The three factors which establish contract formation as set forth in Duldulao also apply where disclaiming language is at issue. Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 1095, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122. Prior decisions of this court have held the presence of disclaimers in an employee handbook preclude the formation of a contract.

Illinois courts have repeatedly recognized that a personnel manual is not reasonably interpreted as an offer of employment when the manual contains language that disclaims the creation of a contract of employment. See Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corp. (1991), 207 Ill. App.3d 1030; Habighurst v. Edlong Corp. (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 426; Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 559 N.E.2d 1119; Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co. (1990), 193 Ill. App.3d 1009, 550 N.E.2d 674; Hogge v. Champion Laboratories, Inc. (1989), 190 Ill. App.3d 620, 546 N.E.2d 1025; Bennett v. Evanston Hospital (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 1030, 540 N.E.2d 979; Moore v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1987), 155 Ill. App.3d 781, 508 N.E.2d 519; see also Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill.2d 54, 102-03. In the case at bar, the personnel policy manual specifically stated, "This is an information book, it is not intended to be a contract between employees and the Village."

The three-pronged test for contract formation set forth in Duldulao is equally applicable where disclaiming language is at issue. Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 1095, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122. • 5 The weight of authority in this State has held the existence of disclaiming language in an employee handbook to preclude the formation of a contract.

Duldulao, 115 Ill.2d at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319. After Duldulao, this court decided Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 559 N.E.2d 1119, and Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co. (1990), 193 Ill. App.3d 1009, 550 N.E.2d 674. In Anders we upheld a summary judgment determining that an employee handbook did not bind an employer to following a particular procedure before discharging an otherwise at-will employee.

Under Illinois law, this unambiguous disclaimer is sufficient to show that the Manual does not create a legal right. See Davis, 231 Ill.Dec. 826, 697 N.E.2d at 388; Habighurst v. Edlong Corp., 209 Ill.App.3d 426, 154 Ill.Dec. 226, 568 N.E.2d 226, 227 (1991); Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co., 201 Ill.App.3d 1088, 147 Ill.Dec. 779, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (1990); see also Garcia v. Kankakee County Housing Authority, 279 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir.2002). Moreover, the disclaimer was not buried or otherwise hidden: it was the first substantive text in the Manual and it was set forth in same typeface as the rest of the Manual.

But so far at least, the Sigels have not presented any evidence of such behavior on the part of the Cookie Company. The term "commercial reasonableness" has cropped up in a few Illinois cases in connection with unconscionability. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Krasny Supply Co., 227 Ill.App.3d 414, 420, 169 Ill.Dec. 521, 525, 592 N.E.2d 8 (1991); Anders v. Mobil Chemical Co., 201 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1097, 147 Ill.Dec. 779, 784, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1124 (1990); Frank's Maintenance Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill.App.3d 980, 989-90, 42 Ill.Dec. 25, 32, 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (1980). But they give the term a restricted meaning.

Under Illinois law, this unambiguous disclaimer is sufficient to show that the Handbook does not create a legal right. Davis v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 297 Ill.App.3d 488, 498 (1998); Semerau v. Vill. of Schiller Park, 210 Ill.App.3d 493, 496 (1991); Habighurst v. Edlong Corp., 209 Ill.App.3d 426, 429 (1991); Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 201 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1094-95 (1990); see also Moss, 473 F.3d at 701.

Gill-Richards' allegations that the employee handbook provided by the Office constituted an offer to contract is plainly insufficient. Employee handbooks or policy statements that contain explicit disclaimers stating that the document does not create a contract and may be unilaterally changed are not offers to enter or modify an enforceable contract. Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 201 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1095, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122-23 (4th Dist. 1990) (collecting cases); see also Bradley v. Wolf Retail Sols. I, Inc., 443 F.Supp.3d 959, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“It is axiomatic that a document stating that it is not a contract and that it creates no contractual obligations of any kind

age inapplicable where language was not distinguished in any manner from rest of text); Hicks v. Methodist Medical Ctr., 229 Ill. App.3d 610, 170 Ill.Dec. 577, 593 N.E.2d 119, 121 (3d Dist. 1992) (disclaimer ineffective because it was not "highlighted, printed in capital letters, or in any way prominently displayed."); Long v. Tazewell/Pekin Consol. Comm. Ctr., 215 Ill. App.3d 134, 158 Ill.Dec. 798, 574 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-94 (3d Dist. 1991) (refusing to enforce disclaimer which "was not distinctly set out separate and apart."); Perman v. ArcVentures, Inc., 196 Ill. App.3d 758, 143 Ill.Dec. 910, 554 N.E.2d 982, 987 (1st Dist. 1990) (finding contractual obligations despite disclaimer language) with Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corp. 207 Ill. App.3d 1030, 152 Ill.Dec. 891, 566 N.E.2d 768, 772 (5th Dist. 1991) (promises negated where manual stated that employer "`assumes no contractual liability to any employee via the job description or this publication.'"); Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 147 Ill.Dec. 779, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1122-23 (4th Dist. 1990); (no clear promises in light of explicit disclaimer); Bennett v. Evanston Hosp., 184 Ill. App.3d 1030, 133 Ill.Dec. 113, 540 N.E.2d 979, 980 (1st Dist. 1989) (no contract could exist in light of explicit disclaimer in introduction). Regardless, the court need not enter the fray among the courts as it finds that the disclaiming language is clear and unequivocal, and that the disclaimer in question is sufficiently conspicuous.

Moreover, the fact that Utah law presumes employment to be at-will in the absence of contrary agreement is alone enough to support the conclusion that an at-will term is not substantively unconscionable. See Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 201 Ill. App.3d 1088, 147 Ill.Dec. 779, 559 N.E.2d 1119, 1124 (Ill.App.Ct. 1990). Turning to the procedural unconscionability prong, we conclude that no procedural unconscionability was present.