Opinion
2:22-cv-00361-GMN-ECF
04-18-2022
YOLANDA AMUNUTIGUI, et al., Plaintiff, v. THE COTTLE FIRM, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
GLORI M. NAVARRO, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Yolanda Amunutigui, et al., (“Plaintiffs'”) Objection, (ECF No. 5), to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 4), recommending that the Court remand this case.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Objection and ADOPTS in full the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
When reviewing the order of a Magistrate Judge, the order should only be set aside if the order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); LR IB 3-1(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 602 F.Supp. 214, 216 (D. Nev. 1985). A Magistrate Judge's order is “clearly erroneous” if the court has “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Burdick v. Comm'r IRS, 979 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” UnitedHealth Grp., Inc. v. United Healthcare, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00224-RCJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129489, 2014 WL 4635882, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2014). When reviewing the order, however, the Magistrate Judge “is afforded broad discretion, which will be overruled only if abused.” Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007). The District Judge “may not simply substitute its judgment” for that of the Magistrate Judge. Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1988)).
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to remand the case. As he writes, the state court complaint does not allege a federal claim, and the parties are not completely diverse. (R&R 3:1-4); (see also Compl. ¶¶ 1-5, 53-66, Ex. 2 to Mot./Appl. Leave Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 1-2). In their Objection, Plaintiff Bequero raises the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago, takes issue with the term “disgruntled client” who made “threats” against the law firm, and describes a Ponzi/Pyramid scheme involving doctors and lawyers. (See Obj. 2:1-3:5, ECF No. 5). However, this does not demonstrate that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in its recommendation, nor does it cure the deficiencies set forth by the R&R. Thus, the Court adopts the R&R and remands the case to state court.
Plaintiff Bequero also requests that the Magistrate Judge be recused for bias. (See Obj. 1:19-23). However, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Cam Ferenbach was merely summarizing the claims made in the state court complaint; he was not asserting a personal opinion about those claims. (See R&R 2:21-24) (“The Cottle Firm parties allege in the complaint that Amunutigui is a former disgruntled client and Bequero is her adult son: the Cottle Firm parties bring claims against them for trespassing and for a restraining order due to threats Amunutigui and Bequero have made against the firm and staff at the firm. ECF No. 1-2 at 2-10.” (See generally Compl., Ex. 2 to Mot./Appl. Leave Proceed in forma pauperis). Therefore, the Request for Recusal is denied.
I. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Objection, (ECF No. 5), is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 4), is ADOPTED in full
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be REMANDED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is instructed to close the case.