Thus, a reviewing court may also consider such issues as whether the Commission applied improper principles of law in reaching its decision and whether the Commission's findings support its decision. See, e.g., Andersen v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968); Mountain States Tel. Tel. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo.App. 1981). These inquiries are not forestalled simply because substantial evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings. Andersen v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221; § 8-74-107(6).
The Act is to be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes. Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973); Anderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281, 284, 447 P.2d 221, 223 (1968). We also emphasize that the unemployment law is intended to provide a speedy determination of eligibility through a simplified administrative procedure.
The employer argues, however, that there was insufficient medical evidence to establish Mr. Lewis's medical condition. It appears that in the absence of some specific provision in an unemployment compensation statute, most courts do not require that there be medical testimony to support a claimant's health problems as long as there is credible testimony as to their severity. See Vulcan Material Co. v. Holst, supra; State Dep't of Indus. Rel. v. Clark, 369 So.2d 561 (Ala.Civ.App.), writ denied, 369 So.2d 562 (1979); Woods v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 613, 599 S.W.2d 435 (1980); Rabago v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 84 Cal.App.3d 200, 148 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1978); Andersen v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968); City of Indianapolis v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 441 N.E.2d 36 (Ind.App. 1982); Jantzen of Louisiana, Inc. v. Blache, 486 So.2d 1176 (La.App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 So.2d 279 (1986); Milliken Co. v. Griffin, 65 N.C. App. 492, 309 S.E.2d 733 (1983), rev. denied, 311 N.C. 402, 319 S.E.2d 272 (1986); Charbonneau v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 78, 705 P.2d 230 (1985); Goettler Dist., Inc. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd., 96 Pa. Commw. 632, 508 A.2d 630 (1986); Box Elder County v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 632 P.2d 839 (Utah 1981). We recognize that after this case arose, the legislature amended W. Va. Code, 21A-6-3, to require that a person who leaves for health reasons must present "certification from a licensed physician that his work aggravated, worsened, or will worsen the individual's health problem.
1987). The CESA establishes a mechanism by which funds are accumulated to provide compensation for a limited time to those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. § 8-73-108(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1986); Salida School District R-32-J v. Morrison, slip op. at 7; Industrial Commission v. Moffat County School District RE#1, slip op. at 9-10 (Colo. No. 86SC84, February 17, 1987) (to be reported at 732 P.2d 616); Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968). A claimant who receives unemployment compensation is entitled to a statutorily prescribed unemployment benefit that is less than his salary and lasts for a limited time. §§ 8-73-102 and 8-73-104, 3B C.R.S. (1986); Salida School District R-32-J, slip op. at 7.
CESA establishes a mechanism by which funds are accumulated to provide compensation for a limited time to those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. § 8-73-108(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1986); Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1974). A dismissed employee is not entitled to reinstatement or back pay in the event his termination was unlawful, and a worker who receives unemployment compensation is entitled to only a statutorily prescribed unemployment benefit which is less than his salary and which lasts for a limited time.
§ 8-73-108(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). See also Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968). Under section 8-73-108(5)(e), 3B C.R.S. (1986), the Division must deny benefits to an employee whose discharge was due to one or more of several enumerated causes, including deliberate disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer, violation of a company rule that could result in serious damage to the employer's interests, off-the-job use of non-medically prescribed intoxicating beverages to a degree that interferes with job performance, on-the-job use of non-medically prescribed intoxicating beverages, willful neglect of an employer's property or interests, careless or shoddy work, and failure to meet established job performance standards.
Lidke v. Indus. Comm., 159 Colo. 580, 413 P.2d 200; Jones v. Board, 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560. Conceding that the Colorado Employment Security Act is to be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes ( Andersen v. Indust. Comm., 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221), it is not the function of liberal construction to twist facts in order to reach a favorable result for an employee. Montano v. Indust. Comm., 171 Colo. 92, 464 P.2d 518.
We decline to adopt a statutory interpretation urged by the State which would engraft new requirements on entitlement for extended benefits which were not required for original benefits in the absence of clear legislative intent in view of the announced purposes of these statutes. See Anderson v. Indus. Comm'n, 447 P.2d 221, 223 (Colo. 1968); Pickman v. Weltmer, 191 Kan. 543, 382 P.2d 298, 304 (1963); Parsons v. Employment Security Comm'n, 71 N.M. 405, 379 P.2d 57, 60 (1963); Johnson v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 7 Utah 2d 113, 320 P.2d 315, 318 (1958). We also note the liberal extension policy announced in federal extended unemployed benefits which must be administered by the Alaska Employment Security Division. "Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970," Pub.L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695 (1970).
Applying this legislative declaration to the specific findings of fact by the referee, we conclude that there is no basis for reversing the No Award entered by the Commission and affirmed by the trial court. [3,4] conceding that the Unemployment Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes, Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221, it is not the function of "liberal" construction to twist the facts in order to reach a result favorable to an employee. It is most difficult to conceive of any construction which would result in the conclusion that the plaintiff had "informed his employer of the condition of this health * * *prior to quitting his employment," or that he had "notified the employer at the earliest practicable time after such occurrence."
The clear inference to be drawn from this language is that an employee must inform his employer at or prior to leaving that he is quitting because of the condition of his health. See Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968). Here, PERA knew of claimant's problems with his eyes (and that other employees were having similar problems).