Opinion
05-21-2024
Dr. Natasha Anushri ANANDARAJA, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, Humale Khan, Plaintiff, v. ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AT MOUNT SINAI, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, New York (Michael P. Bowen of counsel), for appellants. Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (Joseph Baumgarten of counsel), for Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Dr. Prabhjot Singhand and Dr. Dennis S. Charney, respondents. Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville (David S. Greenhaus of counsel), for David Berman, respondent.
Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, New York (Michael P. Bowen of counsel), for appellants.
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (Joseph Baumgarten of counsel), for Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, Dr. Prabhjot Singhand and Dr. Dennis S. Charney, respondents.
Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville (David S. Greenhaus of counsel), for David Berman, respondent.
Kern, J.P., Oing, Kapnick, Higgitt, Michael, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Dakota D. Ramseur, J.), entered July 17, 2023, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws (HRLs) pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Southern District of New York on April 26, 2019, asserting claims for sex and age discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the State and City HRLs. The District Court dismissed Dr. Holly Atkinson’s and Dr. Natasha Anushri Anandaraja's claims for sex and age discrimination and hostile work environment under Title IX, Title VII, and the ADEA as untimely, applying Title IX’s three-year statute of limitations and the 300-day EEOC filing requirement under Title VII and the ADEA (Atkinson v. Singh, 2022 WL 137634, at *5–9 [S.D.N.Y. 2022]). The District Court dismissed Mary Caliendo’s federal sex discrimination claims for insufficiency of the allegations (id. at *11–12). The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ State and City HRL claims (id. at *9, *14).
[1, 2] Atkinson and Anandaraja are collaterally estopped from relitigating the timeliness of their State and City HRL claims, which, like Title IX, have three-year limitations periods (see Purcell v. New York Inst. of Tech. – Coll. Of Osteopathic Med., 931 F.3d 59, 63 [2d Cir. 2019]; Santiago–Mendez v. City of New York, 136 A.D.3d 428, 428, 26 N.Y.S.3d 514 [1st Dept. 2016]). "Where a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s state law claims, collateral estoppel can still bar those claims provided that the federal court decided issues identical to those raised by the plaintiff’s state claims" (Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v. Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP, 120 A.D.3d 18, 23, 987 N.Y.S.2d 338 [1st Dept. 2014]).
Although "(federal and City [HRL] discrimination issues are not necessarily identical for collateral estoppel purposes, because the purposes of the City [HRL] go beyond those of counterpart federal civil rights laws" (Russell v. New York Univ., 204 A.D.3d 577, 579, 167 N.Y.S,3d 471 [1st Dept. 2022], affd — N.Y.3d —, — N.Y.S.3d —, — N.E.3d —, 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 02226 [2024]), here, plaintiffs assert the distinction in pleading requirements without articulating how their allegations meet one timeliness standard but not the other. Their HRL claims are based on "virtually identical" allegations, and they do not argue that they lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the timeliness issue in District Court (see Burrowes v. Combs, 25 A.D.3d 370, 372, 808 N.Y.S.2d 50 [1st Dept. 2006]). The new allegations on which they rely do not cure the timeliness issue, as they either occurred in 2015 or are not actionable conduct under the HRLs.
[3] Anandaraja and Atkinson cannot avail themselves of the six-month grace period under CPLR 205(a) precisely because the federal action was not "timely commenced," as required by that provision. The District Court squarely determined that plaintiffs’ claims were not brought within a three-year statutory period, and that determination has preclusive effect. (Jordan v. Bates Adv. Holdings, 292 A.D.2d 205, 738 N.Y.S.2d 348 [1st Dept. 2002]) is distinguishable. In that case, a federal court dismissed the plaintiffs federal discrimination claims because she failed to file sworn charges with the EEOC within the 300-day statutory deadline (Jordan v. Bates Adv. Holdings, Inc., 1999 WL 595669, at *1 [S.D.N.Y. 1999], affd 4 Fed.Appx. 73 [2d Cir. 2001]). The plaintiff subsequently brought State and City HRL claims in Supreme Court (Jordan, 292 A.D.2d at 206, 738 N.Y.S.2d 348). This Court held that the plaintiff’s claims were timely under CPLR 205(a) and not collaterally estopped because plaintiff "commenced her state action well within the requisite six-month period and her claims ... were interposed on a timely basis in the federal action," noting that the federal complaint "expressly included claims and allegations for ... discrimination within the applicable three-year statute of limitations" (id.).
Here, by contrast, the District Court found that these two plaintiffs’ claims were untimely even under Title IX’s three-year statute of limitations, which is identical to the period applicable to their HRL claims. Therefore, "plaintiff[s] failed to establish that the claims … in this action were timely commenced pursuant to CPLR 205(a), which saves only those claims that were timely interposed in the first action" (Moran v. County of Suffolk, 189 A.D.3d 1219, 1221–1222, 138 N.Y.S.3d 92 [2d Dept. 2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
[4] Collateral estoppel also precludes Caliendo from litigating her City HRL sex discrimination claim. Although Title IX and Title VII have different pleading standards than the City HRL, "it would be illogical" to find pleadings satisfactory in a state action that were "rejected by the federal court where the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate … in the federal action, as long as the same conclusion would result if the allegation[s] were viewed under the more liberal City [HRL] standard" (Russell, 204 A.D.3d at 579, 167 N.Y.S.3d 471).
Here, the District Court’s conclusions that there were "no pleaded facts suggesting that Caliendo was subjected to disparate treatment because of her gender," that plaintiffs "do not plead specific facts demonstrating how anyone similarly situated to Caliendo was treated better or differently on account of gender," and that "nothing in the pleadings connects Defendants’ conduct to Caliendo’s gender," are fatal to her discrimination claims even under the City HRL’s more lenient standard (see Llanos v. City of New York, 129 A.D.3d 620, 620, 10 N.Y.S.3d 870 [1st Dept. 2015]; Russell, 204 A.D.3d at 579, 167 N.Y.S.3d 471; see also Simmons–Grant v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 116 A.D.3d 134, 139–141, 981 N.Y.S.2d 89 [1st Dept. 2014]).
The sole new allegation raised in plaintiffs’ briefing on appeal as to the sufficiency of Caliendo’s claim is that Dr. Prabhjot Singh’s hostility toward Caliendo was "in stark contrast to how Singh treated Caliendo’s male predecessor Executive Assistant, Andrew Randall." This single conclusory allegation, without any facts, does not cure the pleading deficiency identified by the District Court sufficiently to avoid collateral estoppel or otherwise state a claim on the merits (see e.g. Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Group, Inc., 211 A.D.3d 432, 433, 180 N.Y.S.3d 92 [1st Dept. 2022]; Adelaide Prods., Inc. v. BKN Intl. AG, 15 A.D.3d 316, 316, 789 N.Y.S.2d 881 [1st Dept. 2005]).
[5] The court correctly dismissed Anandaraja’s City HRL retaliation claim. Although Anandaraja plainly engaged in protected activity by filing the federal complaint in April 2019, her allegations fail to meet one of the other two elements of the claim (see Fletcher v. Dakota, Inc., 99 A.D.3d 43, 51-52, 948 N.Y.S.2d 263 [1st Dept. 2012]). The fact that the seating arrangement was changed to move the legal team farther from her is not "reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity" (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107[7]). Anandaraja otherwise alleges that she was not invited to several meetings. Although being "excluded from meetings" can have a "chilling effect on future discrimination complaints" and therefore constitute a retaliatory action under the City HRL (Bond v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 215 A.D.3d 469, 470, 188 N.Y.S.3d 16 [1st Dept. 2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]), Anandaraja does not explain the causal connection between her exclusion from these meetings and her filing of the federal action. There are no allegations that anyone with retaliatory intent, or anyone who reported to someone with retaliatory intent, had control over the meeting invitations or interfered with them in any way (cf. Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 476, 922 N.Y.S.2d 244, 947 N.E.2d 135 [2011]).
We have considered plaintiffs’ other arguments and find them unavailing.