Opinion
GIN042025
12-8-2006
SCOTT ANDERSEN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. MIKE HIRSCH et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Mike Hirsch appeals an award of attorney fees in favor of Scott and JoAnne Andersen. Hirsch contends the award of $30,282.40 in attorney fees was unreasonable because the Andersens counsel failed to produce a well-documented application for fees, the bills improperly charged for a summary judgment motion that was never filed and for hours worked after the parties settled, and the fees exceeded the amount of recovery and the amount he paid to his counsel. We find these contentions unavailing or waived and therefore affirm the trial courts award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Andersens entered into a home improvement contract with Hirsch, to install landscaping and construct a retaining wall, which required Hirsch to obtain and pay for all required building permits. The contract contained a broad reciprocal attorney fees provision permitting the prevailing party to recover attorney fees incurred during litigation arising out of the contract or performance of the contract. The Andersens sued Hirsch for contract and tort claims when he failed to obtain the required permits and improperly constructed the wall.
The Andersens tendered an offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Hirsch accepted, agreeing to have judgment entered against him and to pay the Andersens $ 18,500. The settlement was silent as to costs and attorney fees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Andersens and the Andersens filed a motion to recover their costs and attorney fees. The trial court concluded that the Andersens prevailed on the contract, but continued the matter on the issue of whether the requested fee amount was reasonable and requested that the Andersens present unredacted billing statements. After the Andersens submitted unredacted billing statements, the trial court awarded them $30,282.40 as reasonable attorney fees. The trial court also denied Hirschs request to apportion the attorney fees between the contract and tort claims because the attorney fee provision of the contract was broadly drafted so as to allow an award for both contract and tort claims.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The "experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong." (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49, quoting Harrison v. Bloomfield Building Industries Inc. (6th Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 1192, 1196.) Generally, an award of reasonable attorney fees is based on the product of the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel and the prevailing market rate of comparable legal services (this calculation is commonly referred to as the lodestar method). (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48.) Determining "[t]he value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. [Citations.]" (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096, quoting Melnyke v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)
In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the amount awarded by the trial court will not be set aside absent an affirmative showing of abuse of discretion in that the award is "manifestly excessive in the circumstances." (Childrens Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 782.) An award of attorney fees will be reversed "only if that amount is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination." (Acree v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 385, 404, fn. omitted, quoting Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.)
B. Analysis
1. Adequacy of Documentation
Hirsch contends that the attorney fees awarded to the Andersens were unreasonable because their fee request was improperly documented when presented to the trial court. To aid the trial court in determining an award of reasonable attorney fees, an attorney should present evidence documenting the services actually performed. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 558.) Documentary evidence should include such "crucial information as the number of hours worked, billing rates, types of issues dealt with and appearances made on the clients behalf . . . ." (Id. at p. 559.) However, "[t]estimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records." (Id. at p. 559.) "In many cases the trial court will be aware of the nature and extent of the attorneys services from its observation of the trial proceedings and the pretrial and discovery proceedings reflected in the file." (Ibid., quoting In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 301.)
Here, both declarations by the Andersens counsel and the unredacted billing statements submitted to the trial court detailed the hours spent by counsel and the services provided. Although the Andersens initial application for attorney fees was accompanied by redacted billing statements, this apparent deficiency was corrected when they subsequently submitted unredacted billing statements, including descriptions of services rendered, at the trial courts request. Both the declarations and unredacted billing statements provided the trial court with sufficient evidence upon which to base the award.
2. Alleged Improper Charges
Hirsch also contends that the request for attorney fees improperly included charges for preparing a motion for summary judgment that was never filed and for fees incurred after Hirsch accepted the settlement offer, work he argues was unnecessary to conclude the case, because such fees are not chargeable to a client. However, "[c]ompensation should not be strictly limited to efforts that were demonstrably productive." (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 839.) The appropriate number of hours to include in a fee award, as is traditional when an attorney being compensated by a fee-paying client, is all time "reasonably expended" in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1310.)
The hours worked on the motion for summary judgment are compensable because they were reasonably incurred and could have been billed to a fee paying client. Indeed, the trial court could reasonably have inferred that the Andersens service of the motion was the catalyst that prompted Hirsch to accept the settlement offer. In addition, the hours billed after Hirsch accepted the settlement offer were the result of arguments over the form the of the proposed judgment. The time spent resolving this dispute is compensable because it was reasonably incurred and is the type of work that would be billed to a fee-paying client.
3. Alleged Excessive Recovery
Hirsch also contends that the attorney fee award of $30,282.40 is unreasonable because it is "more than 100 [percent] of actual damages" of $18,500. This contention is unavailing. Attorney fee awards are generally not limited by the amount of damages recovered. "Under the lodestar method, a party who qualifies for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent unless special circumstances would render an award unjust." (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 [affirming a $470,000 fee award when damages recovered were only $37,500].) We can find no special circumstances rendering the trial courts award of attorney fees unjust. The award was based on well documented billing statements detailing the time that the Andersens counsel spent on the case and the services he rendered.
Hirschs final contention on appeal is that this court "must consider why [Hirschs] attorney fees were half the uncontested portion of the [Andersens] fees, when both parties worked on the same case, and both parties can be presumed to have generated essentially the same quantity and quality of legal services." Hirsch points to no authority supporting his insistence that we take this factor into consideration. "[U]nless a partys brief contains a legal argument with citation of authorities on the point made, the court may treat it as waived and pass on it without consideration." Accordingly, we deem Hirschs contention waived. (Trinkle v. California State Lottery (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
We conclude that the trial courts award of attorney fees to the Andersens in the amount of $30,282.40 was reasonable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.