Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
PROCEEDINGS for extraordinary relief after reference to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Michael J. Imhoff, Commissioner. San Diego County Super. Ct. No. NJ013775
McCONNELL, P. J.
Amy L. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services regarding her daughter, A.R. She contends the court erred by not returning A.R. to her custody because substantial evidence did not support the finding that A.R. would be at substantial risk in her care. She also asserts there was not substantial evidence to support terminating her services because (1) she complied with her case plan, (2) the court erred by not ordering services continued to the 18-month review date, (3) it abused its discretion by not ordering unsupervised visits, and (4) it erred by limiting her educational rights. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2008, the juvenile court declared eight-month-old A.R. a dependent child of the court on the basis of a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), alleging she had subdural hemorrhages likely caused by inflicted trauma. A.R.'s father, Robert R., admitted he had picked up A.R. too hard and rocked her out of frustration. Amy said Robert had trouble managing his anger, and she planned to divorce him. The court removed custody from Robert, ordered reunification services and placed A.R. with Amy.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In August 2008 the court continued the placement, authorized supervised visits for Robert and terminated jurisdiction. On Robert's appeal, this court reversed the orders and remanded for a new jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, holding the juvenile court had erred by denying Robert's request for a stay. (In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 736.) At a new hearing in May 2009, the juvenile court again sustained the petition. It granted Amy sole physical custody and ordered supervised visits for Robert.
Meanwhile Amy's divorce from Robert had become final in January 2009, and in March she married William L.
In August 2009 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Amy had left almost two-year-old A.R. in William's care, and William left A.R. alone in a bathtub in scalding water. William said he stood A.R. in the tub to clean her off because she had soiled herself, and he began running the water and went downstairs to get a drink. When he came back upstairs, he heard A.R. screaming and saw the water was up to her ankles. She suffered third degree burns on both feet.
A.R. spent several weeks in a hospital burn unit and needed multiple surgeries and skin grafts. The examining doctors said A.R.'s injuries were nonaccidental. The first doctor to treat her said, "This was no accident. It appears that the child was held down." At the August 2009 detention hearing, the court ordered A.R. detained, ordered supervised visits for Amy and no contact between A.R. and William. In January 2010 the court found the allegations true, ordered A.R. placed in foster care and ordered reunification services.
Amy began services, including therapy and a 52-week parenting class for parents of abused children. The psychologist who evaluated her diagnosed her with dependent personality disorder traits. He said she could be overly accommodating to those she was dependent upon and she was defensive, immature and lacked insight. Amy told her therapist she believed Robert had intentionally injured A.R., but William's actions were not intentional. Amy said in the future she would be the only one to care for A.R.. She had not seen any warning signs from William before the bathtub incident and could not believe he would intentionally injure A.R..
By September 2010 Amy had attended all 52 of her parenting classes, but the class facilitator said Amy spent much of her time complaining about the juvenile dependency system and did not appear to understand the magnitude of what had happened to A.R. or have an adequate safety plan for how to protect her in the future. Amy wrote she had not learned anything new from the class. She said A.R. had been injured by others, not her, and she wished she could change what had happened, but dwelling on the past would not help A.R.. At the six-month review hearing, the court continued services.
Amy and William's child, Wyatt L., was born in September 2010. The court ordered him detained with Amy on the condition William not live in the home. William's mother moved in to help care for Wyatt and the court gave the Agency discretion to allow her to supervise Amy's visits with A.R..
We grant Amy's first motion take to judicial notice of the section 300, subdivision (j), petition and minute orders regarding Wyatt's juvenile dependency case. We deny her second motion for judicial notice of matters that occurred after the hearing which is the subject of this appeal. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 412-413.)
At the 12-month review hearing the social worker testified it would be detrimental to return A.R. to Amy's custody. She said Amy had been visiting A.R. four times each week and attending her medical, speech and therapy appointments, but she did not understand how to protect A.R. and still could not identify the warning signs of potential abuse.
Amy's therapist said Amy did not believe William had intentionally caused A.R.'s injuries and she had not developed an adequate plan to ensure A.R.'s safety. The therapist testified that since her last report Amy had made additional progress in expressing emotion and anger toward William for A.R.'s injuries, but she still did not see there had been any warning signs that he would hurt A.R.. She said Amy could not identify her role in A.R.'s abuse and did not take responsibility for her injuries. The therapist said Amy was in an enmeshed relationship with William's mother and Amy needed to be needed, causing her to choose partners who require someone to care for them.
Amy testified she could identify warning signs of potential abuse and signs a child has been abused. She acknowledged she missed signs in Robert's behavior, but said she had seen no warning signs from William. She insisted he did not intend to cause A.R.'s burns and she did not know what he was thinking because she was not there. She said in case of trouble she would take her children to William's parents' home. She wanted to stay married to William and to have her family back together.
William's mother testified that when Amy and A.R.'s visits ended, A.R. cried and wanted to go with Amy. A.R.'s foster mother said A.R. had never appeared to be afraid of William.
After considering the evidence and argument by counsel, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Amy petitions for review of the court's orders. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) This court issued an order to show cause, the Agency responded and the parties waived oral argument.
DISCUSSION
I
Amy contends substantial evidence does not support the finding A.R. would be at substantial risk in her custody.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) "[W]e must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '... view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' [Citation.]" (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Section 366.22, subdivision (a) provides in part:
"The court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent... unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent... would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child."
Amy has not shown a lack of substantial evidence to support the court's finding that returning A.R. to her care would cause a substantial risk of detriment. In the face of the medical evidence, opinions by the doctors and the court's true finding, she continued to deny that William had intentionally hurt A.R., but said her injuries were accidentally inflicted and he was merely negligent. Because she had never confronted William about the incident and she could not understand he had intentionally hurt A.R., she could not formulate an adequate safety plan to ensure she could protect her in the future.
According to Amy's therapist, the parenting class instructor and the social worker, Amy did not make substantive progress with the protective issues. Amy had not safeguarded A.R. from severe abuse first by Robert and then by William and she continued not to accept responsibility for A.R. being injured. Amy's therapist said Amy could not identify her role in A.R.'s injuries. Amy wrote she had not learned anything new from the 52-week class for parents of abused children and complained that she had been required to take it. After many months of services designed to help her learn to be a safe, protective parent, she continued not to see that William had intentionally burned A.R., or be able to identify that there were signs before the incident that he would abuse her, and she continued to maintain a relationship with him.
Amy argues she should not be criticized for making William's parents part of her safety plan or relying on her mother-in-law for emotional support since her mother-in-law had been approved to supervise visits and to live with her to ensure Wyatt's safety. One of the problems that Amy needed to resolve, however, was the dependent personality characteristics that were identified in her psychological evaluation and could lead her to be overly accommodating to those on whom she was dependent. Amy's enmeshed relationship with her mother-in- law and her reliance on William and his family for emotional and financial support show she had not resolved her tendency to be dependent on others.
Because Amy had not confronted William about the incident and did not understand her role in failing to protect A.R., she did not show she would be able to protect her in the future. Substantial evidence supports the finding A.R. would be at substantial risk of detriment in Amy's custody.
II
Amy contends substantial evidence does not support the order terminating her services because she complied with her case plan and had a protective plan to prevent future abuse.
Although Amy complied with her services plan, she did not show she could be a protective parent for A.R.. Technical compliance with the components of a reunification plan is insufficient by itself to find that a child may be safe in a parent's care. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 704; In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.) Amy attended 52 sessions of her parenting class, but she said she had not learned new skills in the class, and her treatment providers stated she had not fully addressed the protective issues. She had not completed an adequate safety plan or overcome her tendency to be dependent on others. She intended to remain in a relationship with William, but had not been able to identify that there had been any warning signs he would abuse A.R., and she had never confronted him about the incident. Amy has not shown error in the court's terminating her services.
III
Amy asserts the court erred by not continuing her services to the 18-month date. She argues she was not provided reasonable services, and, even if the services were reasonable, the court should have continued them because there was a substantial probability A.R. could be returned to her care within 18 months.
As for Amy's argument she was not provided with reasonable services, she has forfeited this issue by not challenging the reasonableness of her services at the six- or twelve-month hearings. "A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) A "reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] [¶]... [¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted.) We reject Amy's argument that she should be excused from forfeiture because she did not know her safety plan was inadequate until her services were terminated at the 12-month review hearing. Amy's therapist kept her informed with treatment updates of her work, including the work she had to do to complete an adequate safety plan. In any event, Amy was provided with extensive services designed to assist her in remedying the protective issues that led to A.R.'s removal. She has not shown services were inadequate.
Amy has not shown error by the court not continuing services to the 18-month date. Under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1), a court may continue a case to the 18-month date only if there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to the parent's physical custody and safely maintained in the home by that time. In considering whether to extend the case for 18 months the court must find the parent consistently and regularly contacted and visited the child, made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the child's removal, and showed the ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan and provide for the child's protection and well being.
Substantial evidence supports the court's decision not to extend services to the 18-month date. Amy consistently visited A.R. and participated in court-ordered services for 16 months, but she did not make substantive progress in addressing the problems that led to A.R.'s removal and made no showing she would be able to complete the objectives of the plan and provide a safe home for A.R. in the two months remaining before the 18-month date. Amy has not shown error by the court not continuing services.
IV
Amy maintains the court abused its discretion by not authorizing her to have unmonitored visits and by limiting her educational rights. She, however, did not challenge her visitation orders in the juvenile court and she did not appeal the visitation orders made at earlier hearings. Also, she did not raise the issue of her educational rights at the 12-month review hearing. She has thus forfeited these issues.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. The request for stay is denied.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., AARON, J.