , 2018 WL 4410110, *10 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018) (citing Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA) , 745 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (11th Cir. 2014) ) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when determining whether an arbitration agreement exists, "courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." Dasher , 745 F.3d at 1116 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) ). "Such a determination rests on the intent of the parties." Seaboard C. L. R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co. , 690 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). "A party may not be required to arbitrate a dispute it did not agree to arbitrate." Id. (citations omitted).
"[A] district court may conclude as a matter of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ concerning the formation of such an agreement." Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC , 827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that "summary judgment-like standard is appropriate" to decide the arbitration question) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). "The party asserting the existence of a contract has the burden of proving its existence and its terms." Id. at 1330 (quoting Jackson v. Easters , 190 Ga.App. 713, 379 S.E.2d 610, 611 (1989) ). Likewise, the party moving to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the contract is a valid and enforceable agreement. Id. (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. DYNAMIC AND AHLUWALIA'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DE [6])
Defendants Dynamic and Ahluwalia move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (DE [1]) for lack of jurisdiction because federal jurisdiction has not been invoked and there is not complete diversity of parties. Defendants also argue Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs concede there is no diversity between the parties, however, they oppose the motion by withdrawing their assertion of diversity jurisdiction in this matter and instead electing to bring this suit solely under the court's admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), federal district courts "have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
Under the saving-to-suitors clause, a plaintiff in a maritime case alleging an in personam claim has three options: (1) the plaintiff may file suit in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction ...; (2) the plaintiff may file suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction; or (3) the plaintiff may file suit in state court.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lago Canyon, Inc. , 561 F.3d 1181, 1187 n.13 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). " Section 1333 vests district courts with original jurisdiction over civil admiralty or maritime disputes, but the statute ‘saves to suitors’—meaning plaintiffs—‘all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.’ " Deroy v. Carnival Corp. , 963 F.3d 1302, 1313 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) ). "One remedy the saving-to-suitors clause safeguards is the right to a jury trial." Id. (citing Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. , 531 U.S. 438, 444-45 (2001)) ("Trial by jury is an obvious, but not exclusive, example of the remedies available to suitors.").
Plaintiffs have not filed suit in state court, concede this Court has no diversity jurisdiction, but reference admiralty jurisdiction as an alternative basis of jurisdiction. See (Compl. (DE [1]) ¶ 3). Accordingly, the Court will address Defendant's position that Plaintiffs lack subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants assert that admiralty jurisdiction is not present as the action involves claims by foreign Plaintiffs purportedly occurring on a foreign flagged vessel in foreign territorial waters committed by a foreign national. In support of this argument, Defendants rely on a statement from Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law , 404 U.S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971), that reads: "maritime law governs only those torts occurring on the [high seas and the] navigable waters of the United States." Defendants cite several courts that have used this statement to conclude that federal maritime law does not extend to torts that occur in territorial waters of other nations. However, the conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction applies to cases which arise on navigable waters outside of the United States is also echoed in prominent treatises. See, e.g. , Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 33 (2d ed. 1975) ("Occurrences on foreign navigable waters may also ground admiralty jurisdiction."); Mink v. Genmar Indus., Inc. , 29 F.3d 1543, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.") (quoting The Plymouth , 70 U.S. 20, 36, 3 Wall. 20, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866) ). "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of injury or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land." 46 U.S.C. § 30101.
In a tort case, a complaint must satisfy two elements to invoke admiralty jurisdiction: "(1) there must be a significant relationship between the alleged wrong and traditional maritime activity (the nexus requirement) and (2) the tort must have occurred on navigable waters (the location requirement)." Aqua Log, Inc. v. Lost & Abandoned Pre-Cut Logs & Rafts of Logs , 709 F.3d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 2013). An incident is connected with maritime activity if, on an assessment of the general features of the type of incident involved, it has "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce," and "the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. , 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995).
Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ Complaint (DE [1]) fails to satisfy the requirements because Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts to establish a viable cause of action against Defendants. The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that when passengers bring personal-injury claims for injuries that occurred at sea, those claims fall squarely within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. See Caron v. NCL (Bah.), Ltd. , 910 F.3d 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 2018). "Admiralty jurisdiction turns on the facts and substance of the claims alleged in the complaint." Deroy , 963 F.3d at 1312. Here, Plaintiffs have asserted three causes of action: Negligence, False Imprisonment, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all named Defendants arising from an allegedly unpleasant experience during a Christmas cruise on the Vessel. This Court finds, however, that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support any cause of action asserted because in each of the causes of action the Plaintiffs fail to specifically identify the acts of the named defendants which give rise to the causes of action. Instead, the Complaint (DE [1]) consists of conclusory allegations and legal assertions without factual predicate as to each Defendant.
1. Count I – Negligence
"Federal maritime law applies to actions arising from alleged torts ‘committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters.’ " Smolnikar v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , 787 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc. , 867 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1989) ). General maritime law is "an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules." E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval , 476 U.S. 858, 864-65, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). In the absence of well-developed maritime law pertaining to negligence claims, a court will incorporate general common law principles and Florida state law to the extent they do not conflict with federal maritime law. See Just v. Chambers , 312 U.S. 383, 388, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941) ("With respect to maritime torts we have held that the State may modify or supplement the maritime law by creating liability which a court of admiralty will recognize and enforce when the state action is not hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation.").
"In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc. , 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980) ). "To plead negligence, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm." Id. (citations omitted). Negligent supervision "occurs when, during the course of employment, the employer becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with an employee that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further actions such as investigating, discharge, or reassignment." Cruz v. Advance Stores Co. , 842 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2012). On the other hand, negligent training occurs when an employer "was negligent in the implementation or operation of the training program" and the negligence causes a plaintiff's injury. Id. ; see also Gutman v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc. , 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Plaintiffs assert a claim of negligence against all Defendants alleging that "Defendants owed Plaintiffs, lawful invitees aboard the vessel they operated on navigable waters, a duty of reasonable care to keep them safe from harm and serious injury on the vessel, to act and navigate the vessel prudently as to avoid injury or illness and to allow free ingress and egress to and from the vessel." Compl. (DE [1] ¶ 89). Defendants argue Plaintiffs Complaint (DE [1]) lacks facts supporting a negligent hiring, training, or supervision claim. This Court agrees. Plaintiffs assert Defendants Ahluwalia and Dynamic are vicariously liable for Captain Heselton's negligence. Plaintiffs claim Defendants Ahluwalia and Dynamic owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care to properly hire, staff, train, and supervise Captain Heselton yet they breached this duty, amongst other recitations of the cause of action, by failing to adequately staff the crew and hire a competent captain and staff. Plaintiffs allege they suffered injuries and damages as a direct and proximate cause arising from Defendants’ breach of their duty. These allegations are insufficient, however, because these causes of action have a specific set of requirements that must be pled to state a claim.
The Court first finds that Count I is an impermissible "shotgun" pleading because it asserts two separate causes of action in a single count. Plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligent hiring, training, or supervision claim with boilerplate allegations nor can such claims be pled in a single count as a defendant could be found liable for negligent hiring or for negligent training. Here, the claim contained in Count I is not "short and plain," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and the allegations are not "simple, concise, and direct," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (d)(1). Rather, Count I contains ten vague, conclusory, and often long-winded paragraphs spanning almost seven pages, and cross-references numerous other allegations spanning many more pages contained elsewhere in the Complaint (DE [1]).
Count I does not allege sufficient factual matter to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Furthermore, the standard requires the pleader to do more than recite elements of a cause of action or state legal conclusions. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Sarver v. Jackson , 344 Fed. Appx. 526, 527 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (court may dismiss complaint "if it rests only on conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, Count I for Negligence against all Defendants is dismissed.
2. Count II – False Imprisonment
"Under Florida law, ‘[f]alse imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person against his will, the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff and deprivation of his liberty.’ " Archer v. City of Winter Haven , 846 Fed. Appx. 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Weiner , 155 Fla. 169, 171 (Fla. 1944) ). "To state a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must establish: ‘1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person 2) against that person's will 3) without legal authority or ‘color of authority’ ... 4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances." Id. (citations omitted). "In a false imprisonment action the plaintiff is required only to ‘establish imprisonment contrary to his will and the unlawfulness of the detention.’ " Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. , 437 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
In Count II, Plaintiffs allege they were forcefully confined to the Vessel for approximate fifteen hours of travel on the open sea. Plaintiffs claim Captain Heselton refused to allow them to disembark despite several orders by the Charterer. As a result of such confinement, Plaintiffs assert they suffered harm including physical illness, anxiety, loss of liberty, loss of enjoyment and benefit of the Charter, pain, suffering and severe emotional distress. Plaintiffs also claim all Defendants are vicariously liable for Captain Heselton's actions because the conduct fell within the scope of his duties of employment as the Vessel's Captain.
Again, while this Court can deduce the identification of the so-called "Charter," Plaintiff's have failed to identify him in the Complaint (DE [1]) or explain why Captain Heselton was purportedly required to obey the Charterer.
This Count suffers from the same pleading deficiencies as the first. Additionally, certain facts asserted in the Complaint (DE [1]) contradict Plaintiffs’ legal conclusions. Specifically, the Complaint (DE [1]) states the Captain determined the seas were too rough to permit safe transfer of the passengers into the tender. See e.g. , (Compl. (DE [1]) at 3); id. at ¶¶ 57, 58, 59, 60, 67, 77, 90.c.iv., 97, 103, 104). There are no allegations which show any actions taken by Captain Heselton were unreasonable or unwarranted under the circumstances, as required by Florida law to state the intentional tort of false imprisonment. Plaintiffs allege only that Captain Heselton was unpleasant and he disregarded direct orders from the Charterer to disembark. Such allegations are nonsensical in light of Plaintiffs’ admission that the seas were rough. Id. Because Count II alleges vicarious liability for false imprisonment against all Defendants, and the underlying claim fails, it is dismissed for that reason as well. See Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish , 464 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1985) (citing Williams v. Hines , 80 Fla. 690, 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) ) ("It is generally recognized that, when a principal's liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held liable if the agent is exonerated."). Accordingly, Count II for False Imprisonment against all Defendants is dismissed.
3. Count III – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A negligent infliction of emotional distress claim requires "mental or emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by the negligence of another and that is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that may manifest itself in physical symptoms." Chaparro , 693 F.3d at 1337-37 (citation omitted). "Common law standards vary in what sort of harm the plaintiff must suffer (an actual ‘physical impact,’ presence in the ‘zone of danger,’ or status as a mere bystander)," but federal maritime law has adopted the application of the "zone of danger" test "which allows recovery if a plaintiff is placed in immediate risk of physical harm by defendant's negligent conduct." Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs allege "Captain Heselton intentionally inflicted continued emotional distress during the voyage and exhibited outrageous conduct including screaming at the crew in front of guests, acting aggressively toward all aboard, committing assault and fear of physical harm, continued intentional transit over rough seas to further punish the guests aboard the vessel, refusal to allow any guest to disembark." (Compl. (DE [1]) at ¶ 103). Plaintiffs further claim all Defendants are vicariously liable for Captain Heselton's actions because the conduct fell within the scope of his duties of employment as the Vessel's Captain.
Defendants argue the Complaint (DE [1]) fails to identify any acts of Dynamic and Ahluwalia which would make them individually liable for Count III. Count III, like Count II, is asserted against all Defendants as vicariously liable only, which Defendants Dynamic and Ahluwalia again claim are barred as a matter of law. Additionally, Defendants Dynamic and Ahluwalia argue this count similarly fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This Court agrees.
The conduct Plaintiffs allegedly suffered may fall below the quality they expected on a luxury cruise but is not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law. See Garcia v. Carnival Corp. , 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 2012 WL 760875, at *l, 4 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (ruling allegations by cruise ship passenger that seven crew members grabbed, kicked, punched, threw her to the floor multiple times, and handcuffed her "in a harmful manner" after the passenger's "disagreement" with a bartender onboard amounted to claims for assault and battery but were insufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Count III alleges vicarious liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants, however, it fails with the underlying claim and is dismissed as well. See Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish , 464 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1985) (citing Williams v. Hines , 80 Fla. 690, 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) ) ("It is generally recognized that, when a principal's liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held liable if the agent is exonerated."). Accordingly, Count III for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all Defendants is dismissed.
B. NBI's MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (DE [15])
In its Motion to Compel Arbitration (DE [15]), NBI argues for this Court to compel Plaintiffs to bring their claims in arbitration pursuant to the Charter Agreement and stay this action and all court proceedings and deadlines as applicable to NBI while the Plaintiffs and NBI proceed in arbitration. Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing neither Plaintiff ever entered any agreement to arbitrate their claims. Since the filing of the instant motion (DE [15]), however, NBI reveals the Charterer has formally initiated arbitration against NBI in the state of New York for the exact same tort claims brought in this case. See (Ex. A. (DE [15]) at 14–48). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ assertion that their claims do not arise out of or in connection with the Charter Agreement are contrary, at best, and misleading, at worst. Nonetheless, as this Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failing to state a claim, this Court need not reach the merits of this motion and will deny it without prejudice. See supra A.
C. DREAM HOLDINGS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DE [26])
As discussed supra , this Court does have subject matter jurisdiction, however, in its Motion to Dismiss (DE [26]), Dream Holdings argues the Complaint (DE [1]) must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Defendant argues Plaintiffs fail to specifically identify the acts of each Defendant which give rise to the causes of action. As discussed supra , this Court agrees, however, because it has dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint (DE [1]), this Court will not reach Defendant Dream Holdings’ argument on lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion (DE [26]) is granted in part as to dismissal for failure to state a claim and denied in part as moot as to lack of personal jurisdiction.
D. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION (DE [37])
On November 12, 2021, Plaintiffs served its First Set of Requests for the Production of Documents and First Set of Interrogatories to Dream Holdings. On December 3, 2021, Dream Holdings responded to these discovery requests, however, Plaintiffs take issue with several responses provided to the Requests for Production of documents and have filed a Motion to Compel Production and Memorandum of Law (DE [37]). Plaintiffs seek to compel disclosure of the name of the beneficial owner of the yacht and shareholder of Dream Holdings, which was redacted from the document produced. In its Order (DE [33]), however, this Court did not permit discovery related to Dream Holdings’ beneficial owner or its cruise history.
A plaintiff "must provide the Court with some showing establishing the need for jurisdictional discovery." Vision Media TV Group, LLC v. Forte , 724 F. Supp 2d 1260, 1267 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co. , 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999) ). It should not be used as a vehicle for a " ‘fishing expedition’ in hopes that discovery will sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc. , 377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2005) ; see also Atlantis Hydroponics, Inc. v. Int'l Growers Supply, Inc. , 915 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2013). Jurisdictional discovery was solely limited to "Dream Holdings relationship with Defendants Ahluwalia and Dynamic only." In this subsequent motion to compel (DE [37]), Plaintiffs have exceeded the scope of jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, the motion is denied.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Dynamic Yacht Management, LLC and Gurmeet Ahluwalia's Motion to Dismiss (DE [6]) is GRANTED .
2. Defendant Nigel Burgess Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay All Court Proceedings and Accompanying Memorandum of Law (DE [15]) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE .
3. Defendant Dream Holdings Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Memorandum of Law (DE [26]) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART .
4. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production and Memorandum of Law (DE [37]) is DENIED .
5. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT any pending motions.
6. Furthermore, all deadlines are TERMINATED , and all hearings are CANCELLED .
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 25th day of February 2022.